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Introduction: A unique 
strategic position
We are of European Race. Our fathers came from Europe: we 
have grown up to think as Europeans, and our interests have been 
centred in that group of nations from which our stock has come. 
Whilst racially we are European, geographically we are Asiatic. 
Our own special immediate Australian interests are more nearly 
concerned with what is happening in China and Japan than what 
is happening in … Belgium, Holland, Poland, or other countries 
farther removed.1
— Nationalist Party Senator George Pearce
Australia finds itself in a unique strategic position. Founded as a white 
settler outpost, the nation’s identity, trade and security all flowed from the 
imperial connection well into the middle of the twentieth century. This 
connection accordingly shaped most of the frameworks through which 
Australia interacted with the rest of the world. This early experience of 
dependence naturalised a policy tradition of strategic alliance with the 
Anglosphere, depending on relationships with ‘great and powerful friends’ 
for the protection of the national interest.
Alongside this cultural heritage and the strategic relationships produced 
as a result is Australia’s geography. Australia is in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
region with an area of immediate strategic interest spanning the Pacific 
and Indian oceans and from the Pacific Islands up through South-East 
Asia. The divide between cultural heritage and geographic reality has 
contributed to a sense of isolation, from both the region and the rest 
of the Anglophone world. Frederic Eggleston, a public intellectual and 
future minister to China and the United States, captured this sense of 
1  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates: Senate [hereinafter CPD: Senate], 27 July 1922, No. 30 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1922), 822. 
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isolation when he observed that Australia is ‘a small nation in an alien 
sea’.2 This isolation, in tandem with Australia’s immense and virtually 
defenceless coastline and fixation on maintaining racial and cultural 
whiteness—as embodied in the longstanding White Australia Policy—
has, in the words of historian John Fitzpatrick, given way to a ‘threat ethos’ 
in settler Australia: a longstanding suspicion of its northern neighbours, 
which underscores the importance of powerful Anglophonic protectors.3 
Alongside these anxieties, the Asia-Pacific region offers significant trade 
opportunities. Managing economic opportunities and fears of a potential 
threat from the north has been a longstanding feature of Australia’s 
foreign, trade and defence policies.4
At the time of writing, the Asia-Pacific region is experiencing a period 
of disruption and transition as China’s economic and military growth 
challenges US predominance in the region. The China–US contest has 
been likened to Thucydides’s Trap (‘it was the rise of Athens and the fear 
that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable’): as each nation flexes 
its proverbial soft and hard power muscles in a bid to exercise influence in 
the region, the other party becomes increasingly defensive and conflict is 
more likely.5 This contest has played out across many stages—most notably, 
the China–US trade war that erupted in March 2018 and the ongoing 
military brinksmanship in the South China Sea. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has accelerated this strategic trend within the region. Australia, too, has 
increasingly done away with diplomatic niceties during the pandemic. In an 
address launching the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and an additional 
A$270 billion in defence spending in the coming decade, Prime Minister 
Scott Morrison openly acknowledged the ‘fractious at best’ US–China 
relations. He went on to predict a post-COVID-19 world ‘that is poorer, 
that is more dangerous, and that is more disorderly’.6
2  Frederic William Eggleston, Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire 
for Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1957), 1.
3  John Fitzpatrick, ‘European Settler Colonialism and National Security Ideologies in Australian 
History’, in Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy, eds Richard Leaver and 
David Cox (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), 116.
4  For comprehensive studies of Australia’s strategic and economic perception of Asia, see Sandra 
Tweedie, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia, 1790–1993 (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1994); David 
Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850–1939 (Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1999).
5  Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, cited in Graham Allison, Destined for War: 
Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), vii.
6  Scott Morrison, ‘Address: Launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update’, Speech, Royal Military 




With China and the US representing Australia’s greatest trading partner 
and greatest security partner, respectively, Australia’s position amid the 
unfolding power transition is a tenuous one. According to military and 
intelligence strategist Hugh White, Australia has historically ‘taken for 
granted’ that its security would be protected by a great and powerful friend. 
Australia’s neighbours have accordingly been relatively insignificant in 
terms of strategic planning. The rise of China undermines ‘the geopolitical 
foundations on which Australia’s strategic outlook has been built’. Until 
recently, White’s proposed solution for the ‘new world’ Australia faces 
was a power-sharing arrangement between China and the US in which 
Australia would act as a mediator.7 In this scenario, Australia would not be 
forced to choose between China and the US and could continue to enjoy 
economic and strategic benefits.8 White has since renounced this power-
sharing thesis as unachievable because of the US decline and China’s 
resolve to not share power.9 White’s reversal was vindicated in the latter 
half of 2020, as two Australian journalists fled China fearing detainment 
following police questioning, and China and Australia launched a series of 
punitive trade measures against a raft of each other’s exports.10 
As this book will reveal, the situation Australia now faces is not a novel 
one. Rather, it is grappling with geopolitical issues that go well back into 
the nation’s history. The assertion that Australia has historically taken for 
granted that its powerful allies will provide for its military security effectively 
discounts the nation’s distinctive geographical interests in policymaking. 
The strategic outlooks of Britain and the US, as global powers, have 
predominated, often at the expense of Australia’s immediate regional and 
particular interests. Australia has long considered itself a Principal Power 
in the Asia-Pacific, with certain rights and responsibilities in regional 
7  Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne: Black Inc., 
2013), 12. 
8  White’s thesis has been developed over the past decade and a half in a series of publications. 
These include, Hugh White, ‘The Limits to Optimism: Australia and the Rise of China’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 4 (2005): 469–80; Hugh White, ‘Powershift: Australia’s Future 
Between Washington and Beijing’, Quarterly Essay 39 (2010): 1–74; White, The China Choice.
9  Hugh White, ‘Without America: Australia in the New Asia’, Quarterly Essay 68 (2017): 1–81.
10  Matthew Doran and Stephen Dziedzic, ‘Australian Correspondents Bill Birtles and Mike Smith 
Pulled Out of China After Five-Day Diplomatic Standoff Over National Security Case’, ABC News, 
8  September 2020, available from: www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-08/bill-birtles-mike-smith-
evacuated-china-safety-concerns/12638786; Prianka Srinivasan, ‘China’s Trade War With Australia 
Is Affecting A Growing Number of Industries. How Did We Get Here?’, ABC News, 10 December 
2020, available from: www.abc.net.au/news/2020-12-10/chinas-trade-war-with-australia-export-
industry/ 12967190.
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decision-making. A prominent feature in Australia’s foreign policy 
history has been navigating the strategic priorities of the great powers and 
compelling them to acknowledge the nation’s Principal Power status.
This book assesses the interrelation between Australia’s geography and 
great-power relations and the development of a foreign policy over the 
period 1921–57. This chosen period is a somewhat unusual one. This 
book holds the view that the years 1921–57 mark a period of transition, 
in terms of both the economic and strategic situation in Australia’s 
region and the nation’s relationships with Britain and the US. Moreover, 
the focus on years not usually prioritised in studies of the genesis and 
development of Australia’s foreign policy—the tendency generally being 
to centre on World War II and the years immediately following—uncovers 
a much longer process of theorising and experimentation by Australian 
policymakers and intellectuals.
In 1921, Australia relied on the UK and its imperial machinery 
for diplomatic  representation and economic and material security. 
The  unprecedented changes under way in the Asia-Pacific region 
challenged this relationship. The US was the emerging Pacific hegemon, 
yet isolationism precluded the development of a complete regional 
policy. Japan’s rise threatened to displace British commercial and 
military influence, exacerbating Australia’s longstanding fears about 
aggressive regional expansion with potential designs on the Australian 
continent.11 By 1957, US defensive predominance was unequivocal, the 
Sterling Area was very much in its twilight and Australia was conducting 
its foreign affairs planning in line with the US order. While 1957 was 
not the end of high-level Australian–British relations, with significant 
commercial, military and cultural links present well into the 1960s, it 
marked a departure from the traditional Australian–British relationship 
of patronage and protection and the point at which the centre of gravity 
in Australian foreign policy shifted decisively to the US.12
11  D.C.S. Sissons, ‘Attitudes to Japan and defence, 1890–1923’ (MPhil thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 1956); Neville Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23. 
Volume 1: The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–1914, 2nd edn, and Volume 2: Australia and 
World Crisis, 1914–1923 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009).
12  James Curran and Stuart Ward, The Unknown Nation: Australia After Empire (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2010). 
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INTRODUCTION
The central task of this book is to examine the gradual development 
of an assertive and pragmatic Australian foreign policy. The Australia 
of the interwar years is often seen as lacking instinct and confidence in 
international matters, preferring instead to deal ‘with the world one step 
removed through Whitehall’.13 This approach seemingly remained when 
Australia transferred its dependency to the US following the collapse of the 
British imperial war effort in the Pacific theatre in 1941–42.14 As this book 
demonstrates, this assessment misreads Australia’s approach to foreign 
policy and its interactions with Britain and the US in the years before and 
after 1941–42. There was a pragmatism—rather than uncritical loyalty 
to Britain or toadying to the US—that informed Australia’s Asia-Pacific 
policy in the period covered in this book. Granted, this pragmatism at 
times necessarily took the form of alignment and it was not without its 
weaknesses. Nevertheless, this book highlights a far more engaged and 
assertive policymaking practice—one informed by the lessons gleaned 
from past failures and successes. This is a lens not previously applied in 
the existing literature.
The Australian governments of the interwar years recognised the shifting 
power distributions under way in the global and Asia-Pacific orders. 
The 1920s and, in particular, 1930s reveal the genesis of a distinct 
Australian foreign policy that developed in response to this recognition. 
This policy was tailored to the nation’s particular geography, size and 
strategic capabilities and informed by the acknowledgement that, while 
necessary security partners, neither Britain nor the US completely served 
the national interest. The Australian government identified in this the 
need to intervene in the policies of the great powers to ensure its particular 
interests were incorporated. In the pages that follow, this book investigates 
how this interventionist approach to foreign policy that was conceived in 
the interwar years went on to shape the governments of John Curtin, 
Ben Chifley and Robert Menzies—at least until 1957, the point at which 
there was a shift as Australia accepted that the ‘Fourth Empire’ and the 
13  Christopher Waters, Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the Origins of World 
War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 7.
14  Harry Gelber, The Australian–American Alliance: Costs and Benefits (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 
1968), 25; Eric M. Andrews, A History of Australian Foreign Policy: From Dependence to Independence 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1979), 70–2; T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External 
Relations Since 1788 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), 21–3, 92.
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maintenance of a British world system were unattainable.15 It demonstrates 
a marked continuity in how Australia’s political elite approached foreign 
policy and defined the national interest.
Both Australia’s junior-partner status and the dynamics of Anglo-
American competition and alliance complicated attempts to navigate 
great-power relations. In the period 1921–57, America’s priorities were 
not always acceptable to Britain or Australia. Postwar plans for Japanese 
reconstruction as the Asian bulwark against communism, for instance, were 
seen to undermine the foundation of British economic power (preference 
and protectionism within the Sterling Area), the Commonwealth’s status 
in the Asia-Pacific region and Australia’s economic and physical security.16 
Similarly, as US military predominance was solidified during the 1950s 
and Australia signed the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security 
Treaty (ANZUS) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 
it remained unclear whether the US could be relied on to lead in the 
Asia-Pacific region in a way that was conducive to Australia’s national 
interest. The Menzies government accordingly promoted—albeit with 
little success—US–British cooperation in the leadership and defence 
of the Asia-Pacific region. The focus on the interplay between the great 
powers presented in this book underscores Australia’s gradual and uneven 
transition from the British order to that of the US, as Australian leaders 
made frank assessments about which relationship best served the nation’s 
interests in the Asia-Pacific.
The secondary aim of this book is to examine the idea of an integrated 
policy—that is, one that balanced Australia’s regional realities with 
great-power relationships and, in assessing those relationships, ensured 
Australia’s economic, diplomatic and strategic interests were met. 
The primary focus here is the importance of trade. Among Australian 
historians and political scientists, there was a longstanding tendency to 
view strategy and diplomacy as ‘high politics’ and the true work of foreign 
15  The ‘Fourth Empire’ refers to Britain’s attempt to maintain its great-power status in the years after 
World War II. The British Commonwealth of Nations was central to maintaining the British world 
system, with the British and Australian governments hoping to engage the disparate regions of the 
Commonwealth to develop specialist area knowledge for regional economic, defence and diplomatic 
arrangements. For an overview of the Fourth Empire, see David Lee, Search for Security: The Political 
Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), Chs 1 and 2.
16  The Sterling Area was a group of countries—mostly members of the British Empire—which 
pegged their exchange rates to the pound sterling, conducted trade in sterling and stored their 
currency reserves in London. Ian M. Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area: 1931–
1939 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 3–7, 10.
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INTRODUCTION
policy, while trade and economic policy were considered ‘low politics’ 
and served only, as Coral Bell wrote, to ‘illuminate … diplomatic and 
strategic decisions’.17 In reality, the economic, diplomatic and strategic 
components of foreign policy intersect and shape one another, the 
policies pursued and the relationships formed. In 1987, the departmental 
machinery of government underwent a major restructure and the creation 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) formalised this 
interrelation and a much broader understanding of foreign policy.18
The assessment in 1987 that there was an interconnection between trade, 
strategy and foreign affairs and that this was somehow a new assertion 
overlooks what has long been a feature of the way Australian actors approach 
foreign policymaking. Amid the strategic and economic uncertainty 
of the interwar years, Australian policymakers came to appreciate the 
interrelation between trade, diplomacy and defence. An integrated 
foreign policy emerged in response to this realisation. In the 1930s, this 
was a policy in which trade served to expand Australia’s regional presence 
in a bid to engage with and placate Japan, while simultaneously alleviating 
some of the commercial upheaval of the Great Depression. In the 1940s, 
trade and economic development played a central role in Australia’s plans 
for the new postwar order in its immediate region. Australia hoped to 
facilitate the creation of a ‘self-subsisting’ regional system that would foster 
political and economic stability in South-East Asia and the South Pacific.19 
By the late 1940s and into the 1950s, economics and trade were central 
to Britain’s waning capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, signalling to Australian 
actors the need for an extensive economic and strategic adjustment. 
While parts of this story have certainly been covered elsewhere, the broad 
and comprehensive approach offered in this book is a new one. This book 
is grounded in close study of archival documents, several of which are 
previously unused or underexamined elsewhere. Moreover, to understand 
17  Lee, Search for Security, 1–6; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, 
2nd edn (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1984), 2. For works critiquing the division of trade, 
diplomacy and security, see Stuart Harris, ‘The Separation of Economics and Politics: A Luxury We 
Can No Longer Afford’, in Academic Studies and International Politics: Papers of a Conference Held 
at The Australian National University, June 1981, ed. Coral Bell (Canberra: ANU Department of 
International Relations, 1982), 75–83; Stuart Harris, ‘The Linking of Politics and Economics in 
Foreign Policy’, Australian Outlook 40, no. 1 (1986): 5–10. 
18  Two separate departments, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade, 
became the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1987.
19  ‘Pacific Area Research Reports, April 1943’, Papers of William Douglass Forsyth, National 
Library of Australia [hereinafter NLA], Canberra: MS 5700/7/16/3.
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the interconnection between trade, strategy and diplomacy in foreign 
policy decision-making, attention has been given to discussions within 
and across key departments such as the Department of External Affairs 
(DEA), the Prime Minister’s Department, the Cabinet and War Cabinet, 
the Department of Defence and Department of Trade and Customs 
(later Department of Trade).
In exploring the development of an assertive and integrated policy, this 
book has been split into three parts and follows a broadly chronological 
structure. Part 1 explores the economic and strategic uncertainty of the 
interwar years and the genesis of an Australian foreign policy in response. 
Chapter 1 sets out the strategic setting in the interwar world, adopting 
the view that the 1921–22 Washington Naval Conference was the point 
at which Britain’s relative decline became undeniable and the US began 
to assert regional hegemony. This chapter examines how the conference 
and a series of other developments in British world leadership forced 
on Australian policymakers the need to give more serious attention to 
affairs in the Asia-Pacific. Against the backdrop of the Great Depression 
and the Manchurian Crisis, Chapter 2 explores the opportunity trade 
offered for regional engagement and the building of Australia’s diplomatic 
capabilities. This chapter also considers how, as Australia reorientated 
towards the Asia-Pacific, the nation attempted to similarly shape the 
focus of empire policy. The third chapter examines the much-derided 
1936 Trade Diversion Policy, when Australia launched a trade war against 
Japan, sacrificing the economic and diplomatic relations it had carefully 
constructed. Rather than a ‘disastrous experiment’ by a naive nation, as it 
has been labelled, the Trade Diversion Policy is presented in this chapter 
as a case study in the expectations of alliance—both Britain’s expectation 
of loyalty and Australia’s perception of the economic benefits of the 
imperial connection—and how they differed in application.20 In the 
context of Australia’s nascent foreign policy—predicated on integrating 
the national interest within the imperial outlook—the Trade Diversion 
Policy underscores the increasing inadequacy of the imperial machinery 
to achieve this goal.
Part 2 focuses on Australia’s preparation for regional conflict and its response 
to British and US wartime strategy and postwar plans for the management 
of the Asia-Pacific region. Chapter 4 argues that Australia was acutely aware 
20  Norman Harper, Australia and the United States (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1971), 94.
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of the limitations of imperial defence planning for the Asia-Pacific region 
and developed a policy over the period 1937–41 in response. In the same 
vein as the Allies’ approach to the European aggressors, Australia coupled 
rearmament with appeasement. British actions threatened to derail these 
efforts and, in so doing, reiterated the diverging priorities of the UK and 
Australia. This chapter also touches on Australia’s increasing initiative in 
relations with the US as the nation looked beyond the Empire for security 
assurances in the Pacific. Chapter 5, which examines the years 1942–45, 
explores the approaches taken by the DEA, Department of Defence and 
Prime Minister Curtin to finding a common goal of carving out a distinct 
role for Australia in the postwar Asia-Pacific. It explores the Australian–
US antagonism that developed on Australia’s realisation that its wartime 
ally could not necessarily be relied on to build a postwar order that would 
provide for its interests. The Australian government articulated its status 
as a Principal Power in the region and set out a strategy for how it would 
manage in the region in the postwar period. Central to this strategy was 
a renewed system for Commonwealth cooperation, the regionalisation 
of defence planning and establishing a friendly yet robust counterweight 
to US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. As detailed in Chapter 5, these 
principles were captured in the 1944 Australian–New Zealand Agreement 
(ANZAC Agreement) and Prime Minister Curtin’s renewed framework 
for Commonwealth relations—which he called the Fourth Empire—both 
of which sought to articulate Australia’s predominant role in the Asia-
Pacific region and secure a Commonwealth defence machinery premised 
on cooperation and strategic zones of responsibility.
The final part of this book explores how Australia’s postwar foreign policy 
drew together threads from interwar and wartime policy thinking and 
lessons learnt. This policy was directed towards expanding the nation’s 
economic, diplomatic and defensive capabilities in South-East Asia and 
the South Pacific amid the shift from British world leadership to that 
of the US. Chapter 6 assesses Australia’s return to the Commonwealth 
connection following the war, focusing on the level of reliance and 
cooperation that existed in the Anglo-Australian relationship and the 
regionalism and self-interest behind plans to rebuild the British world 
system. The Commonwealth was to be the basis of a cooperative regional 
security relationship. Central to this relationship was the preservation of 
the Sterling Area (these markets, of course, being essential to Britain’s 
economic wellbeing and preserving its influence in the Asia-Pacific 
region), finding continuity in the Chifley government’s approaches and 
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the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development 
in Asia and the Pacific, which was introduced in the first year of the new 
Menzies government. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a revised assessment of 
the ANZUS Treaty and Australia’s realignment with the US. The Menzies 
government remained uncertain about the US taking on the leading role in 
the Asia-Pacific region and advocated for a Commonwealth–US strategic 
partnership. Ultimately, it was only after Britain’s declining global power 
became apparent to the world in a series of crises and policy realignments 
in 1955–57 that Australia was forced to make frank assessments of the 
great powers, their priorities and capabilities and which relationship best 
served the national interest.
Each chapter in this book foregrounds Australia’s search to define its 
national interest and cultivate a policy tailored to its geography, strategic 
capabilities and relationships with the great powers. In so doing, this book 
identifies a comprehensive and explicitly pragmatic approach in Australia’s 





The interwar setting and 
Australia’s strategic outlook, 
1921–31
Britain and its allies emerged victorious from World War I. In the course 
of this war for empire, Britain’s greatest imperial rivals, Germany and 
wartime ally Russia, had either been defeated or collapsed, seemingly 
securing British power against future challenges. At first glance, this 
appeared unquestionable: the British Empire encompassed the largest 
population, territory and armed forces globally, while its access to natural 
resources was unmatched, positioning it for continued industrial growth. 
In reality, British power was in decline, both relative to the rising powers 
of Japan and the US and absolutely, as the nation struggled with imperial 
overstretch and the immense cost of global war.1
Leading voices in Australian foreign and defence history have argued 
that Australia accepted the international arrangements made following 
the war as an adequate system for maintaining peace and, through either 
arrogance or ignorance, overlooked Britain’s waning capabilities. Neville 
Meaney, for instance, writes of a ‘cold war’ with Japan that came to an end 
with the 1921–22 Washington Naval Conference and the commencement 
of construction of the Singapore Naval Base in 1923—the cornerstone 
of imperial defence planning in the Far East. This attitude ushered in 
an era of relative complacency in Australia’s international outlook that 
1  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: A. Lane, 1976), 267–8; John 
Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 305–8, 324–5, 357–9.
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remained in force until the outbreak of World War II.2 Rather than 
Australia being the parochial nation that had ‘few ideas and policies of 
its own’ and indiscriminately followed British directives, key individuals 
were, in fact, hesitant to accept the postwar systems for maintaining 
peace.3 Granted, Australia was slow to act on these concerns and, when 
it did act, it tended to vocalise its fears rather than form a distinct policy. 
Nevertheless, the nation’s policymakers were carefully considering the 
changing power dynamic in the Pacific and the capacity of Britain and its 
imperial machinery to protect Australia’s distinct interests.
The old power and the rising powers
Britain’s financial and industrial situation following the war was critical 
in the shifting balance of world power. World War I was an immensely 
expensive undertaking for Britain. During the long years of total war, 
Britain came to rely on US markets for food, raw materials and machinery. 
The US required little in return, resulting in an enormous British balance-
of-payments deficit as the government was forced to borrow dollars. 
For the financial year 1918–19, British national debt reached 127 per cent 
of gross domestic product (GDP).4 Although British debt had reached 
this level before, in the postwar world, the difference was that now the 
US was the world’s largest manufacturing economy and largest creditor 
nation.5 The City of London was no longer the economic and financial 
centre of the world.6
Along with the immediate financial cost of war, there was the human cost 
and its economic implications. More than 700,000 British men were killed 
during the war—approximately 9 per cent of the British male population 
2  Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 2, 492–500, 512–14. 
See also David Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939–42 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1–16.
3  Eric M. Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crisis, 
1935–1939 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 25.
4  B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
600–3. This compared with a national debt of 24 per cent of GDP in the 1913–14 financial year.
5  At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain represented 23.6 per cent of the relative share of 
world manufacturing output, compared with the United States’ 18.5 per cent. Only two decades 
earlier, the US was responsible for 22.9 per cent of world manufacturing and Britain 14.7 per cent. 
P. Bairoch, ‘International Industrialisation Levels from 1750–1980’, Journal of European Economic 
History 11 (1982): 269–333, at pp. 296, 304.
6  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 346, 353, 363; Darwin, The Empire Project, 323, 326–8.
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under the age of 45—and many more had been wounded.7 The financial 
cost of the war combined with the loss of so many men of working age 
greatly reduced Britain’s potential productivity. Its share of world trade 
declined accordingly, falling from 14.15 per cent to 10.75  per  cent 
between 1913 and 1929.8 The British industrial machine, ‘the very heart 
of British power’, Correlli Barnett wrote, ‘beat slow and weak’.9
In the face of immense debt and an economy under strain, the British 
government struggled to preserve its economic capacity to manage a two-
power standard naval fleet. Following the 1919 peace settlement in Paris, 
the British government adopted the view that the nation would not 
be engaged in a major conflict for at least the next decade and should 
accordingly economise (the 10-year rule). Defence expenditure was 
informed by the 10-year rule, prompting the widespread cancellation 
of defence construction contracts and the rapid deceleration of defence 
expenditure.10 While it is not unexpected that a nation at peace would 
reduce its defence expenditure, the rate at which Britain did so was 
unprecedented. Within five years of the war’s end, British defence 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP had fallen below prewar levels, and 
it continued to fall until 1936, when Germany’s reoccupation of the 
Rhineland made clear the need for rearmament in earnest.11
In contrast with the British experience, Japan and the US emerged 
from the war as significant rising powers. In addition to financial and 
economic developments, the United States’ participation in the war 
and  peacemaking process was symbolically significant. Having entered 
the war in the late and critical stages, the US was seen by many as the 
Allies’ saviour. For instance, Australian Prime Minister William Morris 
Hughes described America’s entrance into the war as ‘an inspiration’ and 
‘the most dramatic and important event … of the war’.12 While the US 
ultimately did not join the League of Nations—the new organisation 
responsible for maintaining international peace—US President Woodrow 
Wilson’s vision for the postwar world was instrumental in the league’s 
7  Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914–1920 (London: 
His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1922), 237–9. This figure represents those killed in action, those who 
died of their wounds or as prisoners of war and those missing and presumed dead. 
8  Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 269.
9  Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), 269.
10  Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 323–5.
11  In 1914, British defence expenditure was 3.21 per cent of GDP; in 1924, this had fallen to 2.9 per 
cent. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, 590–1.
12  ‘Australia to Have a Monroe Doctrine’, The New York Times, 1 June 1918, 9.
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conception and establishment.13 With Germany defeated and Russia 
having collapsed in the wake of the November 1917 Bolshevik revolution, 
Japan emerged from World War I with the third-largest navy in the world 
and as a dominant power in the waters of the North Pacific. As had 
been the case for the US, the demands of global war had boosted Japan’s 
industrialisation. The nation’s shipbuilding output, for instance, increased 
from 85,000 tonnes to 650,000 tonnes between 1914 and 1919. Japan 
also emerged from the war a major creditor nation, having made loans to 
allies the UK, France and Russia.14
Australia was aware of the growing significance of Japan and the US and 
the importance of securing cordial relations with them; however, recent 
relations with the two nations were complex. Japan had entered the war 
in August 1914 on the consensus that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) 
would escort Allied flotillas in the Indian and Pacific oceans and capture 
German territories in the East and South China seas. The IJN quickly 
extended operations, capturing Germany’s North Pacific territories (the 
Marshall, Mariana and Caroline islands) by the end of 1914. Australia, 
due to its strategic isolation and overtly racialised suspicions, saw in Japan’s 
territorial advances the accumulation of strategic points from which to 
launch a policy of aggressive southward expansion, with possible designs 
on Australia.15
Throughout the war, the nation’s policymakers had been candid about 
their expectation that Australia would be granted direct control of 
New Guinea and the adjacent islands—islands described by Hughes as 
‘natural bastions’ in the defence of advances from the north towards the 
Australian continent.16 Given the US anticipated an Asia-Pacific power 
struggle between itself and Japan, Australia saw in this shared suspicion 
of Japan an opportunity for cooperation and sought support from the 
US in its regional endeavours. In mid-1918, Hughes visited the US 
and, in a series of meetings and speeches, called on the US to cooperate 
with Australia in ensuring postwar security in the Far East. According to 
Hughes, the potential for islands ‘within striking distance’ of Australia 
to be possessed by an unfriendly power ‘means that our country must 
13  For Wilson’s postwar world vision, see Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and 
the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
14  Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 386. 
15  Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 2, 248–55.
16  ‘William Hughes, “Australia and the Pacific Island Memorandum”, 6 February 1919’, Papers of 
John Latham, NLA: MS 1009/19/1342.
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always sleep with the sword half drawn’. If Australia’s security was to be 
guaranteed, the nation needed local hegemony—‘an Australian Monroe 
Doctrine in the Southern Pacific’. Hughes presented peacemaking as an 
opportunity for pre-emptive action against future ‘predatory designs’ on 
the region, calling on the US ‘to stand by [Australia] around the peace 
tables’, supporting the nation’s claim to Germany’s former South Pacific 
territories.17
Hughes was ultimately unsuccessful in gaining US support. At the Paris 
Peace Conference, Wilson, an idealistic anti-imperialist committed to 
gradual self-governance, and Hughes, a pragmatist and fierce patriot 
resolved to see Australia annex the South Pacific territories, clashed and the 
question of the Pacific territories threatened to derail the conference.18 
The solution was a compromise on Wilson’s original mandate proposal. 
Three classes of mandates (A, B and C) were awarded. The C-class mandates 
in the Pacific were considered the furthest from self-government and ‘best 
administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its 
territory’.19 Australia was granted a C-class mandate over New Guinea and 
a joint British Empire mandate over Nauru. Japan was granted a C-class 
mandate over the Marshall, Mariana and Caroline islands. While these 
mandated territories could not be fortified, Australia was granted a large 
measure of administrative oversight, including control of immigration, 
tariffs and navigation. The Japanese delegation’s insistence on freedom 
of entry and residence in the C-class mandates—a position that was not 
abandoned until late 1920—coupled with their failed attempt to include 
a racial equality clause in the League of Nations’ covenant, galvanised for 
Australia the risk of Japanese expansion in the Far East and the value of 
immigration restrictions afforded by the mandate system.20
17  ‘Australia to Have a Monroe Doctrine’, The New York Times. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) 
stipulated that the Western Hemisphere was the United States’ sphere of interest and attempts by 
European powers to colonise or extend influence in this area would not be tolerated.
18  Carl Bridge, William Hughes: Australia (London: Haus, 2011), 77–81.
19  ‘Peace Treaty of Versailles, 28 June, 1919: Articles 1–30 and Annex—The Covenant of the League 
of Nations’, The World War I Document Archive, available from: net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/ 
versa1.html.
20  David Lee, ‘Sir John Latham and the League of Nations’, in League of Nations: Histories, Legacies 
and Impact, eds Joy Damousi and Patricia O’Brien (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018), 
86–91; Bridge, William Hughes, 83–6; ‘Premier Hughes Denounces Racial Equality Amendment’, 
The Gazette Times [Pittsburgh], 28 March 1919, 2; ‘Draft, Covenant of the League of Nations, 
10  January 1919’, cited in N. Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 
1919 (London: Routledge, 1998), 20.
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Although Australia made small victories in Paris, the nation’s strategic 
outlook remained uncertain. Japan’s postwar position was a strong one 
and, in the course of the peace negotiations, it had become apparent that 
Australia could not rely on US support in its search for regional security. 
Hughes resented Wilson and his idealistic ‘14 points’ on which peace had 
been negotiated. On his return from Paris, he informed the House of 
Representatives: ‘I have always held that that was an error, of judgement, 
if you like, for by those fourteen points adopted as the basis of peace, 
none of those things which Australia had fought for was guaranteed.’21 
This resentment added to Australia’s doubts about the League of Nations’ 
capacity to maintain global order.22 The United States’ unreliability as 
a leader and strategic ally for Australia was further underscored as the 
nation’s foreign policy became increasingly isolationist. Despite Wilson’s 
enthusiastic support for the league, Republican senators opposed 
membership and blocked the necessary legislation. These men feared 
league membership would draw the US into international affairs and 
further conflict—a sentiment captured in prominent Republican Senator 
William Borah’s assessment that ‘political pacts foment war, they do not 
augment peace’.23 Britain accordingly remained Australia’s sole protector 
and the nation’s policymakers viewed the immediate region and the 
systems for global peace with uncertainty.
The end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance
Australia’s general sense of insecurity was heightened by changes in the 
arrangements for peace and alliance in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1902, 
Britain and Japan had signed an alliance in response to Russia’s expanding 
power in the Asia-Pacific region. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
renewed in 1905 and again in 1911. The future of the alliance first 
came under question in 1919, as it was due to expire in 1921. With the 
League of Nations now present to manage international peace, security 
alliances such as that between Britain and Japan were seen as not only 
21  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives [hereinafter CPD: Representatives], 
10 September 1919, No. 37 (Canberra: AGPS, 1919), 12167–8. 
22  David Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century: International Relations Since 
Federation (Melbourne: Circa, 2006), 38–9.
23  Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Education Inc., 2006), 37, 41; Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: 
The United States Congress, 1923), 4075.
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unnecessary, but also incongruent to the spirit of peace.24 The situation 
was complicated by the US. As two rising powers bordering on the Pacific 
Ocean, Japanese–US relations had become increasingly tense in the 
postwar years. The US government’s fear was that, as the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance did not explicitly exclude conflict with the US, Japan may take 
this to mean that aggression towards the nation was viable, implicating 
Britain and its empire in such a conflict.25 Alongside mounting Japanese–
US tension, both nations’ naval expenditure continued to increase.26 
Hughes remarked on this tension and militarisation in an April 1921 
statement in the Australian House of Representatives:
We read almost every day of disturbing rumours of great navies, the 
world longing for peace resounds with the clanging of hammers, 
nations fervently building more and more war ships, and there 
is rivalry openly expressed between those two great nations, the 
United States of America and Japan.27
If not addressed, there was the risk this rivalry would develop into an arms 
race at sea. From the perspective of the UK government, which was seeking 
to reduce its defence expenditure, there was concern this arms race would 
see Japan or, more probably, the US outflank the Royal Navy (RN).28
The first postwar Imperial Conference was held in mid-1921, and the 
future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance dominated discussion in the 
months leading up to and during the conference. Australia, represented 
at the conference by Hughes, was anxious to see the alliance renewed. 
The alliance not only ensured that, through Britain, Australia and Japan 
shared an ally, but it also provided diplomatic leverage with which to 
constrain potential Japanese expansion.29 Hughes, who was ‘obsessed with 
the future threat of Japan’, addressed the strategic consideration of the 
alliance in a statement at the Imperial Conference:30
24  Jaroslav Valkoun, ‘Great Britain, the Dominions and Their Position On Japan in the 1920s 
and Early 1930s’, Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 2 (2017): 32–46, at pp. 32–3. 
25  Frederic Eggleston, ‘Washington and After: An Australian View’, The Nineteenth Century and 
After 92 (1922): 455–65, at pp. 458–9.
26  Darwin, The Empire Project, 366–7.
27  CPD: Representatives, 7 April 1921, Vol. 94, 7267. 
28  Darwin, The Empire Project, 367.
29  Bell, Dependent Ally, 10.
30  James Cotton, ‘William Morris Hughes, Empire and Nationalism: The Legacy of the First World 
War’, Australian Historical Studies 46, no. 1 (2016): 100–18, at p. 105.
THE GENESIS OF A POLICY
20
Should we not be in a better position to exercise greater influence 
over the Eastern policy [of Japan] as an Ally of that great Eastern 
power, than as her potential enemy? Now, if Japan is excluded 
from the family of great Western nations—and mark, to turn 
our back on the Treaty is certainly to exclude Japan—she will be 
isolated, her national pride wounded in its most tender spot.31
The Australian government was also mindful of the United States’ growing 
influence, in spite of its isolationist foreign policy, and the importance of 
fostering friendly relations. Hughes accordingly supported the proposition 
that had emerged in the lead-up to the conference of a reworded Anglo-
Japanese alliance that would ‘guard against even the suspicion of hostility 
or unfriendliness to the United States’.32 Accommodating the US in the 
alliance would ensure the rising power remained content and, although 
not explicitly stated, strengthen the diplomatic leverage the alliance had 
over a potentially disruptive Japan.
While Australia, the UK and New Zealand supported renewing an 
amended Anglo-Japanese alliance, Canada and South Africa steadfastly 
opposed its renewal. With the Imperial Conference set to close with no 
decision made, US President Warren Harding invited the principal naval 
powers to Washington to discuss naval disarmament and the future of Far 
Eastern peace.33
The Washington treaties
The Washington Naval Conference, held between November 1921 and 
February 1922, was the first US-led international gathering. This signalled 
an assertion of its influence in the Asia-Pacific region, albeit not backed by 
a complete regional policy. British public servants acknowledged the shifting 
distribution of power in the postwar world, evidenced in a memorandum 
compiled by an officer from the British Consul-General in New York that 
was circulated among the dominions in preparation for the conference. 
‘Great Britain must acknowledge,’ according to the memorandum, ‘the 
naval superiority of the United States in the Pacific. Australia, New Zealand 
31  Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and 
India Held in June, July and August 1921: Summary of Proceedings and Documents (London: J.J. Keliher 
& Co. for His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1921), 19.
32  ibid., 19.
33  Valkoun, ‘Great Britain, the Dominions and Their Position On Japan in the 1920s and Early 
1930s’, 37–8.
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and Canada must recognise the ground of common interest with the United 
States and look to this country for protection rather than to Great Britain.’ 
The US was viewed not as a challenger; rather, the nation’s rise presented 
the opportunity for a ‘great union of the English-speaking peoples of 
the world bound … by common language, common institutions and by 
common customs’.34 Although this document presents the personal view 
of a mere consular officer rather than that of the British government, it 
remains significant as an open acknowledgement that Britain’s power in the 
Far East was indeed abating.
Although the British government had initially supported the renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pressure from within the Cabinet gradually 
forced the conclusion that closer relations with Washington would better 
serve the national interest than the renewal of the alliance.35 The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was terminated and the Four-Power Treaty—comprising 
the British Empire, France, Japan and the US—was its replacement. 
The  signatories agreed to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. If a 
conflict did emerge, the four nations were not obliged to provide military 
aid to another and the Four-Power Treaty framework would exist for 
discussion and, in theory, a resolution.36
The second and complementary treaty signed at the Washington 
conference was the Five-Power Treaty, a naval disarmament agreement 
between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the US. The treaty 
stipulated new limits on the tonnage of capital ships, established a 10-year 
holiday on capital shipbuilding and required that no new naval bases were 
constructed or existing bases expanded. The new tonnage limitations 
restricted Britain and the US to 525,000 tonnes, Japan to 315,000 tonnes 
and Italy and France to 175,000 tonnes.37
34  ‘American Policy in the Far East, Memorandum, British Consul-General in New York to 
Foreign Office, 16 June 1921’, in ‘Governor-General: Correspondence and printed matter arranged 
according to subject (“Special Portfolio”), 1888–1936’, National Archives of Australia [hereinafter 
NAA], Canberra: A6661, 1405.
35  Antony Best, ‘The “Ghost” of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination into Historical 
Myth-Making’, The Historical Journal 49, no. 3 (2006): 811–31, at pp. 817–18.
36  ‘Doc. 15, Treaty between the US, the British Empire, France, and Japan, 13 December 1921’, 
in Joseph V. Fuller (ed.), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1922, Volume I 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1938).
37  ‘Doc. 77, Treaty between the US, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, 6 February 1922’, 
in Fuller, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1922. The construction of new 
British and US bases in Singapore and the Philippines, respectively, was allowed to go ahead as they 
had already been planned prior to the conference. While this precluded Japan from establishing new 
naval bases, it also excluded the possibility of fortification in the area immediately to Australia’s north.
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The treaties signed in Washington effectively resolved the tension between 
Japan and the US and removed the pressure on the British government to 
increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.38 For the US, the 
Washington System secured an Asia-Pacific order with American interests 
firmly at the centre. It promoted peace, mollifying isolationist factions 
in the US government by reducing the likelihood of future international 
entanglements and, through the new naval ratios, formalised the United 
States’ position as a leading naval power.39
The Washington conference had immense implications for Australia’s 
strategic outlook. Hughes acknowledged that the Washington conference 
had ‘achieved great things’ and he hoped the treaties signed there would 
establish a new and peaceful balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. 
However, he cautioned that the Four-Power Treaty offered only a vaguely 
worded guarantee of peace as, unlike the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it was 
not backed by an obligatory call to arms should any of the members be 
attacked.40 Shortly after his election as prime minister in February 1923, 
Stanley Melbourne Bruce echoed Hughes when he informed the House 
of Representatives that the Washington conference ‘certainly did not solve 
the problem of the future safety of Australia … one wonders how much 
was really accomplished by the Washington Conference’.41
The British government, too, had its reservations. During the Washington 
conference, the British ambassador to the US, Auckland Geddes, had 
privately conceded that he was ‘not so optimistic … about the value of 
the Quadruple Treaty to ensure peace in the Far East’. The ‘validity’ of 
the treaty, Geddes continued, rested ‘largely on the power to enforce the 
treaty’.42 The appraisal by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) 
of the Four-Power Treaty, received by Australia in December 1922, was 
even more forthright, judging that the long-term ‘strategic position in the 
Western Pacific has been adversely affected’. While it was accepted that 
war with Japan was unlikely in the coming 10 years, the CID judged that, 
in the event of such aggression, ‘the Four Power Pact … may not save 
38  In addition to the four and five-power treaties, there were two other treaties dealing with the use 
of submarines, gas warfare and territorial integrity. 
39  Cotton, ‘William Morris Hughes, Empire and Nationalism’, 106, 112–13; Eggleston, ‘Washington 
and After’, 459, 462–5.
40  CPD: Representatives, 26 July 1922, No. 99, 789–93.
41  CPD: Representatives, 24 July 1923, No. 30, 1484.
42  ‘Minutes of Meeting, British Empire Delegation to the Washington Conference, 9 December 
1921’, in Department of External Affairs: Volumes of microfilm printout of the personal papers of 
Sir George Pearce (compiled by Dr J.S. Cumpston), 1907–37, NAA: A4719, 14.
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us from becoming involved in war’.43 Ultimately, the Four-Power Treaty 
did not offer the diplomatic or military leverage necessary to exclude the 
possibility of aggressive expansionism. For Australia—ever suspicious 
of Japan—the Washington System could offer only temporary security.
The Washington Naval Conference also had implications for imperial 
power. In accepting the new tonnage restrictions, Britain had, for the 
first time since the Napoleonic Wars, accepted naval parity rather than 
mastery. Admittedly, there had been past occasions when the French 
possessed a larger navy than Britain, but Britain, as the centre of global 
finance and trade, still possessed the largest naval potential. This was no 
longer the case, with the US both the largest manufacturing and the largest 
creditor nation. During a meeting of the British Empire Delegation to the 
Washington conference, Rear Admiral E. Chatfield, Assistant Chief of the 
Naval Staff, and Australia’s representative, Minister for Defence George 
Pearce, registered their concern that the new tonnage ratios and 10-year 
shipbuilding holiday would lead to the decay of specialist skills. Chatfield 
argued that this would ‘leave the Empire with a fleet of unreliable strength 
destined to deteriorate progressively’.44 Britain nevertheless accepted 
naval parity and the shipbuilding holiday. In this willingness to accept a 
compromised naval position, the British government tacitly acknowledged 
that it was struggling to afford the upkeep of a first-rate naval power.45
From the Australian perspective, the most pressing aspect of the new naval 
ratios was in relation to Japan. While Britain’s upper limit was more than 
200,000 tonnes greater than that of Japan, in terms of areas of interest, 
the ratio was in Japan’s favour. Britain’s interests spanned three oceans 
and the nation was required to monitor and defend the people, trade 
and territories within this vast area. The tonnage restriction established 
in Washington was only adequate to maintain these ongoing activities. 
If a new strategic threat developed, Britain, already at is limit, would be 
unable to respond adequately. Conversely, Japan’s interests were limited 
43  ‘“The Washington Conference and its Effect Upon Empire Naval Policy and Co-operation”, CID 
Memorandum, December 1922’, in Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Offices, Empire Marketing Board, and related bodies, Colonies, General: Original 
Correspondence, The National Archives [hereinafter TNA], Kew: CO 323/888/29.
44  ‘Minutes of Meeting, British Empire Delegation Washington Naval Conference, 9 December 
1921’, NAA: A4719, 14.
45  Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 197–200, 254; Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of 
British Naval Mastery, 273–5.
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to the Pacific Ocean and it could concentrate its resources there.46 In the 
event of an emergency in the Far East, Britain would be left to rely on 
the support of the US, as Frederic Eggleston publicly observed:
In case of any … trouble affecting British interests, as it might 
easily do, the British armaments available for the Pacific are not 
sufficient for the burdens that might be cast upon them; and 
unless the United States of America can be relied upon to pull 
her weight in the same direction as Britain the whole system [of 
Pacific security] might break down. Australia … can only watch 
the play of forces upon which her fate depends.47
The end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington System that 
replaced it highlighted the evolving global distribution of power and, in the 
case of Australia, differing strategic outlooks as Britain appeared to prioritise 
relations with the US above the protection of its Far Eastern interests.48
The Singapore Strategy
With two rising powers in the Pacific, it was essential Britain reinforced 
its regional presence. The proposed solution was the Singapore Naval 
Strategy, which planned for the construction of a major naval base in 
Singapore where a RN fleet would be stationed. The origins of the 
Singapore Strategy can be found in Australian actions during World 
War I. During that war, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Prime 
Minister’s Department paid close attention to Japan’s naval movements 
and collated intelligence concerning the nation’s intentions in the region.49 
In September 1917, Australia’s Minister for the Navy, Joseph Cook, 
requested the British Admiralty reassess the maritime defence needs of 
Australia and the Asia-Pacific, suggesting a major imperial naval base was 
46  Eric M. Andrews, The Writing On the Wall: The British Commonwealth and Aggression in the East, 
1931–1935 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 31–2.
47  Eggleston, ‘Washington and After’, 465. 
48  Pearce, with full knowledge of the discussions of the British Empire delegation in Washington, 
implied as much in his report to Hughes. ‘Pearce to Hughes, NAA: A221 ExRel V22, 334 ff.’, cited 
in Cotton, ‘William Morris Hughes, Empire and Nationalism’, 113. 
49  Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 2, 407–9; ‘Navies 
Japanese—Miscellaneous Telegrams AWM36 1914–1915’, in Department of Defence: Official 
History, 1914–18 War—Naval records of Arthur W. Jose, 1912–30, NAA: AWM36, Bundle 32/1; 
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1927–42, NAA: A981 Mars 5.
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required either in Australia or in another nearby British territory. Plans 
were made to send an Admiralty officer to Australia to investigate once 
the war had ended. In December 1918, the Australian government was 
informed that the Admiral of the Fleet, Lord John Jellicoe, would visit to 
review the situation.50
Cook’s original request for the Admiralty review had been justified on 
the vague basis of ‘the experience of the war’.51 A cable sent in May 
1919 to Jellicoe from Acting Prime Minister William Watt suggests 
these experiences were specifically Japan’s naval advancements and new 
territorial acquisitions in the Pacific. Watt’s cable outlined Australia’s 
concerns and the questions he hoped would be addressed during the 
Admiralty review. Watt requested Jellicoe provide an assessment of the 
‘naval strategical problems affecting Australian waters and the Pacific’. 
This included probable routes of attack on Australia, ‘with special reference 
to occupation by a foreign power of Islands north of the Equator’ and 
Britain’s strategy in the event of war with any of the Pacific powers.52
Jellicoe presented his report to the British government in February 1920 
and it mirrored many of Australia’s concerns. Jellicoe identified the 
Pacific as the most likely area for future conflict and judged Australia 
to be ‘powerless against a strong naval and military power without the 
assistance of the British fleet’.53 He advised that a Far Eastern fleet and 
major naval base be established in the Asia-Pacific in the next five years, 
with Singapore the recommended location. This strategy was expected 
to protect the lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian oceans 
and allow two zones of conflict to be operational, Europe and the Asia-
Pacific.54 This was the Singapore Strategy—the ‘impregnable’ cornerstone 
in imperial defence planning in the Asia-Pacific.55
50  ‘Attachment, Admiralty letter, 23 December 1918’ and ‘Naval Bases, n.d. on or after 3 January 
1919’, both in NAA: A981, Def 350 Part 1.
51  ‘Naval Bases, [n.d. (on or after 3 January 1919)]’, NAA: A981, Def 350 Part 1.
52  ‘Watt to Jellicoe, 2 May 1919’, NAA: A981, Def 350 Part 1.
53  ‘Jellicoe Report—1919’, in Department of Defence: ‘The Shedden Collection’ [Records collected 
by Sir Frederick Shedden during his career with the Department of Defence and in researching the 
history of Australian defence policy], two number series, 1937–71, NAA: A5954, 1080/1.
54  ‘Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe’s Naval Mission to Colonies, 3 February 1920’, in Records 
of the Admiralty, Naval Forces, Royal Marines, Coastguard, and related bodies, Admiralty: Record 
Office: Cases, TNA: ADM 116/1831.
55  ‘Penang Naval Conference—March 1921, 11 April 1921’, in Department of Defence: Naval 
historical files, single number series with alphabetical suffixes, NAA: B6121, 311J; ‘Report of the 
Conference held on board the HMS Hawkins at Penang, between the Commanders-in-Chief of 
the China, East Indies and Australian Stations, from 7 March 1921 onwards, 13 March 1921’, NAA: 
B6121, 311J.
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In March 1921, a meeting of the commanders-in-chief of the Australian, 
Chinese and East Asian stations was held in Penang, British Malaya. 
The  Admiralty requested they make recommendations for Far Eastern 
defence planning on the basis of a war between Japan and the British 
Empire. Although the Singapore Strategy was yet to be formally ratified, 
the recommendations that emerged at Penang were made on the basis 
of the strategy being the cornerstone of imperial defence planning in 
the  Asia-Pacific. Recommendations included establishing Singapore 
as the centre of an imperial communications system in the region.56
The state of Britain’s economy and the public demand for financing social 
services rather than defence industries meant these recommendations 
and even Jellicoe’s original plan went beyond what could reasonably be 
afforded. Instead, when the Singapore Strategy was finally approved in 
June 1921, it was decided that a base would be constructed but only fully 
garrisoned when required and the recommended five-year construction 
timeline was pushed back to eight years.57
The early deviations from Jellicoe’s initial recommendations heralded 
years of uncertainty and interruptions in the Singapore project. Work did 
not begin in Singapore until late 1923. This delay was due to a succession 
of political U-turns. First, there were the new naval disarmament 
agreements made at the Washington conference, which raised questions 
about whether the construction of a major naval base was conducive 
to peace and disarmament. It was not until February 1923, following 
the election of a conservative government the previous October, that 
Britain confirmed the Singapore Strategy would continue.58 The election 
of Britain’s first Labour government in December 1923 posed yet 
another obstacle. The new government was committed to international 
disarmament and opposed the Singapore idea, which Prime Minister 
56  Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 2, 470–1; ‘Penang 
Conference Report, 13 March 1921’, NAA: B6121, 311J. Initial estimates planned for a fleet of eight 
battleships and eight battlecruisers, four aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, 40 destroyers and 36 submarines. 
‘Jellicoe’s Naval Mission to Colonies, 3 February 1920’, TNA: ADM 116/1834.
57  Malcolm Murfett, ‘The Singapore Strategy’, in Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External 
Relations from Federation Until the Second World War, eds Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 188–204; ‘Cabinet Minute, 16 June 1921’, in Records of the 
Cabinet Office, War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes, TNA: CAB 23/26/5.
58  Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New 
Zealand, 1919–1942 (Singapore: NUS Press, 1981), 47–50; ‘Cabinet Minute, 21 February 1923’, 
TNA: CAB 23/45.
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Ramsay MacDonald deemed a ‘wild and wanton escapade’.59 In March 
1924, MacDonald ordered the cancellation of the Singapore project; the 
staff there were withdrawn and orders were given to sell all equipment 
present.60 Later that same year, the Conservative Party was returned to 
power and the Singapore project was reinstated.61
The result of the delays and indecision surrounding the Singapore Strategy 
was that the initial eight-year timetable for construction passed in 1929 
with the project far from complete. All there was to show was one floating 
dock and a number of other incomplete structures.62
The indecision surrounding the Singapore Strategy led key figures in 
Australian defence and political circles to question its feasibility and 
appropriateness. One of the earliest warnings came in 1921 from Rear 
Admiral Percy Grant, Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Naval 
Station and advisor on defence to the prime minister. He drew attention 
to the strategic weakness of Singapore, particularly the long lines of 
communication that would connect the base with Australia and Britain.63 
Grant’s concern led Prime Ministers Hughes and Bruce to question the 
British government on the logistics of the Singapore Strategy. Both were 
mindful of the delays in initial construction in the years 1921–23. They 
each received the same bland reassurances that Singapore would be finished 
and the fleet would arrive.64 This led Bruce, somewhat unconvinced, to 
remark: ‘I am not quite clear as to how the protection of Singapore is 
to be assured, I am quite clear on this point, that apparently it can be 
done.’65 That key figures in Australian policy and defence circles held 
some reservations about the Singapore Strategy—albeit small ones—adds 
credence to the view that the nation was not convinced by the system for 
Asia-Pacific security offered in the Washington System.
59  ‘Singapore Naval Base. HC Deb 05 March 1924 vol 170 c1360’, in United Kingdom, 
Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, available from: api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/
commons/1924/mar/05/singapore-naval-base. 
60  ‘Sitting of 18 March 1924’, in United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, 
available from: api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/sittings/1924/mar/18. 
61  Hamill, The Strategic Illusion, 86–7, 99.
62  Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 33–4.
63  ‘Penang Conference Report, 13 March 1921’, NAA: B6121, 311J.
64  ‘Minutes Fourteenth Meeting of the Imperial Conference, 4 July 1921’, in Records of the Cabinet 
Office, Records of Imperial, Commonwealth and International Conferences, etc., TNA: CAB 32/2 
Vol. 1A; ‘Minutes Ninth Meeting of the Imperial Conference, 17 October 1923’, TNA: CAB 32/9. 
65  ‘Minutes Eleventh Meeting of the Imperial Conference, 22 October 1923’, TNA: CAB 32/9. 
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Australia’s questions surrounding the Singapore Strategy were never truly 
resolved. Despite this, Singapore remained the cornerstone of Australian 
regional security. This may suggest Australia was wilfully naive in relying 
wholly on Britain.66 Here, however, it is important to recall Australia’s 
acute sense of insecurity, the fact Britain remained the nation’s sole 
security partner and that Singapore was the only available assurance 
against regional aggression.67 While Australia had little choice beyond 
accepting the Singapore Strategy as the cornerstone of regional defence, 
this does not mean it necessarily accepted the strategy uncritically or failed 
to pursue its own defence initiatives.
The imperial framework redefined
After the Federation of Australia in 1901 and the establishment of 
a  government that was responsible for forming national policies, 
defence  and foreign policies were made in relation to the British 
Empire and the sentimental loyalties, values and interests that bound its 
members.68 The main opportunities for consultation concerning defence 
and foreign policy were the regular Imperial Conferences and through the 
offices of the prime minister, governor-general, high commissioners and 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Within this system, the status of 
British dominions, such as Australia, was an awkward one. They were self-
governing nations, yet loyal to the Crown and subject to the sovereignty 
of British rule.69 This was the case until 1925, at which point a process 
of restructuring the imperial framework began.
While the markets and human resources offered in the Empire were 
a great strength to Britain, there was also the immense cost of defending, 
financing and administering a cumbersome empire that sprawled across 
66  Peter Dennis, ‘Australia and the “Singapore Strategy”’, in Sixty Years On: The Fall of Singapore, eds 
B. Farrell and S. Hunter (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), 29–41; Murfett, ‘The Singapore 
Strategy’, 188–9. 
67  Richard Devetak, ‘An Australian Outlook on International Affairs? The Evolution of International 
Relations Theory in Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 55, no. 3 (2009): 335–59, 
at p. 337.
68  For an overview of the shared values of the Commonwealth, see Eggleston, Reflections on 
Australian Foreign Policy, 173–206.
69  Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 1, 3–5; Peter Geoffrey 
Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901–1949 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1983), 1–2. 
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the globe.70 The fragmentation that existed at the administrative level of 
the Empire called attention to Britain’s experience of overstretch. In the 
1920s, members of the Empire did not have representatives—diplomatic, 
trade or otherwise—outside London. With no formal means of liaising 
with one another, foreign policy and defence directives were passed down 
by Britain and, at best, discussed at Imperial Conferences or, at worst, 
slowly filtered throughout the Empire’s chain of communication. 
This system produced an imperial administration that Eric Andrews 
described as 
not like an organism with a brain and inter-connected nerves, 
which could therefore come to a decision, and act on it, but more 
like a brain dead octopus, with its tentacles acting independently 
of each other, and no vital connections being made at the centre.71 
Most critically for Australia, from the perspective of a remote outpost 
of the Empire, this system was not particularly conducive to consultative 
policymaking.
The 1922 Chanak Crisis was indicative of the administrative 
disorganisation of the British Empire, the diverse interests of its members 
and the need for a more decentralised system. In September 1922, Turkish 
troops attacked and defeated Greek forces in a bid to restore Turkish rule 
in the Dardanelles’ neutral zone. In so doing, Turkey violated the Treaty 
of Sèvres. The British government’s response was almost immediate, 
declaring the Empire would enter into an armed conflict if need be to 
support Greece. Britain had failed to consult with its empire; in Australia’s 
case, the government learnt of the empire commitment by way of a press 
release.72 This action was a regression from the Paris peace negotiations just 
three years earlier, when the dominions had been individually represented 
and directly involved in decision-making.73 
70  Darwin, The Empire Project, 323–6, 360–1, 375. 
71  Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 25. John Darwin has similarly compared the British Empire 
with an ‘Octopus Power’. Darwin, The Empire Project, 83–6. 
72  ‘Forster (Secretary of Prime Minister’s Department) to Churchill (Secretary of State for the 
Colonies), 20 September 1922’, in Governor-General: Decoded copies of telegrams exchanged 
between the Governor-General and the Secretary of State in connection with the ‘Chanak Incident’ 
with Turkey, 1922–24, NAA: CP78/32, 1.
73  Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 2, 508–9.
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Despite a public statement that Australia would commit troops if 
necessary, Hughes observed the slight and he was incensed. He contacted 
British Prime Minister Lloyd George, expressing his concerns that the 
decision—which he described as ‘a bolt from the blue’—‘gravely imperils 
the unity of the Empire’. He went on to argue that 
the Dominions ought to be consulted before any action is taken or 
irrevocable decision made by Britain, then and then only can our 
voices be heard and our counsels heeded. The Empire is one and 
indivisible or it is nothing.74 
Other members of the Empire joined Australia, both publicly and 
privately, in rejecting the prospect of being dragged by Britain into 
a conflict involving neither their own region nor their national interests.75
The Chanak Crisis forced the British government to acknowledge that 
the status of dominions needed to be clarified. In 1925, the Dominions 
Office was established, along with the Cabinet-level portfolio of Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs. Later the same year, the British government 
signed the Locarno Treaties, which dealt with the postwar management of 
borders in Western Europe. Not only were the treaties signed by Britain 
alone, but also Article 9 stipulated the treaty ‘shall impose no obligation 
upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India unless the government 
of such Dominion or India signifies its acceptance thereof ’.76 While these 
developments did not expressly define the status of dominions, they did 
make a clear distinction between the colonies and the dominions and 
their differing relationships to British sovereignty.77
The formal status of dominions was defined at the 1926 Imperial 
Conference, which was called in part to discuss the implications of 
the Locarno Treaties and the dominions’ great diversity of interests. 
74  ‘Forster to Churchill, 20 September 1922’, NAA: CP78/32, 1. 
75  R. Eccles, ‘Australian Perspectives and the Balfour Declaration of 1926’, in Dependency? Essays in 
the History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, ed. John McCarthy (Canberra: University College, 
University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1989), 23. Among the most 
vocal opponents were Canada and South Africa.
76  ‘Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, 
16 October 1925 (Locarno Treaty)’, in Arthur B. Keith (ed.), Speeches and Documents on International 
Affairs, 1918–1937. Volume 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 116. 
77  Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 5; Eccles, ‘Australian Perspectives and the Balfour Declaration 
of 1926’, 25–6.
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The  Inter-Imperial Relations Committee was formed to consider the 
future form and substance of imperial relations within this context. 
The result was a declaration by Arthur Balfour, chairman of the committee:
They [the dominions] are autonomous communities within the 
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to 
another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though 
united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated 
as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.78
The wording of the 1926 Balfour Declaration had been carefully 
deliberated, as historian John Darwin has noted, with care given not to 
equate self-governance and equality of status with independence and 
a  lapsing of empire membership. The effect of the prudent declaration 
was, first, to recognise and embrace the varied interests of the dominions. 
Second, the declaration redefined the imperial connection by appealing to 
the sentimental terms of shared ‘positive ideals’, including ‘peace, security 
and progress’.79
The final step in the decentralisation of the imperial relationship came 
at the 1930 Imperial Conference, when it was decided that legislative 
independence should be extended to the dominions. This brought to an 
end the ability of the British Parliament to legislate for the dominions, 
granting full independence in areas such as foreign policymaking. 
The 1931 Statute of Westminster ratified this resolution and the 1926 
Balfour Declaration.80
Far from dispelling Australia’s fears of imperial disunity, the developments 
in 1925–31 generated greater anxiety. In light of Hughes’s indignant 
response to the Chanak Crisis, Australia’s reaction may at first appear 
counterintuitive. The concern of Hughes and other likeminded 
individuals was not with a definition of dominion status and freedoms, 
but an acknowledgement of the varied interests of the Empire and 
78  ‘Summary of Proceedings 1926 Imperial Conference, 23 March 1927’, in Department of 
External Affairs: Correspondence files, annual single number series [Main correspondence files series 
of the agency], 1890–1968, NAA: A1, 1927/14972.
79  Darwin, The Empire Project, 406–7; ‘1926 Imperial Conference, 23 March 1927’, NAA: A1, 
1927/14972.
80  ‘An Act to give effect to certain resolutions passed by Imperial Conferences held in the years 
1926 and 1930, 11 December 1931’, in Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on British 
Commonwealth Affairs, 1931–52 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1–3.
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a framework for integrating these interests into a unified imperial foreign 
policy.81 Hughes voiced these concerns in a lengthy review of the 1926 
Balfour Declaration delivered in the House of Representatives:
I wish to point out that every important act by one dominion may 
affect other dominions … We claim the right of an equal voice 
with Great Britain in moulding British foreign policy … Britain’s 
foreign policy conditions our very existence, and we should insist 
upon our right to have an effective voice in shaping it. Without 
some control over foreign policy, self-government is a farce, and 
we are living in a house built upon quicksands … [A]s long as 
peace lasts all will be well; but if, and when, war comes along, we 
shall be blown to the heavens as by a charge of gelignite. Unless 
we are able to influence the foreign policy of the Empire our boast 
of freedom is nothing but empty words. No dominion parliament 
can be said to be master of its own domestic circumstances, unless 
it exercises the right to assist in moulding the foreign policy of the 
Empire. That applies no less forcibly to the right of all dominions 
to be consulted by other dominions before treaties with foreign 
countries are ratified.82
These concerns explain in part the Australian government’s delayed 
adoption of the Statute of Westminster (in 1942).
Australia’s diametric opposition to the 1926 Balfour Declaration and 
Statute of Westminster can understandably be viewed as reluctance to take 
steps towards greater autonomy in foreign policy. While the Australian 
government did rely on the imperial framework, the main concern was 
consultation—that is, full knowledge of and a voice in imperial affairs. 
On the basis of this assessment, Australia was not necessarily shying away 
from responsibility. Rather, it hoped to participate in a cohesive imperial 
foreign policy that gave equal attention to all the regions and the distinct 
interests encompassed by the Empire.
The Manchurian Crisis
Despite the persistent concern surrounding Japanese intentions, Australia 
made little effort to engage with the nation or the wider Asia-Pacific. 
Richard Casey, for instance, wrote of a remote Asia-Pacific with which 
81  Eccles, ‘Australian Perspectives and the Balfour Declaration of 1926’, 30–1.
82  CPD: Representatives, 22 March 1927, No. 12, 864.
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Australia had little need to engage.83 In 1925, when the newly appointed 
Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, Prince Iemasa Tokugawa, arrived in 
Australia, he brought with him an invitation from Japan’s Prime Minister 
for Australia to make a reciprocal appointment. This appointment was 
part of Foreign Minister Kijūrō Shidehara’s campaign to heighten Japan’s 
international representation for economic and diplomatic purposes. 
Australia, however, made no such appointment.84 Events in 1931 
brought into sharp focus that Australia could no longer continue with its 
wilful isolation.
In September 1931, as the Statute of Westminster was being debated in 
the British Parliament, the Japanese Army attacked and proceeded to 
occupy the Chinese province of Manchuria, contravening the Covenant 
of the League of Nations and the Nine-Power Treaty—one of the treaties 
signed at the 1921–22 Washington Naval Conference, which required 
members to respect the territorial integrity of China and aid the nation 
in developing and maintaining effective government.85 For Australia, the 
Manchurian Crisis confirmed fears that had fermented in the previous 
decade: neither the league nor the Washington System could adequately 
maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific. This realisation was the genesis of 
a distinct Australian policy for the Asia-Pacific. This policy was twofold, 
aiming to increase Australia’s regional presence and to develop a more 
assertive voice within the Empire with a view to incorporating regionally 
specific interests within the imperial outlook. The next chapter considers 
how this approach developed. 
83  Richard Casey, Australia’s Place in the World (Melbourne: Robertson & Mullens, 1931), 9–15, 
18, 62.
84  Shimizu Hajime, ‘Japanese Economic Penetration into Southeast Asia and the Southward 
Expansion School of Thought’, in International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar 
Period, eds Shinya Sugiyama and Milagros C. Guerrero (Newhaven, CT: Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1994), 19–22; ‘To Win Esteem’, The Sun, [Sydney], 26 November 1925, 12.




Increasing assertiveness in 
foreign and economic affairs, 
1931–35
We have adopted European phrases and the ideas that correspond 
to them. From our childhood we have been accustomed to read, 
think, and speak of the ‘Far East’. It is the Far East to Europe, to 
the old centres of civilisation, but we must realise that it is the 
‘Near East’ to Australia.1
— Australian Minister for External Affairs John Latham
With crisis in the Asia-Pacific region and neither Britain nor the US 
providing adequate security assurances, the Australian government was 
keenly aware of the need to reorient itself towards its immediate region. 
It did so with a careful interrogation of the relationships and policy 
approaches that would facilitate this process. Against the backdrop of 
the Great Depression and the limited opportunities offered in the British 
and US markets, trade played a key role in the genesis of a distinct 
Australian policy.
As Australia looked to the Asia-Pacific to meet its needs for more diverse 
markets, Japan emerged as the most promising opportunity. In the wake 
of the Manchurian Crisis, Australia’s trade interests intersected with 
the nation’s diplomatic and security ones. This undoubtedly shaped 
1  ‘Speech by Latham on the Australian Eastern Mission, 6 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16. 
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Australia’s response to the Manchurian Crisis and its attempts to convince 
Britain of the economic and diplomatic importance of cordial relations 
with Japan. 
The Great Depression and Australia’s 
foreign debt
The Great Depression saw a worldwide contraction of economic output 
following the US stock market crash in October 1929. Australia’s Great 
Depression experience was consistent with that internationally, with 
rapidly  reduced export volumes, high inflation and unemployment.2 
The  nation’s particular challenge during the depression years was 
foreign debt. 
Following World War I, Australia became a ‘voracious borrower’, relying 
on overseas loans to cover the costs of repatriating servicemen, interest 
on its war loans and postwar public building projects.3 The majority of 
the Australian government’s loans were issued by the City of London. 
In the years 1923–29, Australia was responsible for more than one-
quarter of London’s total oversees issues.4 When the depression hit, 
Britain and the US ceased lending and called in existing loans, leaving 
Australia to fund its debt on export income alone. The combined forces 
of decreased global demand and a sharp drop in the price of Australia’s 
principal exports led to the reduced volume and value of exports.5 While 
the Australian Labor Party (ALP) government of James Scullin drastically 
reduced imports through increased customs duties, these measures proved 
woefully inadequate to cover overseas debt repayments.6 By early 1931, 
2  Unemployment in Australia reached its peak at 30 per cent in 1932. Official Year Book of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, No. 30 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1937), 589.
3  Boris Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression: A Study of Economic Development and Policy 
in the 1920s and 1930s (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1970), 96; Bernard Attard, ‘Financial 
Diplomacy’, in Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation Until the 
Second World War, eds Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 
2000), 93–4, 96–100.
4  Attard, ‘Financial Diplomacy’, 100.
5  Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, 28–9, 110–14.
6  Tim Rooth, ‘Ottawa and After’, in Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from 
Federation Until the Second World War, eds Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian 
Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 110–11; Attard, ‘Financial Diplomacy’, 100–2. 
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with export stagnation, a near exhaustion of the country’s reserves and 
an exchange rate already under pressure, Australia looked set to default on 
loan repayments to London.7 
Australia was able to avoid default by departing from the gold standard 
and devaluing against the sterling in June 1931, which allowed the nation 
to export gold reserves to service overseas debt. The nation’s position 
was also helped by a temporary postponement on war debt repayments 
owed to Britain and the US. The British government departed from the 
gold standard the following September and the Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia, Australia’s central bank, set a fixed exchange rate according 
to the pound sterling (A£1.25 to £1 sterling).8 The departure from the 
gold standard and the 1932 Ottawa Agreements, which is detailed below, 
formalised a pre-existing arrangement predicated on the preferential 
treatment of British capital, migration and trade within the Empire. This 
was known as the Sterling Area. Members of the Sterling Area pegged their 
exchange rates to the pound sterling, conducted trade in sterling and stored 
their currency reserves in London. The Sterling Area codified a structural 
reliance on Britain and its economic performance, as a contraction in the 
British economy and devaluation would, in turn, devalue the currency of 
all the Sterling Area members. In this way, a strong British economy and 
currency became a shared interest within the Sterling Area.9
7  The New South Wales Premier, the ALP’s Jack Lang, did default on interest repayments in 
1931. This was part of Lang’s policy response to the Great Depression, in which he called on the 
British government to temporarily suspend interest payments to British bondholders and reduce 
the interest rate on Australian government debt repayments. Lang argued that these measures would 
allow domestic expenditure to be prioritised. The federal government was forced to cover New South 
Wales’s repayments. In January 1932, when Lang announced that he would again default on interest 
repayments in London, the newly elected United Australia Party passed the Financial Agreement 
Enforcement Act, which gave the federal government new powers to take control of state revenue. Lang 
withdrew more than £1 million in state revenue and instructed public servants not to pay state revenue 
into the federal Treasury, so as to deprive the federal government of New South Wales’s revenue. 
The New South Wales Governor-General found Lang’s actions illegal, and he was subsequently 
dismissed. The Lang case is significant not only in terms of state–federal government relations, but 
also in highlighting the Australian government’s support for imperial fiscal policy. David Meredith 
and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and Change (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 132–4. 
8  Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression, 238–9; Attard, ‘Financial Diplomacy’, 101–3.
9  Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area, 3–7, 10, 258–61.
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Opportunities in the imperial and 
US markets
Australia’s ability to continue servicing its overseas debt repayments and 
recovery from the depression relied on increased export margins. Britain 
was by far the most important market for Australian goods. In the first 
two years of the Great Depression, as the rest of the world adopted 
protectionist measures, Britain remained committed to free trade. As the 
economic crisis continued, however, key British industries began to 
struggle. For instance, from 1929 to 1932, coal and steel production fell 
by 20 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively.10 As the British government 
faced increasing unemployment and a growing trade imbalance, it became 
clear that free trade was an unsustainable approach.11
The 1932 Imperial Economic Conference, held in Ottawa, Canada, 
was convened in response to the economic challenges presented by the 
Great Depression. The proposed solution was greater intra-empire trade 
through a system of reciprocal preferential tariffs, ratified in the Ottawa 
Agreements. Under the Ottawa Agreements, Britain abandoned three-
quarters of a century of free-trade policy with the introduction of high 
import tariffs for foreign goods. The dominions received free entry into 
the British market and a margin of preference compared with similar 
foreign producers on certain exports. In return, the dominions extended 
preferential margins to British goods and granted domestic competitor 
status to British manufacturers, meaning tariffs would be reduced ‘to give 
United Kingdom producers full opportunity of reasonable competition’ 
with domestic producers.12 The Ottawa Agreements were, as a young 
James Plimsoll, future secretary of the DEA, argued, an ‘economic alliance 
by the Empire against the rest of the world’.13
10  Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 317.
11  Francine McKenzie, ‘Imperial Solutions to International Crises: Alliances, Trade and the Ottawa 
Imperial Economic Conference of 1932’, in The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy 
1900–2000, eds John Fisher, Effie G.H. Pedaliu and Richard Smith (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), 167, 171, 173–4.
12  Ian M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917–1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), 31; ‘Report on the Imperial Economic Conference, Ottawa, 1932’, 
in Department of Trade and Customs: International trade relations files, multiple number series 
[Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1925–56, NAA: A1667, 430/B/18.
13  James Plimsoll, ‘Australia and Ottawa’, The Australian Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1941): 14–21, 
at pp. 14–16.
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The Ottawa Agreements offered a solution to the immediate challenges 
of the Great Depression; however, they were only a partial solution—one 
that Francine McKenzie describes as a ‘defensive response to long-term 
decline’.14 In relying on protectionist measures and the imperial markets, 
the Ottawa Agreements simply masked Britain’s decline, rather than 
addressing the structural weakness in the nation’s economy. Moreover, 
imperial preference restricted Britain’s market access, irritating other 
nations and complicating trade relationships.15 While imperial preference 
did aid Britain in its recovery from the Great Depression, it also marked 
the nation’s waning economic capacity and three decades of reliance 
on the Sterling Area and imperial markets to mask this decline.
The Australian government recognised both the benefits and the 
limitations of the Ottawa Agreements and economic dependence on 
Britain. The concessions won by Australia in the negotiation of the 
Ottawa Agreements included free entry within the Sterling Area for 
a  great number of Australian exports and increased import tariffs on 
foreign competitor beef and dairy. When Prime Minister Joseph Lyons 
first discussed the agreements in the House of Representatives, he 
predicted not only increased exports to Britain, but also the building 
of ‘the strongest economic unit that history has ever known’.16 
The imperial preference did promote intra-empire sales, contributing 
to an overall increase in the volume of Australian exports to Britain, 
rising from 49.79 per cent in the 1931–32 financial year to 52.23 per 
cent in 1934–35. However, this growth was inconsistent and relatively 
conservative. Moreover, the Ottawa Agreements restricted any future 
trade agreements with non-empire nations, stipulating that they could 
not interfere with the imperial preference.17 This constrained Australia’s 
opportunities in foreign markets, as the nation was left with little scope to 
offer other countries greater access to its market. Minister for Commerce 
F.H. Stewart was sceptical of the limited opportunities offered in the 
Ottawa Agreements. He argued that the depression and the need for 
protectionism had revealed that ‘the Empire markets are not limitless in 
14  McKenzie, ‘Imperial Solutions to International Crises’, 167. 
15  Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917–1939, 280–4. 
16  CPD: Representatives, 31 August 1932, No. 35, 26, 29.
17  ‘Report on Imperial Economic Conference, 1932’, NAA: 1667, 430/B/18.
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their capacity’ and dependence on them was unsustainable. Accordingly, 
Stewart believed ‘foreign trade must be fostered and increased if we are to 
regain our former standard of living’.18











Sources: Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 26 (Canberra: 
Commonwealth Government Printer, 1933), 238; Official Year Book of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, No. 28 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1935), 258; Official Year 
Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 33 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government 
Printer, 1940), 775.
The US was also a significant market for Australian purchases. Where 
the imperial markets offered opportunities for growth, limited as they 
were, opportunities in the US were stagnant. Australian–US trade 
relations date back to the late eighteenth century when the Pacific Ocean 
was a prominent area for fishing and US merchant ships made port at 
the newly founded colonies in Australia. Historically, Australia bought 
far more from the US than it sold in return, the key reason being the 
two nations’ similar exports. Both Australia and the US were primary 
industry exporters, with raw materials from the mining and agricultural 
sectors dominating overseas sales. Unlike Australia, the US also had an 
established secondary industry. Unable to produce its own manufactured 
goods, Australia developed an immense trade imbalance with the US, 
at a ratio of approximately 6:1.19
18  F.H. Stewart, ‘Australian Commercial Representation Abroad’, in Australian Foreign Policy, 
1934, eds H. Dinning and J. Holms (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press for Australian Institute 
of International Affairs, 1935), 11.
19  Raymold A. Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance: US–Australian Relations, 1931–1941 (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1964), 6–8, 13; Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
No. 26 (1933), 235–9. 
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The Great Depression exacerbated Australian–US trade tensions. 
In  June 1930, the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act was signed into law in the 
US. The Smoot–Hawley Tariff was designed to combat the falling value 
of US  imports and protect against foreign competition. The Act raised 
import duties on more than 20,000 goods, with an average increase of 
40 per cent. The agricultural sector was granted particularly high tariffs 
in response to the sharp decline globally in the price of agricultural 
goods. The US tariff on Australian wool—the nation’s principal export—
increased from an already high 31 cents per pound to 34 cents per pound.20 
Combined with Australia’s existing trade imbalance with the US, the new 
tariff rates sparked acrimony within Australian political and commercial 
circles. The Daily Commercial News and Shipping List, for instance, argued 
that the new higher tariffs would make the balancing of Australian trade 
with the US an impossibility. The paper pondered whether ‘Hawley and 
Smoot, the two gentlemen responsible for the new Tariff … are altogether 
devoid of any sense of proportion’.21 The Australian Association of British 
Manufacturers was particularly vociferous in its criticism of the Smoot–
Hawley Tariff and Australia’s longstanding trade deficit with the US, 
proposing a boycott against the nation.22 
The protectionist measures of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff and the Ottawa 
Agreements contributed to a reduced volume of two-way trade between 
Australia and the US. However, as Australia still relied on the US for 
manufactured goods, the adverse ratio of 6:1 remained relatively consistent 
throughout the depression.
Faced with the embarrassment of an ongoing trade imbalance, the 
Australian government sought to better position its trade in the US 
market. In June 1934, with the worst of the depression having passed, 
Lyons presented a draft trade treaty to the US Consul-General in Australia. 
The treaty tabled lower overall tariff rates and fixed quotas on Australian 
20  Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance, 6–8, 13; Richard N. Cooper, ‘Fettered to Gold? Economic Policy 
in the Interwar Period’, Journal of Economic Literature 30, no. 4 (1992): 2120–8, at pp. 2122–5. 
21  ‘Australian Imports and American Tariffs’, Daily Commercial News and Shipping List, [Sydney], 
16 July 1929, 4.
22  Australian Association of British Manufacturers, One-Way Traffic: Australia’s Trade with the 
United States (Melbourne: Australian Association of British Manufacturers, 1931), cited in Harper, 
Australia and the United States, 124. 
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meat, butter and wool.23 Lyons’ request was subsequently rejected. In the 
cable detailing this rejection, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained 
that the US was adopting a new framework for world trade premised 
on ‘lessening generally the obstacles to trade’ rather than restrictive trade 
treaties. The Reciprocal Tariff Act, passed in June 1934, was the first 
significant step towards US tariff reform. The Act gave the US President 
the power to negotiate bilaterally with foreign powers to reduce tariff 
duties on a reciprocal basis by up to 50 per cent without reference to 
Congress. Hull admitted that Australia would benefit little in the early 
stages of the trade liberalisation program, although he was optimistic 
that, as the program progressed, ‘certain Australian products … will be 
placed in a more favourable position’.24 In truth, the competing export 
industries of the two nations meant that, at least until Australia diversified 
its exports, it would be unlikely to receive any significant benefits from 
the US trade liberalisation program.25 With Australia’s traditional markets 
offering limited opportunities for growth, the government needed to 
locate new export markets.
Opportunities in regional markets
Australia’s first significant moves towards diversifying its export 
markets were in 1931. Herbert Gepp, a consultant on economic 
development to the  Prime Minister’s Department, was appointed to 
undertake an investigative mission to the Far East documenting the 
trade potential in the region. The University of Queensland Senate also 
commissioned a Far Eastern tour in 1931. A.C.V. Melbourne, Professor 
of History at the University of Queensland, visited Japan and China, 
making a comprehensive study of commercial, political and intellectual 
exchange opportunities. 
23  ‘Doc. 677, Caldwell (US Consul-General in Australia) to Hull (US Secretary of State), 5 June 
1934’ and ‘Doc. 679, O’Brien (Chairman US Tariff Commission) to Hull, 10 August 1934’, in Rogers 
P. Churchill, Matilda F. Axton, Shirley L. Landau, N.O. Sappington and Kieran J. Carroll (eds), 
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, 
Volume I (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950) [hereinafter FRUS 1934]. 
24  ‘Doc. 11, Hull to Caldwell, 15 January 1935’, in Rogers P. Churchill and N.O. Sappington (eds), 
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The British Commonwealth; Europe, 
Volume II (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952) [hereinafter FRUS 1935]. 
25  Esthus, From Enmity to Alliance, 13–18.
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The final reports of Gepp and Melbourne were markedly similar. Both 
men found the Asia-Pacific region, with its cheap and large labour force 
and growing industrialisation, presented immense import and export 
opportunities for Australia.26 Gepp concluded that, by virtue of these 
opportunities and Australia’s proximity, the nation’s future political 
and economic outlook would be ‘influenced materially by Pacific 
affairs’.27 To advance trading opportunities, both Gepp and Melbourne 
emphasised the importance of developing Australia’s regional reputation, 
recommending the appointment of trade representatives and a trade 
delegation visit to the Far East.28
The Gepp and Melbourne reports added weight to the voices of those in 
the Australian press and political circles also calling for the expansion of 
regional trade linkages.29 In February 1933, Stewart, who, it will be recalled, 
had questioned the limited opportunities in imperial markets, headed 
the Conference on Eastern Trade. In attendance were representatives 
from the federal and state governments, the Consuls-General of Japan, 
China and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), along with academics and 
representatives from the chambers of commerce and of manufacturers 
from across Australia. The attendees agreed that both the empire link and 
geography must dictate Australia’s trade relations.30 
The Conference on Eastern Trade led to the establishment of the Advisory 
Committee on Eastern Trade, with federal and state-level divisions, to 
investigate and promote regional economic opportunities. Melbourne 
served as chair of the federal and Queensland divisions of the advisory 
committee (1933–35). In this role, he reiterated the importance of regional 
26  Herbert Gepp, Report on Trade between Australia and the Far East (Canberra: Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1932); A.C.V. Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan 
and China (Brisbane: Fredrick Phillips, Government Printer, 1932).
27  Gepp, Report on Trade between Australia and the Far East, 63. 
28  ibid., 10–11, 13–14; Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China, 76, 
147–52.
29  For examples of media commentary on Australia’s trade opportunities in the Asia-Pacific, see 
‘Eastern Export Trade’, The Argus, [Melbourne], 8 May 1931, 4; ‘Eastern Trade’, The Brisbane Courier, 
9 February 1933, 10.
30  Shannon L. Smith, ‘Towards Diplomatic Representation’, in Facing North: A Century of 
Australian Engagement with Asia. Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, ed. David Goldsworthy (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), 70–2; ‘Far Eastern 
Trade’, The Australian Worker, [Sydney], 15 February 1933, 11.
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representation and it was on this advice that the federal government 
passed the Trade Commissioners Act 1933, restoring the Australian Trade 
Commissioner Service.31
The Gepp and Melbourne missions and the Conference on Eastern Trade 
indicate that, even as the Ottawa Agreements were being delineated, 
Australia was exploring opportunities outside its traditional markets. 
In  this, there was a tacit acknowledgement that the nation could not 
depend indefinitely on the Empire for its economic welfare.
Australia’s economic and security 
interests converge on Japan
In their individual reports, both Gepp and Melbourne paid particular 
attention to trade opportunities in Japan. Japan’s economy remained 
relatively controlled throughout the Great Depression as a result of its 
government’s decision to devalue the yen in December 1931, which 
stimulated exports. As exports grew, the Japanese government imposed 
exchange controls to keep imports from rising too quickly. These measures 
protected against overproduction, kept unemployment low and ensured 
a stable and relatively quick recovery.32 Japan’s recovery was further aided 
by the nation’s organisation and access to a ‘practically unlimited supply 
of cheap labour’, allowing goods to be produced efficiently and at a lower 
cost to consumers.33 
Japan’s efficient and controlled economy provided a relatively safe 
market in which Australia could expect increasing export opportunities. 
Furthermore, Japan was chiefly a manufacturing nation, yet it lacked 
the raw materials required to meet production needs. This provided an 
unmatched opportunity for Australia as an exporter of primary goods. 
Australian wool was in particularly high demand in Japan and came 
to dominate trade between the two nations. In the 1919–20 financial 
year, just 4 per cent of Australia’s exportable wool was being purchased 
31  James Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 75–6. The Trade Commissioner Service was established in 1918, only to be abandoned in 
1927 after poor results. Following this, Britain assumed control of dominion trade representation. 
32  Dick K. Nanto and Shinju Takagi, ‘Korekiyo Takahashi and Japan’s Recovery from the Great 
Depression’, The American Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 369–74, at pp. 370–2.
33  Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China, 11–13, 130–2.
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by Japan. By 1931–32, this had ballooned to almost 25 per cent.34 
The wool trade with Japan was largely responsible for positioning the 
nation as Australia’s second-best trading partner by 1930–31.35 Given 
the depression had greatly reduced Australia’s purchasing power, Japan’s 
affordable manufactured goods, particularly textiles, were in high demand. 
A mutually beneficial trade relationship appeared to be emerging—one 
that played a significant role in stabilising Australia’s economic position 
post depression.36 
Australia’s economic opportunities in Japan emerged against the backdrop 
of the Manchurian Crisis. Despite a longstanding fear of an expansionist 
Japan, Australia was reluctant to take action on the Manchurian 
Crisis, adopting a position of impartiality. Rather than a disinterest 
in  international affairs, Australia’s response can be better understood in 
relation to assessments about its economic and defensive interests.37 
Following Japan’s attack on and annexation of the Chinese province 
of Manchuria, the League of Nations appointed a commission of 
inquiry to determine the cause of the crisis and how best to remedy it. 
The commission was headed by the British Earl of Lytton and the report, 
known as the Lytton Report, was delivered in October 1932. Before the 
Lytton Report was made public, the situation in Manchuria deteriorated 
further, as the Japanese Army continued to extend its power and established 
the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Lytton Report, finding Japan in 
breach of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Washington 
Naval Treaty, recommended the nation withdraw from Manchuria. Japan 
refused to comply and was condemned by the league as an international 
34  I.M. Cumpston, ‘The Australian–Japanese Dispute of the Nineteen-Thirties’, The Australian 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1957): 45–55, at p. 50; Eric M. Andrews, ‘The Australian Government and the 
Manchurian Crisis, 1931–3’, Australian Outlook 35, no. 3 (1981): 307–16, at p. 310. 
35  By 1930–31, Japan was purchasing 10.56 per cent of Australia’s total exports, at a value of more 
than £9.5 million annually. Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 26 (1933), 
237–9.
36  Jack Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East (New York: International 
Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 27–8; Boris Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade: A History 
of the Australian Trade Commissioner Service (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2008), 46–8.
37  Ruth Megaw, ‘The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934: Its Significance in the 
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 59, no. 4 
(1973): 247–63, at pp. 247–8.
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aggressor. The league also adopted an official policy of non-recognition of 
Manchukuo. In March 1933, in response to this policy, Japan announced 
its withdrawal from the league, effective March 1935.38 
Australia was reluctant to adopt the league’s recommended response to 
the Manchurian Crisis. In addition to non-recognition of Manchukuo, the 
league had recommended economic sanctions against Japan in the hope 
this would discourage any further hostile actions. Japan was Australia’s 
second-best trading partner, with exports valued at more than 
£11.6 million annually.39 This trade was essential to the nation’s economic 
survival, and Australia did not wish to see sanctions introduced that would 
threaten this lucrative relationship.40 The Australian government voiced 
its disapproval of sanctions in a 1933 cable to Stanley Melbourne Bruce—
who was serving as Resident Minister in Britain and was appointed High 
Commissioner later that year—concluding that ‘economic sanctions 
should not be applied or even considered by the Commonwealth 
Government’. The hope was that Bruce could convince the British that 
sanctions would be regarded by the Japanese as an act of hostility.41 
Situated at the centre of empire policymaking, Bruce had access to the 
most influential individuals and committees. The diplomatic culture of 
Whitehall in the 1930s was a matter not simply of opportunity, but also 
of prestige. Bruce embraced this culture, building private and professional 
relationships with key British figures in the hope of engendering influence. 
He coupled cordial relations with vigorous diplomacy, regularly attending 
and speaking at Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) meetings at which 
he raised issues of importance to Australia.42 Official and private papers 
reveal that Bruce maintained regular correspondence with the Australian 
Prime Minister, Minister for External Affairs and other key ministers, 
offering advice on how best to respond to British policy developments.43 
38  Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 78–9; ‘“Actions of the League of Nations in the Sino-Japanese 
Crisis”, Report by Bruce, 17 January 1933’, NAA: A981, Chin 166 Part 2. 
39  Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 26 (1933), 237. Figures for 1931–32.
40  CPD: Representatives, 9 March 1933, No. 10, 139.
41  ‘Commonwealth government to Bruce, [n.d. (early 1933)]’, NAA: A981, Chin 125 Part 2.
42  P.G. Edwards, ‘The Rise and Fall of the High Commissioner: S.M. Bruce in London 1933–1945’, 
in Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship, eds A.F. Madden and W.H. Morris-Jones 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980), 39, 42–7; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 109–12.
43  Bruce’s correspondence and private papers during his time as High Commissioner can be found 
in Australian High Commission, United Kingdom [London]—Office of the High Commissioner: 
Official papers and correspondence maintained by Stanley Melbourne Bruce in London, 1932–45, 
NAA: M2236. 
47
2. INCREASING ASSERTIVENESS IN FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, 1931–35
In the case of the Manchurian Crisis, Bruce lobbied the British government 
to reject the sanctions against Japan. Fortuitously, Britain, with its own 
trade interests in Japan, was reluctant to adopt economic sanctions. 
The proposed sanctions were accordingly voted down due to a lack of 
support among the league.44 Britain did not, however, have reservations 
about the non-recognition of Manchukuo, adopting this policy in 
August 1933 despite Australia expressing its apprehension.45 
The second and more critical factor influencing Australia’s response to 
the Manchurian Crisis was security. As tensions increased in the Asia-
Pacific region, the British government was forced to acknowledge the 
inappropriateness of its recent defence planning. In February 1932, 
the annual defence review of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) was 
released. The review criticised the 10-year rule and its impact on British 
armed power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, where the position was 
deemed ‘about as bad as it could be’.46 On the advice of the COS, the 
10-year rule was cancelled, in March 1932.47 Despite the cancellation, the 
Australian government was cautioned that the unstable global economic 
situation would not permit greater defence commitments to the Asia-
Pacific, with work at the Singapore base continuing but not intensifying.48 
It is reasonable to conclude that the Australian government’s noncommittal 
approach to the situation in Manchuria was shaped by national security 
interests. In taking no action on non-recognition of Manchukuo, neither 
Japan nor China would be offended and, in turn, further antagonism in 
the region could be avoided. The records of the Australian Parliament 
and private government correspondence indicate this indeed contributed 
to Australia’s reluctance to take action. In the immediate aftermath of 
the Manchurian Crisis, the government was cautious when making 
comments on the situation, so much so that some accused the Lyons 
government of failing to keep the Parliament fully informed.49 Australia’s 
44  David S. Bird, J.A. Lyons: The ‘Tame Tasmanian’—Appeasement and Rearmament in Australia, 
1932–39 (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008), 37–8.
45  ‘Officer (External Affairs officer in London) to DEA, 10 August 1933’, NAA: A981, Man 7. 
46  ‘COS Annual Review 1932, 23 February 1932, TNA: CAB 4/2’, cited in Andrews, The Writing 
on the Wall, 108.
47  ‘Cabinet Meeting, 23 March 1932’, TNA: CAB 23/70/19.
48  ‘CID and Standing Defence Sub-Committee Meeting, 28 July 1932’, in Records of the Cabinet 
Office, Committee of Imperial Defence and Standing Defence Sub-committee: Minutes, TNA: 
CAB 2/5. 
49  For instance, see CPD: Representatives, 26 February 1932, No. 8, 413, and 3 March 1932, No. 9, 
577.
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Minister for External Affairs, John Latham, was particularly reluctant to 
make public statements. He simply emphasised his hope for a peaceful 
solution and avoided placing responsibility on any one nation, arguing 
that ‘it is inadvisable to make any statement in this Parliament concerning 
the possibility of aggression by a nation which is now friendly to us’.50 
Bruce was present at the League of Nations assembly when the Lytton 
Report was handed down. In his report to Lyons, he encouraged 
Australia to ‘remain friends of both parties [Japan and China] and strictly 
impartial’, suggesting no statement be made regarding non-recognition 
of Manchukuo.51 The government agreed, emphasising that its particular 
security interests would be served by a noncommittal approach. A cable 
Bruce received from his government stressed: 
[W]e are anxious not to adopt at any stage any attitude which 
might commit us to any participation in military etc. action 
on account of a quarrel between China and Japan in respect to 
Manchuria. This should be the guiding principle.52 
Australia postponed action on the league’s recommendations, eventually 
choosing to adopt a position of non-alignment.53 Clearly, Australia was 
tailoring its response to the unfolding crisis in its region that would deliver 
integrated economic and strategic outcomes. 
‘The whole of our interests’: The 1934 
Australian Eastern Mission
The 1934 Australian Eastern Mission (AEM) was Australia’s first 
diplomatic mission outside the British Empire. What little has been 
written on the AEM tends to characterise it as the personal venture of 
Latham and the swansong of his political career, as he went on to retire 
in September 1934.54 Far from an interesting yet ultimately unimportant 
episode that had ‘no lasting impact on Australian policy’, the AEM denotes 
50  CPD: Representatives, 19 February 1932, No. 7, 142.
51  ‘Bruce to Lyons, 22 December 1932’, NAA: A981, Chin 166 Part 2.
52  ‘Commonwealth government to Bruce, [n.d. (early 1933)]’, NAA: A981, Chin 125 Part 2.
53  Andrews, The Writing on the Wall, 95–7.
54  Megaw, ‘The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East in 1934’, 247–63; Edwards, Prime 
Ministers and Diplomats, 90–1.
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Australia’s appreciation of the relationship between trade, diplomacy and 
geography and a determination to integrate its distinct regional interests 
into the imperial outlook.55 
From March to June 1934, the mission, led by Latham, travelled through 
East and South-East Asia, visiting China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaya, 
the NEI and the Philippines.56 While the AEM was promoted as an 
exercise in goodwill, with newspaper reports couched in the language of a 
neighbourly ‘courtesy call’ and extending ‘the hand of friendship’—both 
Lyons and Latham privately contacted the press to request that it be referred 
to as such—the vested security and trade interests are easily identifiable.57 
In his preparation for the mission, Latham meticulously studied the 
nations he would visit, including local politics, customs and how the 
Australian government’s past policies had impacted its neighbours and 
shaped perceptions of Australia. Latham also cooperated with the British 
Foreign Office, drawing on its recommendations and knowledge—more 
extensive than that of Australia’s own embryonic DEA—to inform the 
AEM’s itinerary.58 The enthusiasm with which Latham approached these 
activities suggests he was keenly aware of the strategic capital of the AEM.
On his return, Latham made a speech to parliament in which he centred 
the security imperatives of the AEM. ‘The whole of our interests,’ he 
concluded, ‘therefore, lie in doing everything in our power to prevent the 
risk of war in the East from becoming a pulsing reality.’59 He expanded on 
this theme in his detailed report on the mission, which was disseminated 
widely throughout the government and business sector:
The continent of Australia is actually in the geographical area often 
described as ‘the East’. The risks attendant upon any disturbance 
of the peace or actual outbreak of war in that region are of the 
greatest moment to our people … Accordingly, the maintenance 
55  Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942 (Melbourne: Black Inc., 
2017), 17.
56  ‘Eastern Mission, 1934. Arrangements and Documentation’, NAA: A981, Far 2.
57  ‘The Hand of Friendship’, The Sun, [Sydney], 19 March 1934, and ‘Mission to East’, 
The Courier-Mail, [Brisbane], 24 March 1934, cuttings, both in NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 14.
58  For a detailed analysis of Latham’s cooperation with the British Foreign Office, see Michael 
Kilmister, ‘Antipodean imperialist: Sir John Latham, a political biography, 1902 to 1934’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Newcastle, 2018), 235–42. 
59  ‘Speech by Latham, 6 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16.
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of friendly relations between Australia and our neighbours and, 
more generally, the maintenance of peace in the East, should be 
the major objective of Australian foreign policy.60
Although not specified, Japan and the situation in Manchuria were 
likely the focus of Latham’s attention. This speculation is confirmed in 
private government correspondence and Latham’s confidential reports—
given only to Cabinet. While the AEM visited a number of Far Eastern 
nations, its true purpose can be found in its interactions with Japan. 
The significance of Japan was apparent from the preparatory stages of the 
AEM. The Foreign Office advised the Australian government that a visit 
to China was ‘very desirable if Japan is visited’.61 Latham supported this 
advice, however, he was reluctant to commit to an itinerary for China 
before plans in Japan were confirmed, fearing this would reduce the time 
spent in Japan.62 In the end, Latham spent roughly equal time in China 
and Japan. 
Latham’s interest in Japan rested on the situation in Manchuria. Following 
the League of Nations’ condemnation of Japan’s actions, the nation was 
isolated in the international community. As historian Ian Nish argues, 
the Australian government identified in this isolation an opportunity to 
promote bilateral relations that were conducive to national interests—
namely, convincing Japan to maintain league membership and stabilise 
the situation in Manchuria.63 During his time in Japan, Latham met with 
Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kōki Hirota. The two men discussed 
Japan’s league membership and the historical, political and social aspects 
of the situation in Manchuria, as Latham sought to understand Japan’s 
view on the matter.64 
Latham was unable to convince Hirota that Japan should remain in the 
league and, in the ‘Secret Report on the International Position in the 
Far  East’, he was markedly candid about the situation in Manchuria. 
‘It  appears to me,’ he wrote, ‘that the policy of non-recognition of 
Manchukuo is going to meet increasingly greater difficulties as time 
60  ‘Australian Eastern Mission 1934: Report of Latham, [n.d. (July 1934)]’, NAA: A981, Far 5 
Part 16.
61  ‘Bruce to Lyons, 15 December 1933’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 1.
62  ‘Latham to Bruce, 9 February 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 1. 
63  Ian Nish, ‘Relations with Japan’, in Between Empire and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from 
Federation Until the Second World War, eds Carl Bridge and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian 
Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 132. 
64  ‘Secret Report on International Position in Far East, 3 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16. 
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passes. So far as one can judge there is not the slightest probability that 
Manchukuo will cease to exist.’ Latham went on to offer a possible 
solution, recommending that 
consideration should be given to the possibility of discovering 
some formula which would enable both Japan and the League to 
‘save face’ and get rid of what threatens to be a permanent source 
of poison in the relations between Japan and other countries. It is 
most improbable that any conceivable formula would satisfy any 
of the Chinese factions, but that could not be helped.65
Despite the vagueness of Latham’s formula, the implications are clear: he 
judged Japan to be the priority for Australia’s regional policy and it should 
somehow be accommodated.
Although the Australian government was seeking to tailor a policy to its 
distinct regional circumstance, it was not seeking to break away from 
Britain and the Empire. Australia sought to use the imperial framework to 
meet its regional needs. This goal is evidenced in Latham’s emphasis on the 
significance of the AEM to the Empire. Latham’s public report concluded 
that the mission had contributed to a ‘friendly attitude towards Australia 
… This atmosphere should greatly assist in the solution of present and 
future problems’. Latham was conceivably referring to the significance 
of diplomatic ties in protecting Australia’s strategic interests in the Asia-
Pacific region. He went on to suggest that friendly relations with Japan 
were ‘of value not only to Australia, but also to the British Empire as 
a whole’. The link between the Asia-Pacific and the role Australia could 
play there as a member of the Empire was echoed in a remark made by 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs John Simon, whom Latham cited in 
his final report: ‘[The AEM] has been of the greatest value to Australia 
and the British Commonwealth of Nations in promoting good relations 
with the countries of the Far East.’66 In this emphasis on shared benefits, 
Australia was highlighting the significance of the Asia-Pacific region and 
the need to integrate it into the imperial strategic outlook.
The contributions of the AEM and Latham to Australia’s foreign policy 
thinking and increasing assertiveness within the imperial framework have 
been largely overlooked in the existing literature. Gregory Pemberton, 
65  ‘Secret Report, 3 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16. 
66  Simon was speaking in the House of Commons. ‘Report of Latham, July 1934’, NAA: A981, 
Far 5 Part 16. 
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for  instance, contends that Latham’s interest in the Asia-Pacific 
differentiated him from his colleagues, precluding many of his proposals 
from gaining support and going on to shape policy.67 Both the government’s 
earlier interest in regional economic opportunities and Lyons’ efforts at 
the 1935 meeting of the dominion leaders (Leaders’ Meeting) discount 
Pemberton’s thesis. The Leaders’ Meeting was organised to coincide with 
the silver jubilee celebrations of King George V and Queen Mary and was 
not an imperial conference; Australia’s express request for a gathering of 
this calibre had in fact been rejected.68 Foreign affairs and defence were, 
accordingly, given little attention by the British government in preparations 
for the meeting. For Lyons, however, this being his first overseas trip as 
prime minister, the Leaders’ Meeting was an opportunity for consultation 
in imperial policymaking. He arrived in London armed with a detailed 
report on foreign affairs and an agenda including British rearmament and 
imperial policy towards the mounting unrest in the Far East and Europe.69 
So seriously, in fact, did the Australian Prime Minister take the Leaders’ 
Meeting that one newspaper reported the nation’s delegation was almost 
equal in size to all the other delegations combined.70
During the third session of the Leaders’ Meeting, Lyons tabled the Far East 
and foreign policy as topics for discussion. He requested more information 
from the British government on its relations with Japan, indicating that 
the League of Nations’ policy towards Manchukuo left him concerned 
about the prospects for long-term peace in Australia’s immediate region. 
In a plea to restore Anglo-Japanese relations, Lyons offered a solution: 
‘some sort of pact of security for all the nation’s [sic] bordering on the 
Pacific Ocean’.71 Here Lyons was echoing his predecessors Alfred Deakin 
and William Morris Hughes, who, in 1909 and 1918, respectively, had 
67  Gregory Pemberton, ‘An Imperial Imagination: Explaining the Post-1945 Foreign Policy of 
Robert Gordon Menzies’, in Menzies in War and Peace, ed. Frank Cain (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1997), 160. 
68  ‘Hankey (CID Secretary and Cabinet Secretary) Diary, 2 October 1934, TNA: CAB 63/66’, 
cited in Bird, J.A. Lyons, 94.
69  ‘“Report on Foreign Affairs”, Bruce to Lyons, 7 March 1935’, in Prime Minister’s Department: 
Correspondence files, annual single number series with occasional ‘G’ [General Representations] infix 
[Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1903–, NAA: A463, 1957/1060.
70  ‘Lyons’ Jubilee Jaunt: London Surprised at Big Retinue’, Sunday Times, [Perth], 27 January 
1935, 1. 
71  ‘Minutes Third Meeting of Leaders, 9 May 1935’, NAA: A981, Imp 135.
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proposed a Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific to be underpinned by US 
and British security guarantees.72 Just as Latham’s earlier so-called formula 
had recommended, Lyons’ pact included the recognition of Manchukuo:
Were the Japanese to be allowed to expand in their own area … 
and if not, was there not a fear that the Japanese would turn to the 
Southern Pacific? The question of the recognition of Manchukuo 
was relevant … The recognition of Manchukuo would go a long 
way to remove any feeling of antagonism on the part of the 
Japanese.73
Lyons saw in Japan a threat to Far Eastern security and feared the nation 
may turn its attention towards Australia. He looked to the Empire for 
a collective approach to prevent this from eventuating. Lyons’ proposal was 
not taken seriously and was quickly set aside, with British representatives 
dismissing Manchukuo as ‘irrelevant’ to the future of Anglo-Japanese 
relations and other dominion leaders indicating that Manchukuo was 
a League of Nations matter and not a question for the Empire.74
Both the AEM and Lyons’ efforts at the 1935 Leaders’ Meeting represent 
an increasing pragmatism in Australian foreign policymaking, as the 
nation developed an approach distinct to its geographical locality. This 
approach was underpinned by a desire to shape the imperial framework to 
deliver regional security outcomes. The imperial response was indicative 
of Australia’s continuing challenge to convince the rest of the Empire of 
the importance of the Asia-Pacific in strategic planning.
Strategic integration into the 
Japanese market
Although the AEM was promoted as an exercise in friendship and goodwill 
and ‘not’, as Lyons explained to Bruce, ‘in search of trade’, trade invariably 
came into play.75 Latham was a supporter of the Ottawa Agreements and 
the benefits they accrued for Australian exports. He was also candid in 
72  ‘Deakin to Crewe (Secretary of State for the Colonies), 27 September 1909, TNA: FO 
800/91/77’, cited in Meaney, A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, vol. 1, 199; 
‘Australia to Have a Monroe Doctrine’, The New York Times, 1 June 1918, 9.
73  ‘Minutes Third Meeting of Leaders, 9 May 1935’, NAA: A981, Imp 135.
74  ibid.
75  ‘Lyons to Bruce, 13 December 1933’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 1. 
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his belief that Ottawa need not constrain the development of foreign 
trade relationships. In a statement in the House of Representatives, 
Latham remarked that the Ottawa Agreements were ‘the first step towards 
maintaining and extending the most important of all these markets 
[the imperial market] for the Australian producer’. He went on to share 
his hopes that agreements ‘along the same line’ as Ottawa would develop 
between Australia and foreign nations, concluding: 
Without foreign trade, there would be no chance whatever of our 
maintaining anything approaching our present standard of living. 
Australia needs her markets overseas. It is important to us that we 
shall develop and cultivate real and friendly relations with nations 
that afford markets for our producers of many commodities.76
While he acknowledged that intra-empire economic cooperation was 
valuable, he believed it was ‘obvious that our economic destiny … is 
already largely and may be determined even more largely in the future by 
the volume of trade we do with the countries of the East’.77 
Following the AEM, Latham prepared three confidential reports on 
Australia’s trade interests in the Asia-Pacific. By virtue of Japan’s large 
volume of trade with Australia, there was an entire report dedicated to 
Australian–Japanese bilateral trade. The nation also featured prominently 
in the other two reports, which dealt with wool sales and the appointment 
of Australian trade commissioners. During the AEM’s visit to Japan, 
Arthur Moore, an information officer from the Department of Trade 
and Customs, met with Saburō Kurusu, the Director of the Commercial 
Bureau in the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs. Although it was 
agreed that no definite decisions would be made, the meeting allowed 
both men to voice their hopes for future trade relations. Kurusu presented 
a litany of grievances concerning Australian trade policy and potential 
solutions. Chief among his requests was the negotiation of a trade treaty 
and establishment of a direct link with Australia, rather than, as had been 
the case in the past, a British official acting on the nation’s behalf.78 While 
76  CPD: Representatives, 23 May 1933, No. 21, 1933, 1651.
77  ‘Speech by Latham, 6 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16.
78  ‘Confidential Report on Trade between Australia and Japan, 30 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 
Part 16; Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade, 50–3. 
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Latham made no specific recommendations for the negotiation of a trade 
treaty, believing this to be beyond his jurisdiction as Minister for External 
Affairs, he did note that ‘it would be very wise to act promptly’.79
The AEM reports and the increasing importance of the Japanese market 
influenced the Australian government’s decision to commence trade 
treaty negotiations with Japan.80 In December 1934, a small Japanese 
delegation arrived in Australia to negotiate the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation. Negotiations opened in February the 
following year.81 The  Japanese government identified high tariffs and 
the imperial preference system as barriers to the export of Japanese goods. 
Early negotiations accordingly focused on remediating these barriers.82 
Although the negotiation of a trade treaty appeared to be a natural 
progression of Australia’s expanding economic and diplomatic interests 
in Japan, as will be seen in Chapter 3, imperial interests complicated 
this process.
Latham enthusiastically supported the appointment of an Australian trade 
commissioner in Tokyo with visions of a dual role.83 The first role was the 
more obvious, being a representative of Australian trade interests. For the 
financial year 1932–33, Japan’s purchases from Australia totalled more 
than £13.9 million. Australia’s purchases were £3.7 million in return.84 
At a ratio of more than 3:1, this was not a sustainable exchange for Japan 
and Latham reported criticism among the Japanese government and 
the press concerning the imbalance. He accordingly encouraged greater 
purchases if Australia wished to maintain, and in time increase, its share in 
79  ‘Confidential Report on Trade, 30 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16.
80  The Japanese government had initially proposed a trade treaty in April 1932. The Australian 
government, however, postponed action until after the upcoming Imperial Economic Conference. 
The Ottawa Agreements ultimately limited action on bilateral trade treaties with foreign nations and 
the treaty discussions with Japan were set aside. ‘Confidential Report on Trade, 30 July 1934’, NAA: 
A981, Far 5 Part 16.
81  CPD: Representatives, 12 December 1944, No. 50, 1077.
82  ‘Australia and Japan Seek Trade Treaty’, Far Eastern Survey 4, no. 11 (1935): 86–7; ‘“Draft Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation between Japan the Commonwealth of Australia”, Memorandum by 
Abbott (Comptroller-General Department of Trade and Customs) to Prime Minister’s Department, 
7 February 1935’, NAA: A981, Trad 68 Part 2. 
83  ‘Confidential Report on Appointment of Trade Commissioners, 20 July 1934’, in Prime 
Minister’s Department: Papers collected in the offices of the Secretary and the Prime Minister, 1901–
39, NAA: CP290/1, 10; ‘Broadcast Address of Leader of Australian Eastern Mission, Rt Hon. J.G. 
Latham, during his visit to Japan, 15 May 1934’, in D.B. Copland and C.V. Janes (eds), Australian 
Trade Policy: A Book of Documents (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1937), 257. Trade commissioners 
were also dispatched to China and the NEI.
84  Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 28 (1935), 255, 257. 
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the Japanese market. The appointment of a trade commissioner in Tokyo 
would aid this process, as they could report to the government on bilateral 
trade opportunities and act as an advocate for Australian exports in the 
Japanese market.85
Latham also believed a trade commissioner could assume the role 
of  a  quasi-diplomat. The trade commissioner posting would provide 
a permanent link between Japan and Australia. Latham emphasised 
the significance of a quasi-diplomatic role in view of the ‘powerful 
influence’ of the Japanese press, which ‘plays a big part in forming public 
opinion’.86 A trade commissioner could build a rapport with the media, 
government and public in what Latham described as a ‘persistent and 
tactful … propaganda’.87 In this way, Australian policy pertinent to Japan 
could be immediately clarified, ensuring misunderstanding and potential 
resentment were avoided. Not only would this diplomatic activity 
promote Australia’s trade interests, it also would improve relations with 
Japan, theoretically contributing to regional stability and protecting the 
nation against future hostility.
Latham paid great attention to the character of the man who would be 
appointed as trade commissioner in Tokyo, detailing the honour and 
respect bestowed on government officials in Japanese culture. It  was, 
he stressed, imperative someone be appointed who would ‘inspire 
confidence, trust and friendliness’.88 Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Longfield 
Lloyd, who had served as an advisor and interpreter during the AEM and, 
significantly, had a background in intelligence, was appointed Australia’s 
first trade commissioner in Tokyo with a personal recommendation from 
Latham. He arrived in Tokyo in October 1935.89 
William Macmahon Ball, who worked with Longfield Lloyd in Japan 
following the nation’s defeat in and occupation after World War II, later 
questioned his suitability for the posting. Macmahon Ball was critical of 
Longfield Lloyd’s Japanese-language skills and believed his knowledge 
85  ‘Report of Latham, July 1934’ and ‘Confidential Report on Trade, 30 July 1934’, both in NAA: 
A981, Far 5 Part 16.
86  ‘Report of Latham, July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16.
87  ‘Confidential Report on Trade Commissioners, 20 July 1934’, NAA: CP290/1, 10.
88  ‘Confidential Report Appointment of Trade Commissioners, 20 July 1934’, NAA: CP290/1, 10.
89  Nish, ‘Relations with Japan’, 133. 
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of  Japan to be ‘exceedingly meagre and unreliable’.90 These criticisms 
aside, Longfield Lloyd approached his dual role with much industry, 
particularly as a quasi-diplomat. Official dispatches from Tokyo reveal 
that he established a close working relationship with Japanese officials. 
As  economic historian Boris Schedvin notes, he was particularly 
‘assiduous in digging out material and making it available to Australian 
authorities’, providing fastidiously detailed reports about the political 
and economic situation in Japan as it related to Australia.91 These reports 
included strategic insight. For instance, Longfield Lloyd monitored 
Japan’s developments at the Yampi Sound mine in Western Australia, 
commenting on the likelihood of Japan using economic projects in 
Australia as a base for an offensive strategy.92 From the perspective of 
Australia—in an unpredictable region and with a desperate need to expand 
its export markets—economic engagement with Japan could contribute 
to the nation’s economic and physical security.
In addition to trade commissioner appointments, 1935 also saw the DEA 
undergo a major restructure and receive full administrative autonomy. 
Previously, the DEA had been presided over by the Prime Minister’s 
Department and the two departments had shared a secretary. In April 
1934, as foreign affairs took on increasing significance and required greater 
resources, the position of Assistant Secretary of the DEA was established 
and filled by Lieutenant-Colonel William Roy Hodgson. Hodgson had 
an extensive military background, having served as the Australian Military 
Forces (AMF) head of military intelligence (1925–34). In this role, he had 
specialised in military intelligence in the Far East, including the rise of 
Japan and how Australia could respond to the threat of regional aggression. 
In November 1935, the DEA gained full administrative autonomy and 
Hodgson was appointed secretary.93
90  ‘Report to the Prime Minister on a Mission to Japan, 1 September 1947’, in W. Macmahon Ball, 
Intermittent Diplomat: The Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. Macmahon Ball, ed. Alan Rix (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1988), 272–3.
91  Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade, 61. There are numerous dispatch files from Longfield Lloyd. Those 
most pertinent to his early years as trade commissioner include ‘Japan–Australia Trade Relations 
Dispatches from Trade Commissioner’, in Department of Commerce: Correspondence files, multiple 
number series, 1935–48, NAA: A601, 402/17/28; ‘Japan—General File—Part I’, NAA: A601, 
402/17/15; ‘Japan—General File—Part II, NAA: A601, 402/17/2.
92  ‘Implications of Japanese Southward Expansion Movt’, NAA: A601, 402/17/30. 
93  Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 92–3; W.J. Hudson, Towards a Foreign Policy, 1914–
1941 (Melbourne: Cassell, 1967), 37–8.
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While there is nothing to suggest the AEM or the appointment of trade 
commissioners influenced the restructuring of the DEA, against the 
backdrop of these developments, the decision is a marker of Australia’s 
growing attention to foreign affairs and the need for its own professional, 
if embryonic, diplomatic service.
Australia’s activities in the years 1931–35 do not constitute a complete 
foreign policy; however, they do demonstrate a concerted attempt 
by Australian policymakers to define the national interest in relation 
to Australia’s unique regional, economic and strategic circumstances. 
Foresight and keen appreciation of the components of the national 
interest accordingly emerge. This is a pragmatism that has been largely 
overlooked and, when it is noted, it is gestured to, rather than unpacked 
and its development carefully traced, as has been done here. Though 
the Australian government was developing an increasing assertiveness in 
foreign and economic policy, there was nothing to suggest this was at the 
expense of the imperial link. Rather, Australia actively sought to enmesh 
its region-specific interests within the imperial framework, in an attempt 
to reshape the outlook of the Empire into one that better served Australia’s 
unique strategic position. Yet, as the next chapter explores, balancing 
regional and imperial interests was not so easily achieved.
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Expectations of the empire 
connection and the Trade 
Diversion Policy, 1936–37
Hugh White, in what has become a familiar refrain in assessments of 
Australia’s contemporary relations with China and the US, argues that 
today is the first time in the nation’s history that ‘our biggest trading 
partner—and our biggest potential trading partner—has not been a close 
ally’. This situation is complicated by the fact that China is a strategic rival 
of the US.1 While White rejects the notion, many hold that Australia need 
not choose between China and the US and the trade and security interests 
they represent.2 These assertions disregard the situation in the 1930s, 
when Japan was both a significant market for Australian goods—at one 
1  Lowy Institute, ‘In conversation: Hugh White on How to Defend Australia’ (Lowy Institute, 
Sydney, 16 July 2019), available from: www.lowyinstitute.org/news-and-media/multimedia/audio/
conversation-hugh-white-how-defend-australia. See also, Peter Greste, ‘China Rising: The Challenges 
for Australia as China and the US Struggle for Supremacy in Asia’, Four Corners, [ABC TV], 3 October 
2016, available from: www.abc.net.au/4corners/four-corners-china-rising-promo/7890504.
2  For assertions and assessments of this view, see Alex Lavelle, ‘Australia Doesn’t Have to Choose 
US Over China or Vice Versa’, The Age, [Melbourne], 1 March 2018, available from: www.theage.com.
au/national/australia-doesn-t-have-to-choose-us-over-china-or-vice-versa-20180301-p4z2cd.html; Rod 
Lyon, ‘What Happened to the “Canberra Consensus” on Australia–China Relations?’, The Strategist, 
3  July 2019 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute), available from: www.aspistrategist.org.
au/what-happened-to-the-canberra-consensus-on-australia-china-relations/. Remy Davidson judged 
the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper to be a continuation of Australia’s policy of hedging its bets. 
Remy Davidson, ‘Australia is Hedging its Bets on China With the Latest Foreign Policy White Paper’, 
The  Conversation, 23 November 2017, available from: theconversation.com/australia-is-hedging-its-
bets-on-china-with-the-latest-foreign-policy-white-paper-88009. Until recently, White was himself 
of the view that Australia need not choose between China and the US as the two nations could be 
convinced to share power. 
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point, Australia’s second-best export market—and a challenger to British 
commercial interests and dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. The 1936 
Trade Diversion Policy was a point at which Australia did, in fact, choose, 
highlighting the interplay between trade, diplomacy and defence and the 
nation’s longstanding dilemma of constructing foreign policy within an 
asymmetrical relationship.
On 22 May 1936, Henry Gullett, who was responsible for the negotiation 
of trade treaties, announced a new protectionist policy targeting Japanese 
textile imports. This policy was known as trade diversion. Japan’s 
immediate and predictable response was to boycott Australian exports, 
leading to a heated, albeit short-lived, trade war. Although the Australian 
government suggested the trade diversion measures were designed to 
eradicate its trade deficit, Japan was the nation’s second-best trading 
partner with a balance of trade firmly in Australia’s favour.3
There are two prevailing assessments of the Trade Diversion Policy. 
For many, the contradictory economic logic of trade diversion renders the 
episode a disaster that ‘achieved a maximum of irritation with a minimum 
of benefit’ as Joseph Lyons’ government naively sacrificed trade relations 
with Japan for the sake of British textile producers.4 Kosmas Tsokhas and 
others reject this ‘imperial fallacy’ in which Australia was a ‘passive victim’ 
of British pressure.5 Instead, trade diversion was a calculated gamble 
influenced by domestic politics that was designed to better position 
Australian exports in the British market, and any benefits afforded to 
Britain were only of secondary importance.6 
3  ‘“Considerations which led to the Adoption of the Trade Diversion Policy”, Department of 
Trade and Customs Memorandum, [n.d. (1937)]’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/52A.
4  Eggleston, Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy, 3. See also J.B. O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National 
Interest in Australian–British Relations During the 1930s’, Historical Studies 22, no. 89 (1987): 569–86; 
Stuart Ward, ‘Sentiment and Self-Interest: The Imperial Ideal in Anglo-Australian Commercial Culture’, 
Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (2001): 91–108, at p. 93.
5  Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘The Wool Industry and the 1936 Trade Diversion Dispute Between Australia 
and Japan’, Australian Historical Studies 23, no. 93 (1989): 442–61, at p. 459.
6  ibid., 442–61; Kosmas Tsokhas, Markets, Money and Empire: The Political Economy of the Australian 
Wool Industry (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1990), 12–15, 98–118. See also Drummond, 
Imperial Economic Policy, 1917–1939, 375–6, 398–406; D.C.S. Sissons, ‘Manchester v. Japan: The 
Imperial Background of the Australian Trade Diversion Dispute With Japan, 1936’, Australian Outlook 
30, no. 3 (1976): 480–502, at pp. 495–8; D.C.S. Sissons, ‘Private Diplomacy in the 1936 Trade Dispute 
With Japan’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 27, no. 2 (1981): 143–59.
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Despite their differences, these two assessments similarly depict trade 
diversion within a vacuum, overlooking the range of pressures that 
contributed to the policy and had been building for several years. This 
chapter broadens the historical understanding of the trade diversion 
episode and its aftermath by bringing into focus the interplay between 
economics, security and the expectations of empire membership, in terms 
of both British pressure to act on behalf of its economic interests and what 
Australia sought to negotiate in return. What emerges from the Trade 
Diversion Policy case study is an important lesson, for the Australian 
policymakers of the 1930s and today. 
The Trade Diversion Policy
In February 1935, in what appeared to be a very natural progression 
after years of increasing commercial relations, negotiations opened 
between Japan and Australia for the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation. Early negotiations focused on a reciprocal most-favoured 
nation (MFN) status and greater liberty for cargo ships to port. 
The negotiation process appeared outwardly smooth and it was generally 
assumed a mutually beneficial settlement would be reached.7 It therefore 
came as somewhat of a surprise when negotiations reached a stalemate 
in March 1936. The central issue was Gullett’s advice to the Japanese 
Consul-General, Kuaramatsu Murai, that unless Japan agreed to 
a voluntary quota on rayon and cotton piece goods exported to Australia, 
negotiations could not continue. The proposed quota was 75 million 
square yards (62.7 million square metres) per annum, compared with the 
152 million square yards (127 million sq m) purchased by Australia in the 
previous financial year. In return, Gullett offered an intermediate tariff 
rate. This rate established a median between the tariff rates foreign nations 
paid and those paid by empire nations as stipulated in the 1932 Ottawa 
Agreements.8 In the context of negotiating a trade treaty and Australia’s 
significantly favourable trade balance, Japan expected reciprocal trade to be 
7  ‘Revised Draft Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 13 February 1935’, NAA: A981, Trad 68 Part 2. MFN grants the best possible trade terms 
to a trading partner. Other MFNs would be treated equally, but not better. For Australia, this would 
be MFN status outside the benefits enjoyed by other members of the British Empire.
8  ‘Longfield Lloyd (Trade Commissioner in Japan), to Murphy (Secretary Department of 
Commerce), 12 March 1936’ and ‘Longfield Lloyd to Murphy, 16 March 1936’, NAA: A601, 
402/17/28.
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expanded rather than restricted. Gullett’s proposal was simply unacceptable 
and Japan’s refusal to cooperate led to the breakdown of negotiations. 
On 22 May 1936, Gullett announced the Trade Diversion Policy.9 
With a narrow range of primary exports and reliance on foreign 
markets for manufactured goods, Australia continued to struggle to 
maintain a  balance-of-payments surplus. The Trade Diversion Policy 
was promoted as addressing this problem by increasing sales of primary 
exports, expanding the nation’s developing secondary industries and, 
in turn, increasing employment. The Trade Diversion Policy amended 
the licensing system for foreign goods, prohibiting the importation of 
more than 90 classes of goods unless the Australian government granted 
special approval. Additionally, the customs duties on foreign rayon and 
cotton were increased to 40 per cent and between 68 and 85 per cent, 
respectively.10 
These measures targeted so-called bad customers—those nations 
benefiting from unfair trade advantages or with whom Australia had 
a trade imbalance. It was hoped the threat of exclusion would force bad 
customer nations to pursue a more favourable position in Australia’s 
market. Conversely, ‘good customers’ could easily apply for a licence, 
thereby exempting them from the new restrictions. Australia expected to 
benefit in kind with increased purchases from good customers.11 In this 
way, Gullett informed the House of Representatives: ‘[W]e have resolved 
to give more room in this market to those who are our great buyers, and 
somewhat less room to those who are indifferent buyers.’12
The two countries most affected by trade diversion were the US and Japan. 
The US was a bad customer. In the face of a continuing trade imbalance, 
a series of embarrassing and ill-fated proposals for an Australian–US 
bilateral trade agreement and mounting pressure from commercial circles, 
the Australian government ‘had no alternative but to seek an adjustment 
of the unsatisfactory trade position by unilateral action’.13 Trade diversion 
sought to protect Australia’s primary and fledging secondary industries 
9  CPD: Representatives, 22 May 1936, No. 21, 2211–20.
10  ibid.; ‘Adoption of Trade Diversion Policy, [n.d. (1937)]’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/52A.
11  ‘“Government’s Courageous Trade Policy”, Press Release, Prime Minister’s Department, 1 June 
1936’, in Prime Minister’s Department: Records relating to the Imperial Conference, 1937, NAA: 
CP4/2, 33. 
12  CPD: Representatives, 22 May 1936, No. 21, 2213.
13  ‘The Trade Diversion Policy, [n.d. (1937)]’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/52A.
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against the United States’ developed and heavily subsidised industries.14 
The Department of Trade and Customs estimated an annual gain of more 
than £580,000 in increased sales from Australia’s secondary industries as 
a result of the new measures affecting the US.15
While the US was undeniably a bad customer, the same could not be 
said of Japan. That nation’s response was swift and harsh. On 25 June 
1936, the Japanese government announced a boycott of Australian wool 
purchases. A special import duty of 50 per cent was also introduced for 
other Australian goods. The Australian government retaliated by placing 
licensing restrictions on a further 38 classes of Japanese exports.16 The two 
nations were locked in a trade war. 
The inconsistency of trade diversion in Australia’s recent trade relations 
with Japan sparked a great deal of criticism among the Australian public. 
R.L. Curthoys, former editor of Melbourne’s The Argus and an Australian 
correspondent for The Times of London, concluded that the policy was 
‘a complete repudiation’ of the 1934 AEM and the appointment of a trade 
commissioner in Tokyo, ‘the obvious implication’ of which was ‘that 
Australia intended to do more business with her Pacific neighbours’.17 
Among the most vocal in their criticism of trade diversion were, 
unsurprisingly, Australian wool producers. Prior to May 1936, Australia 
had provided Japan with an estimated 85–95 per cent of its raw wool 
requirements—one-quarter of Australia’s total annual wool clip.18 Joseph 
P. Abbott, Vice-Chairman of the Australian Woolgrowers’ Council and 
President of the Graziers’ Association of New South Wales, described 
Japan’s wool purchases as having sustained the Australian wool industry 
during the Great Depression and being ‘an outstanding factor’ in the 
nation’s ongoing economic recovery.19 The architects of trade diversion 
had initially assumed that Japan’s dependence on Australian wool would 
force the nation to negotiate a quick settlement and accept a voluntary 
14  ibid.
15  CPD: Representatives, 22 May 1936, No. 21, 2214. It was estimated that more than £1.7 million 
in trade would be diverted annually from the US. For a recent assessment of the impact of trade 
diversion on Australian–US commercial relations, see Shannon Tow, Independent Ally: Australia in an 
Age of Power Transition (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2017), 84–113. 
16  R.D. Westmore, ‘Japan and the Trade Diversion Policy’, The Australian Quarterly 9, no. 1 (1937): 
93–6, at p. 95. 
17  R.L. Curthoys, ‘Australia in the Changing East’, Foreign Affairs 15, no. 4 (1937): 750–6, at p. 752.
18  Cumpston, ‘The Australian–Japanese Dispute of the Nineteen-Thirties’, 50.
19  ‘Statement by Vice-Chairman of Australian Woolgrowers’ Council, J.P. Abbott, at deputation 
to Prime Minister, J.A. Lyons, 17 July 1936’, in Copland and Janes, Australian Trade Policy, 295.
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textile quota. Although Australian wool was preferable, Japan was able 
to meet its needs by importing from South Africa.20 With the boycott in 
place and an alternative wool supply sourced, the value of Japan’s wool 
purchases from Australia fell by almost 50 per cent between 1935–36 
and 1936–37.21 During the 1937 annual conference of the Graziers’ 
Association of New South Wales, an irate Abbott restated the damages 
of trade diversion, remarking that wool was Australia’s ‘lifeblood’ and 
‘those who would cut us off from our international markets would cut the 
carotid artery of the nation and bleed Australia to death’.22
For Abbott and his contemporaries, it appeared that Australia’s commercial 
interests had been sacrificed on the ‘altar of Imperial sentiment’.23 
In  addition to the higher import duties on foreign textiles introduced 
under trade diversion, the imperial preference tariff on British textiles was 
lowered.24 In terms of fiscal returns, Britain was the largest benefactor of 
trade diversion. Of the estimated £2.3 million that would be diverted 
annually from bad customers, £1.3 million would benefit British 
producers. Australia expected to receive considerably less at £845,000. 
The remanding trade would be diverted to other good customers, 
predominantly within the Empire.25 To critics of trade diversion, the 
government appeared to have disregarded Japan’s competitive advantage 
in textile production, along with the benefits to Australian consumers 
of affordable manufactured goods, in an attempt to protect British 
trade interests.26
Following Japan’s retaliatory actions, Australian Prime Minister Joseph 
Lyons offered his government’s justification for the trade diversion 
measures in a nationwide radio broadcast. Lyons lay ‘the entire 
20  ‘Longfield Lloyd to Murphy, 16 June 1936’, NAA: A1667, 194/B/4/A/2 Part 1. 
21  Japan’s wool purchases from Australia for 1935–36 totalled £14.6 million; for 1936–37, wool 
purchases totalled only £7.5 million. Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 30 
(1937), 511, and No. 31 (1938), 515.
22  ‘Address of the President of the Graziers’ Association of NSW, J.P. Abbott, at Twentieth Annual 
Conference, 1 Mach 1937’, in Copland and Janes, Australian Trade Policy, 298.
23  Edward Masey, Is It Necessary? An Examination of the Commonwealth Government’s Trade 
Diversion Policy (Sydney: Stafford Printing, 1936), 11. 
24  CPD: Representatives, 22 May 1936, No. 21, 2215–17.
25  ibid., 2214; Earl Page, Truant Surgeon: The Inside Story of Forty Years of Australian Political 
Life, ed. Ann Mozley (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1963), 246. These figures did not account for 
motor vehicle chassis—exports of which received a separate licensing system and duties to account 
for British Empire member Canada’s proximity to the US—nor benefits to Lancashire, which were 
estimated at £10 million annually. 
26  Masey, Is It Necessary, 3, 10, 14–18; ‘Press Statement by the Premier of Queensland, William 
Forgan Smith, 28 December 1936’, in Copland and Janes, Australian Trade Policy, 323.
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responsibility’ for trade diversion at the foot of Japan and its textile 
exporters, who had ‘continuously and drastically’ reduced the prices of 
their goods beyond reasonable competition. The Australian textile market 
had traditionally been reserved for British exports. As Japan’s prices fell, 
the market in Australia for British textiles ‘was doomed to extinction’.27 
In 1932, Britain had sold 167 million square yards (140 million sq m) of 
cotton piece goods and 8 million square yards (6.7 million sq m) of rayon 
piece goods to Australia. By 1935, this had fallen to 90 million square 
yards (75.3 million sq m) and 7.25 million square yards (6 million sq m). 
In 1932, foreign producers—for the most part, Japanese—accounted 
for 40 million square yards (33.4 million sq m) of cotton piece goods 
and 13 million square yards (10.9 million sq m) of rayon piece goods. 
By 1935, this had increased to 90 million square yards and 68.5 million 
square yards (57.3 million sq m), respectively.28 Trade diversion sought to 
arrest this. 
Lyons argued that Australia refused to ‘weaken in its firm resolve to adhere 
to its Empire trade treaty obligations and—above and beyond all material 
considerations—to the Empire bond’. Britain’s textile market was closely 
linked to Australia’s overseas trade. Australia had a narrow range of primary 
exports and relied on British purchases.29 In the past, textile purchases from 
Britain had partially offset Britain’s immense purchases from Australia. 
However, as Australia’s market for British textiles contracted—Japan 
having replaced Britain as Australia’s largest textile supplier in 1934—the 
nation could not expect Britain to continue purchasing large volumes of its 
exports. Lyons pointed out that if sales to Britain fell Australia would ‘sell 
very little indeed’ anywhere else, leaving the nation’s farmers and graziers 
to ‘face ruin’. Valuable as trade with Japan was, for every pound it spent in 
Australia, Britain spent four. Moreover, Japan’s purchases were centred on 
wool and wheat, while Britain purchased from across Australia’s primary 
and incipient secondary sectors.30
27  ‘“The Truth about the Japanese Trade Position”, Lyons broadcast, 25 June 1936’, NAA: A981, 
Trad 68 Part 2.
28  CPD: Representatives, 22 May 1936, No. 21, 2214–15.
29  Britain was Australia’s best overall customer, purchasing nearly 50 per cent of Australia’s total 
overseas trade. Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 30 (1937), 506.
30  ‘“The Truth about the Japanese Trade Position”, Lyons broadcast, 25 June 1936’, NAA: A981, 
Trad 68 Part 2.
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The Trade Diversion Policy overlapped with attempts by the Australian 
government to increase its beef exports to Britain. Tsokhas argues that trade 
diversion pandered to imperial sentiment and the appearance of sacrifices 
in the Japanese market in the interest of British textile manufacturers in 
exchange for a privileged position for Australian meat and other primary 
produce in the British market.31 While government documents confirm 
that exports to Britain did shape the Australian government’s approach 
to trade diversion, Tsokhas’s assessment disregards the strategic object 
of the economic and diplomatic relations Australia had cultivated with 
Japan over the previous half-decade. These activities are rendered as little 
more than part of a broader political ploy designed to pressure the British 
government. This is a misrepresentation of the relationship between 
the domestic and international spheres in Australian decision-making. 
To understand what motivated the Australian government to adopt trade 
diversion and the protracted process of arriving at this decision, we must 
consider events unfolding prior to 22 May 1936. 
Pressure, protectionism and Australia’s 
reluctance to act against Japan
Some have diminished the significance of the Australian–Japanese trade 
treaty negotiations, suggesting Australia was only making a show in 
the hope this would placate Japan without having to make any definite 
commitment. Tsokhas only gives the negotiations passing mention and 
Sandra Tweedie writes that ‘far from contemplating a treaty’, Australian 
officials actively sought to resist Japan, and it was only after ‘insistent 
Japanese demands’ that the nation finally yielded.32 These assessments 
do not acknowledge the intersection of Australia’s trade interests 
with diplomatic and broader strategic interests in the years preceding 
trade diversion, nor the nation’s reluctance to act against Japan in the face 
of British pressure.
Japan’s textile industry was highly organised, modern and, due to lower 
wages and longer working hours, competitively priced. The British textile 
industry was slow to adopt modern techniques like mass production 
31  Tsokhas, Markets, Money and Empire, 12–15, 105–9; Tsokhas, ‘The Wool Industry and the 1936 
Trade Diversion Dispute Between Australia and Japan’, 442–4.
32  Tsokhas, Markets, Money and Empire, 105; Tweedie, Trading Partners, 141–5. 
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and consisted of hundreds of small, independent units. This resulted in 
unnecessary administrative costs, a lack of cooperation and ineffective 
production.33 Japan’s competitive advantage saw the nation replace Britain 
as the world’s largest cotton market in 1933.34 
The textile producers in Lancashire, who held significant political leverage, 
lobbied Whitehall to limit Japan’s competitive advantage.35 There was 
particular embitterment surrounding Australia’s textile purchases from 
Japan. The Australian government’s slow action on implementing the 
Ottawa Agreements further exacerbated this situation. Australia had 
failed to comprehensively reduce tariffs so as to treat British producers as 
domestic competitors, even increasing duties to protect its emerging cotton 
industry despite an adverse effect on Lancashire.36 British textile producers 
directly contacted Lyons and Bruce, High Commissioner in London, 
calling on Australia to use anti-dumping duties against Japan and act on 
‘the principles for which it accepted responsibility at Ottawa’.37 The British 
Foreign Office and Tariff Board also criticised Japan, accusing the 
nation’s producers of extensive cost-cutting. The Tariff Board accordingly 
recommended that members of the Empire enforce anti-dumping duties 
against Japan to protect the British textile market.38 Despite this pressure, 
the Australian government refused to adopt prohibitive measures on the 
grounds that Japanese textiles, dumped or otherwise, did not directly 
compete with Australian exports. In ignoring the recommendations of 
the Tariff Board, Australia had contravened the Ottawa Agreements.39 
It is worth recalling that the Tariff Board recommendations came soon 
33  A. Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933–1937 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 
27–9; Masey, Is It Necessary, 10–15.
34  Sissons, ‘Manchester v. Japan’, 490. 
35  Antony Best, ‘Economic Appeasement or Economic Nationalism? A Political Perspective on 
the British Empire, Japan and the Rise of Intra-Empire Trade, 1933–37’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 30, no. 2 (2002): 77–101, at pp. 81–4. 
36  Bernard Attard, ‘The Limits of Influence: The Political Economy of Australian Commercial 
Policy After the Ottawa Conference’, Australian Historical Studies 29, no. 111 (1998): 325–43, at 
pp. 330–2; Felicity Barnes, ‘Lancashire’s “War” with Australia: Rethinking Anglo-Australian Trade 
and the Cultural Economy of Empire, 1934–36’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
46, no. 4 (2018): 707–30, at pp. 707, 713–18.
37  ‘Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Lyons, 17 August 1932’, in Australian High 
Commission, United Kingdom [London]: Correspondence files, multiple number series (Class 400), 
1913–60, NAA: A2910, 413/5/135 Part 1; ‘W.H. Milsted and Sons to Bruce, 14 February 1933’, 
NAA: A2910, 413/5/135 [emphasis in original].
38  ‘“Japanese Competition”, Memorandum by the Board of Trade, 11 December 1933’, in Records 
created or inherited by the Foreign Office, Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: 
Embassy and Consulates, Egypt—General Correspondence, TNA: FO 141/755/7.
39  Cumpston, ‘The Australian–Japanese Dispute of the Nineteen-Thirties’, 51.
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after the Manchurian Crisis and Australia’s rejection of sanctions against 
Japan based on economic and security imperatives. Against this backdrop, 
Australia’s response can be better understood.
As the British government and manufacturers encouraged greater 
protectionism, Australia continued to explore opportunities in Japan. 
During the AEM, Australia again quietly defied the principles of imperial 
economic cooperation. Saburō Kurusu, Director of the Commercial 
Bureau in the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs, expressed his 
government’s ‘keen appreciation’ for Australia’s decision not to implement 
anti-dumping duties. Arthur Moore, an information officer from the 
Department of Trade and Customs who was part of the AEM, emphasised 
‘the difficult political position’ in which Australia had been placed as 
a result of rejecting the Tariff Board’s recommendations, remarking that 
this ‘showed very clearly its regard for maintaining friendly relations with 
Japan’ and was ‘concrete evidence of the value placed on Japanese trading 
relations with our country’.40
Britain made a renewed effort to emphasise the expectations of imperial 
economic reciprocity in 1935. As preparations for the 1935 Leaders’ 
Meeting began, the British government indicated that trade measures 
to strengthen imperial economic relations would take precedence in the 
forthcoming discussions. Australia’s poor performance in implementing 
the Ottawa Agreements was singled out by Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs James Henry Thomas. He described it as ‘a source of difficulty to 
the commercial relations between the two countries’, which had given ‘rise 
to much dissatisfaction on the part of trade organisations in the United 
Kingdom’.41 Lyons responded to Thomas’s criticism with his own litany 
of complaints about the Ottawa system. The Australian government was 
preparing for trade treaty negotiations with Japan and Lyons informed 
Thomas that the Ottawa Agreements presented ‘obstacles which at present 
appear unsurmountable’ as the ambit of imperial preferences left Australia 
with little scope to offer foreign countries greater access to its market. 
Australia’s restricted access to foreign markets would make it difficult for 
the nation to increase export revenue and, in turn, increase purchases 
from the British market.42 Lyons asked that some of the Ottawa preference 
margins be narrowed and requested that Bruce ‘stress’ in London that 
40  ‘Confidential Report on Trade, 30 July 1934’, NAA: A981, Far 5 Part 16. 
41  ‘Thomas to Lyons, 2 January 1935’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/22A. 
42  ‘Lyons to Thomas, 4 January 1935’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/22A. 
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a ‘number of foreign countries have been penalising Australia because of 
Ottawa Margins’.43 The British government resolved that the margins 
would remain unchanged.44 This appeal indicates Australia’s seriousness 
in its approach to trade treaty negotiations with Japan and that the nation 
had not, as Tweedie suggests, entered into negotiations under duress. 
Moreover, the reluctance to act against Japan despite British pressure 
suggests Australia judged the value of close economic and diplomatic 
relations with Japan outweighed the ideal of imperial reciprocity.
Trade promotion in Britain
There was a marked change in Australia’s position towards the Ottawa 
Agreements and British textiles from early 1936. The reason for this can 
be found in Australia’s overseas trade position. In 1935, foreign markets 
accounted for most of Britain’s beef supply. Britain’s trade treaty with 
Argentina, a major beef exporter, was due to expire in December 1935 
and the nation was looking to increase frozen and tinned beef purchases 
in the renewed treaty. The new treaty would result in a further reduction 
of British purchases from Australia and the other dominions. With meat 
making up a significant portion of Australian exports, the Australian 
government deemed Britain’s plans to be ‘inconsistent with the spirit and 
intention of the Ottawa Agreement’.45 While in London for the Leaders’ 
Meeting, Lyons and Gullett lobbied the British government to introduce 
higher import duties and quotas in the interest of improving the position 
of Australian beef. They were unsuccessful in this undertaking.46
Lyons remained in London for some weeks following the Leaders’ 
Meeting. During this time, he met with representatives from the Tariff 
Board and the Lancashire Chamber of Commerce. While little detail was 
given about these meetings in the local press, a cable from the Dominions 
Office reveals the representatives urged Lyons to ‘take action that will 
safeguard Lancashire’s important trade to Australia’, making clear that 
unless Australia upheld the principles of economic reciprocity, the nation 
43  ‘Lyons to Bruce, 7 February 1935’, NAA: A981, Trad 68 Part 2. 
44  Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917–1939, 397–8.
45  ‘Lyons to Thomas, 4 January 1935’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/22A.
46  Sissons, ‘Manchester v. Japan’, 495–6; Tsokhas, Markets, Money and Empire, 107.
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could expect its share in the British market to shrink.47 In view of Australia’s 
narrow range of primary exports and reliance on British purchases, the 
British government and Lancashire had sent a clear message: Australia 
would not long survive without the British market for its goods. Lyons 
indicated that he would bring the issues discussed before his government.48 
The months following Lyons’ return home from London were marked 
by grim news. The US had again rejected Australia’s offer of a trade 
agreement.49 This was exacerbated by low wool sales in 1934–35, which 
greatly depleted Australia’s reserves, and a rise in the prices of wool and 
wheat in 1935–36, triggering an escalation of imports while exports 
increased only marginally. It seemed likely that Australia would, for the 
second consecutive year, face a balance-of-payments deficit and be forced 
to default on loan repayments to Britain and the US.50 Faced with this 
situation, Cabinet conceded on 23 January 1936 that some action should 
be taken to reduce the volume of Japanese textile purchases in favour 
of British exporters.51 
Soon after Gullett began drafting proposed quotas for Japanese textiles, 
a delegation from the Manchester Chamber of Commerce arrived in 
Australia. The Manchester Mission was headed by H.C.N. Ellis, Special 
Commissioner for Trade for the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 
and Ernest Thompson, the chamber’s former president. The mission 
was designed to mobilise support for prohibitive measures against the 
Japanese textiles that had ‘invaded’ the Australian market and discuss 
measures to ‘secure the maximum demand’ for Australian exports in 
the British market.52 With the Australian government having already 
decided to introduce quantitative restrictions, this pressure was no longer 
47  ‘Thomas to Isaacs (Governor-General) 15 August 1935’, in Records created or inherited by the 
Dominions Office, and of the Commonwealth Relations and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, 
General Records of the Dominions Office, TNA: DO 35/284/1.
48  ‘Mr Lyons in Manchester’, Telegraph, [Brisbane], 13 June 1935, 13.
49  Australia’s offer of a trade treaty had been rejected in January 1935, yet the nation continued 
to inquire throughout 1935 and early 1936 whether the US had changed its position. ‘Doc. 13, 
Memorandum by Hull (Secretary of State), 9 July 1935’ and ‘Doc. 14, Hull to Moffatt (Consul-
General Sydney), 23 September 1935’, in Churchill and Sappington, FRUS 1935.
50  ‘Adoption of Trade Diversion Policy, 1937’, NAA: A1667, 430/B/52A; ‘Doc. 582, Moffat to 
Hull, 4 March 1936’, in Matilda F. Axton, Rogers P. Churchill, N.O. Sappington, John G. Reid, 
Francis C. Prescott and Shirley L. Phillips (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1953).
51  ‘Cabinet Meeting, 23 January 1936’, in Secretary to Cabinet/Cabinet Secretariat: Lyons and 
Page Ministries—Folders and bundles of minutes and submissions, 1932–39, NAA: A2694, 245.
52  ‘Plea for Trade’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 1936, 11. 
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necessary. Nevertheless, the Manchester Mission highlights the logic that 
had influenced the Australian government’s decision to act against Japan: 
Britain could not be expected to continue its preference for Australian 
goods without reciprocal treatment.
The Australian government was candid in its expectation that trade 
diversion would afford inroads for Australian beef into the British market. 
In a 10 May 1936 cable to British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Lyons 
outlined the trade diversion measures. He couched the policy in the 
language of imperial economic cooperation and stressed his expectation 
that his government’s actions would ‘receive full compensation in 
[the form of ] increased British imports from Australia’.53 Lyons restated 
this in a cable sent to Baldwin the following week, writing that the trade 
diversion measures concerning textiles had been ‘made to meet the express 
wishes of your government’ and were expected to result in ‘very substantial 
and increasing benefits’ for British textile manufacturers. Lyons, noting 
that these measures would likely elicit retaliatory action from Japan, 
stressed that his government looked ‘to these restrictions to confer benefit 
upon Australia by increasing opportunity for our exports in the United 
Kingdom’.54 There was a willingness among Australian policymakers to 
act in favour of imperial interests on the basis of what would be received 
in return. Baldwin replied that the trade diversion measures would ‘be of 
material assistance … and we greatly appreciate them’. He also informed 
Lyons that ‘we share your hope’ that trade diversion will ‘help to solve 
the particular problems of Australia’.55 It appeared that Britain endorsed 
Australia’s actions and the anticipated returns in the British market. 
This enthusiasm soon dissipated. 
In April 1936, Page and Robert Menzies, the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Industry, left for London to discuss Australian beef sales. 
The British government offered an increased duty on foreign beef and 
a restriction on the volume of Argentinian chilled beef sales in favour 
of cheaper frozen beef. The dominions would be free to fill this newly 
vacant market for chilled beef. However, the actual volume of dominion 
and Argentinian beef sales would not change, being set at existing levels.56 
53  ‘Lyons to Baldwin, 10 May 1936’, TNA: DO 35/278/3.
54  ‘Lyons to Baldwin, 18 May 1936’, TNA: DO 35/278/3.
55  ‘MacDonald (Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) to Prime Minister’s Department, 
20 May 1936’, in Department of Trade and Customs: Correspondence files, annual single number 
series [Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1935–, NAA: A425, 1939/2673. MacDonald 
was speaking on behalf of Baldwin.
56  Sissons, ‘Manchester v. Japan’, 496–7.
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Page described this offer as ‘useless’ and a betrayal of the principles of 
Ottawa.57 It was only through the intervention of Lyons—who stressed 
that a failure to deliver on beef and legitimate the trade war with Japan 
would likely lead to a loss of government—that Australia was able to 
secure a small concession. The British Cabinet agreed to a 5 per cent 
increase in Australia’s chilled beef exports over three years at the expense 
of foreign suppliers.58 Australia’s hard-fought concession suggests trade 
diversion was introduced with an implied rather than a clear agreement 
that Britain would reciprocate with preferential treatment of Australian 
beef.59 The Australian government ultimately misjudged the dynamics 
of the imperial relationship, in which Australia was expected to make 
sacrifices in the name of imperial economic cooperation, while Britain 
would not necessarily reciprocate.
Defence and Australia’s secondary 
industries
The Trade Diversion Policy cannot be divorced from defence planning 
and Australia’s strategic outlook. The year 1936 was one of turmoil in 
international affairs. Nazi Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles, 
Locarno Treaties and League of Nations Covenant when the German 
Army reoccupied and remilitarised the Rhineland in March 1936. 
The year also marked the lapse of the Washington Treaties and Japan’s 
withdrawal from the second London Naval Conference and the Treaty 
for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament following Britain 
and the United States’ rejection of Japan’s demand for naval parity. These 
developments spelt doom for collective security, drew attention to the 
influence of the military in the Japanese government’s policymaking and, 
as Melbourne’s Herald grimly concluded, left Japan with ‘a free hand in 
the Pacific’.60
57  ‘Telephone call, Page, Lyons and Gullett, 24 June 1936’, in Papers of J.A. Lyons, NLA: MS 
4851/1/10.
58  ‘Minutes of Meeting, Cabinet Committee on Trade and Agriculture, 24 June 1936, TNA: CAB 
27/619’, cited in Sissons, ‘Manchester v. Japan’, 498.
59  O’Brien, ‘Empire v. National Interest in Australian–British Relations During the 1930s’, 582; 
Paul Jones, ‘Trading in a “Fool’s Paradise”? White Australia and the Trade Diversion Dispute of 1936’, 
in Relationships: Japan and Australia, 1870s – 1950s, eds Vera Mackie and Paul Jones (Melbourne: 
University of Melbourne, Department of History, 2001), 137.
60  ‘Japan Upsets Naval Parleys’, The Herald, [Melbourne], 15 January 1936, 1.
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Australia began rearming in 1933, with a particular focus on modernising 
its defence equipment. Rearmament depended on a stable financial 
situation—achieved through consistently strong exports—and an 
established domestic secondary industry with access to strategic materials 
such as steel and iron. That defence and rearmament considerations 
influenced trade diversion is evidenced in Gullett’s remark that the policy, 
in promoting the development of Australia’s secondary industries, would 
‘make a significant indirect contribution to defence’.61 Lyons also spoke to 
the relationship between trade diversion and imperial defence, invoking 
the maxim of ‘Men, Money and Markets’ in a cable to Baldwin by 
suggesting that the growth in Australia’s secondary industries prompted 
by trade diversion would encourage intra-empire migration, making 
‘a useful and timely … contribution to Empire defence’.62 While trade 
diversion was not predicated on defence considerations, it was certainly 
shaped by Australia’s pre-existing concerns about regional stability and 
defence planning for the Asia-Pacific region.
Australia’s strategic outlook in the 
aftermath of trade diversion
The Australia–Japan trade war was short-lived, arguably because the 
conclusion of the semi-successful beef negotiations in June removed 
the imperative for a hardline position towards Japan. In August, Australia 
amended the duties on foreign textiles ‘as a gesture of amiability’ and, 
by December, a settlement had been made.63 Japan removed the 50 per 
cent tariff on Australian goods and the boycott on Australian wool, while 
Australian duties on foreign textiles were again lowered. In the 18 months 
from 1 January 1937, Japanese cotton and rayon exports entering Australia 
were restricted to a total of 102.5 million square yards (85.7  million 
sq m)—compared with the 152 million square yards (127 million sq m) 
Australia had purchased the previous year. Australia also granted Japan 
61  CPD: Representatives, 22 May 1936, No. 21, 2211–12.
62  ‘Lyons to Baldwin, 18 May 1936’, NAA: A425, 1939/2673. The Bruce–Page coalition adopted 
‘Men, Money and Markets’ as the basis for economic development. The premise was that, in obtaining 
labour and capital from Britain for Australia’s expanding secondary industries, products would be 
produced for purchase in British Empire markets with the benefit of protection under preferential 
tariffs. Growth in population from British migration could service Australia’s new industries and 
could be called on to defend Australia and the Empire in the event of war.
63  ‘Abbott (Comptroller-General of Customs) to DEA, 24 August 1936’, NAA: A981, Trad 68, 
Part 2.
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the intermediate tariff rate. Japan agreed to purchase 800,000 bales of 
Australian wool for the same 18-month period. This quota fell well below 
the 1935–36 export volume when Japan had purchased 750,000 bales for 
the financial year.64 
The new restriction on textile purchases accomplished Gullett’s initial aim 
of a textile quota system that served to reserve a place for British textiles in 
the Australian market. Yet in achieving this goal, the Australian–Japanese 
trade relationship was seriously damaged and Australia’s sales to Japan 
steadily decreased over the coming years.
Table 3.1 Two-way trade between Australia and Japan, 1935–36  
to 1938–39, pound sterling value and as a percentage of Australia’s 
total exports
Fiscal year Australian exports to Japan










Source: Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 32 (Canberra: 
Commonwealth Government Printer, 1939), 507–10.
Along with the economic implications of trade diversion, the episode 
created fissures in Australian–Japanese diplomatic relations. In May 1936, 
on learning of Australia’s intentions, Baron Goh, President of the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce in Sydney, contacted Minister for External Affairs 
George Pearce. Goh believed the Japanese government regretted trade 
diversion and believed it would not only harm economic relations, but 
also ‘invariably react on friendship and goodwill existing between us’.65 
64  ‘Abbott to DEA, 22 September 1936’ and ‘Statement by Gullett, 27 December 1936’, both in 
NAA: A981, Trad 68 Part 2. It was also agreed that Australia would purchase an extra 2 million square 
yards (1.82 million sq m) of cotton and rayon for every additional 10,000 bales of wool Japan purchased.
65  ‘Baron Goh (President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce) to Pearce, 13 May 1936’, NAA: 
A981, Trad 68 Part 2.
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Australia’s trade commissioner in Tokyo reported a similar feeling in Japan, 
noting the hostile and ‘rather reckless attitude’ of Japan’s highly influential 
press.66 From the Australian perspective, the risk was that trade diversion, 
having affronted Japan, could threaten national security. In the weeks 
before the policy was announced, Gullett himself acknowledged this threat 
when he confided in the British High Commissioner, Geoffrey Whiskard. 
This conversation was then reported to the Dominions Secretary, with 
Whiskard remarking that Gullett was ‘definitely apprehensive’ that trade 
diversion would ‘lead eventually to trouble between Japan and Australia’. 
Gullett reportedly ‘expounded at some length … the indefensibility 
of Australia against Japanese attack’.67
Australia’s security concerns were no doubt amplified by developments on 
the international stage. In addition to broken and lapsed treaties, 1936 saw 
the Japanese government give official standing to the policy of Nanshin-
ron (‘southern advance’ or ‘southern road’), which defined the area 
south of Japan as ‘indispensable’ to the nation’s industrial development, 
defence and growing population.68 The diplomatic implications of trade 
diversion were all the more pressing against this backdrop of international 
uneasiness.
From May to June 1937, an Imperial Conference was convened to discuss 
imperial policy in light of the recent developments in Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific. The Australian delegation’s performance at the conference 
can be best understood in the context of the diplomatic damage of 
trade diversion and Japan’s increasingly outspoken foreign policy. The 
Australian delegation used the Imperial Conference as an opportunity to 
revisit and clarify imperial defence planning, submitting a list of defence-
related questions to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS). Particular 
attention was given to the Far East and the intended strategy in the event 
of a two-ocean war. Australia requested ‘a clear definition of the strategic 
objective of the Empire forces in a war with Japan or with Japan and 
another first-class power’. Britain’s response was discouraging, stating 
that, in the event of war with Japan and Germany, Europe would be the 
priority and ‘we cannot count on being able to support anything more 
66  ‘Longfield Lloyd to Murphy, 28 May 1936’, NAA: A601, 402/17/28.
67  ‘Whiskard to MacDonald, 24 April 1936, TNA: FO 3097/119/23’, cited in Sissons, ‘Manchester 
v. Japan’, 482. 
68  Henry P. Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World 
War II (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 140–3. Nanshin-ron was codified in two 
documents, the ‘Fundamentals of National Policy’ and ‘Guidelines of Imperial Diplomacy’.
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than a defensive policy in the Far East’. The British also noted that ‘a very 
considerable period may elapse’ before the situation in Europe was settled 
and ‘the redistribution of our forces permit[s] of a fleet arriving in the 
Far East’.69 The 1937 Imperial Conference confirmed that the Singapore 
Naval Strategy was not the bastion of imperial defence it was purported 
to have been and Australia was left to face an increasingly uncertain future 
in its region. 
Prime Minister Lyons used the Imperial Conference to promote 
diplomacy to offset reservations about imperial defence planning for the 
Asia-Pacific. Following the lapse of the Washington Treaties and Japan’s 
withdrawal from the London Naval Conference, Yoshida Shigeru, the 
Japanese Ambassador in London, proposed an Anglo-Japanese agreement 
be negotiated as a  replacement. He proposed mutual recognition of all 
existing Japanese territorial claims in China, an open-door policy and 
the settlement of trade competition ‘on a basis of goodwill and mutual 
understanding of each other’s difficulties’.70 This proposal was ‘naturally 
desirable’ to the Australian government. Britain’s response, however, 
was, according to a DEA memorandum, ‘lukewarm’.71 Lyons took it on 
himself to find a  solution to Asia-Pacific peace. In his opening address 
to the first plenary session of the Imperial Conference, Lyons revived 
his ‘Pacific pact’. His proposal was based on a broad vision of regional 
understanding and non-aggression between the British Empire, Japan and 
the US.72 The proposal was received with only middling support and it 
faced insurmountable challenges: chiefly, the United States’ and Britain’s 
fraught relations with Japan, particularly in the wake of the London 
Naval Conference, and the ongoing question of Chinese–Japanese 
relations made negotiating a Pacific pact difficult. As had been the case at 
the 1935 Leaders’ Meeting, Lyons’ plans for Asia-Pacific peace were laid 
aside.73 Despite the failure of the Pacific pact, on reflection, the episode 
is insightful. It underscores the shift in approaches to integrate Australia’s 
national interest within the imperial policymaking framework at a time 
69  ‘“Questions Raised by the Australian Delegation”, Report of British COS, 9 June 1937’, NAA: 
A5954, 1064/3.
70  R.G. Neale (ed.), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49. Volume 1: 1937–1938 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1976) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 1], 36n.1.
71  ‘Doc. 13, “Review of Relations with Particular Countries having Special Significance vis-a-vis 
the United Kingdom or Particular Dominions”, Memorandum prepared for Delegation to Imperial 
Conference, [n.d. (on or before 6 March 1937)]’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 1.
72  ‘Doc. 25, Speech by Lyons, First plenary session of Imperial Conference, 14 May 1937’, in Neale, 
DAFP, vol. 1.
73  Bird, J.A. Lyons, 203–4; Waters, Australia and Appeasement, 21–5.
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when many scholars suggest the nation’s policymakers had neither the 
appetite nor the aptitude for such thinking. The Pacific pact episode also 
highlights the challenges the small nation faced in attempting to influence 
its powerful allies.
Both the diplomatic shortfalls of trade diversion and the disappointing 
outcome of the 1937 Imperial Conference were more pressing in the face 
of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In July, soon after the 
Australian delegation returned from the Imperial Conference, Japanese 
troops attacked and eventually invaded China. Lyons lamented the 
conflict, even suggesting it could have been avoided had his Pacific pact 
been taken up:
I am very sorry that some action on the line of the Pact I proposed 
was not taken earlier. If something of this kind had been in 
existence before this trouble in the east, it is possible that some 
pressure might have been applied to prevent the tragic events that 
are now occurring.74
At the time, international affairs commentator Jack Shepherd drew a link 
between the Trade Diversion Policy and Japan’s attack on China. Trade 
diversion served to exclude Japan from an important market, contributing 
to a sense that it was being ‘deprived of the very means of her existence’. 
According to Shepherd, this hastened Japan’s campaign for regional 
conquest in pursuit of raw materials.75 
While Shepherd’s theory is a striking one and Japan’s need for raw resources 
was a motivating factor in its policy of aggressive expansion, it is difficult 
to substantiate the link between trade diversion and the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. It can, however, be reasonably concluded 
that Japan saw in trade diversion an attempt to build an exclusive 
imperial economic bloc, contributing to a sense of being threatened and 
a  subsequent need to economically and territorially penetrate the Far 
East. This proposition is in part supported by a letter Lyons received 
from A.C.V. Melbourne, who liaised with the Australian government and 
Japanese Consul-General in Australia during the settlement of the Trade 
74  ‘Fighting Speech’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October 1937, 9. 
75  Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, 190–1.
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Diversion Policy. Melbourne wrote that the ‘British aspect’ of Australian 
foreign policy had been ‘overemphasised’ and subsequently estranged and 
offended Japan.76 
At any rate, the trade diversion episode was a significant lesson for 
Australian policymakers, highlighting the liability of relying on the Empire 
for economic and physical security. Indeed, it informed experimentation 
by policymakers as accommodating Japan came to dominate Australia’s 
foreign policy approach in the coming years as the Asia-Pacific region 
moved towards war. 
76  ‘Melbourne to Lyons, 22 July 1936, Papers of A.C.V. Melbourne, NLA: Mfm G 14442–14446’, 





‘A chronic lack of 
self-reliance’? Australia’s 
response to the coming 
Pacific War, 1937–41
By 1937, war had reached the Asia-Pacific region and the world was 
once again drifting towards global conflict. This was likely to be a war in 
which Japan and Australia would be enemies. It is easy to believe that the 
Australia of the interwar years—a remote colonial outpost yet to assume 
full autonomy from Britain in foreign policy—could stand idly by, failing 
to prepare as war drifted towards its shores. This situation was seemingly 
the result of a ‘chronic lack of self-reliance’, as the Australian government 
could, according to David Day, ‘see no alternative to historic[al] reliance 
on Britain’.1 Others, such as John McCarthy and Ian Hamill, have offered 
a more measured appraisal, acknowledging that Australia realised its 
strategic needs differed from those of Britain and, at times, attempted 
to articulate this. They nevertheless conclude that, when Australia failed 
to deliver meaningful changes in imperial defence planning, the nation 
remained wedded to the Singapore Strategy.2 Australia’s disillusion was 
1  David Horner, High Command: Australia’s Struggle for an Independent War Strategy, 1939–45, 
2nd edn (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 15; David Day, ‘27 December 1941 Prime Minister 
Curtin’s New Year Message: Australia “Looks to America”’, in Turning Points in Australian History, 
eds Martin Crotty and David Roberts (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2008), 131.
2  John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–39: A Study in Air and Sea Power (Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press, 1976); Hamill, The Strategic Illusion. 
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duly revealed in December 1941 when two RN capital ships, HMS Prince 
of Wales and HMS Repulse, were sunk by the Japanese and, in February 
1942, with the fall of Singapore.3
Instead, this chapter examines how Australian policymakers, having 
drawn on the lessons of the interwar years, were acutely aware of the 
limitations of imperial defence planning for the Asia-Pacific region and 
adopted a much more proactive policy in response. In the same vein 
as the Allies’ approach to the European aggressors, Australia coupled 
rearmament with appeasement. Eastern appeasement centred on coercive 
diplomacy, aiming to deter Japanese aggression for long enough to allow 
for military preparation. In the absence of an adequate security assurance 
from Britain, the Australian government was also looking beyond the 
Empire to the US, using diplomatic pathways to draw the US into Asia-
Pacific affairs and extract a military guarantee. By shifting the focus from 
Australia’s material preparation for the coming Pacific War, Australia’s 
independent diplomatic efforts become apparent—efforts that sought to 
shape the circumstances under which the war took place. 
Rearming for a regional conflict
The economics and strategy of Australia’s rearmament process have been 
documented widely elsewhere, but it is useful to consider the changing 
nature of the nation’s defence preparations in view of the outbreak 
of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the diverging strategic priorities of 
Australia and Britain that resulted.4
The 1937 Imperial Conference was, as Andrew May has written, an 
‘instrument of change’ in Australian defence planning.5 Shortly after his 
return from the conference, Joseph Lyons was thrown into campaign 
mode for the upcoming federal election. The United Australia Party was 
3  Day, The Great Betrayal, 1–16, 210–13, 234–56; Richard Waterhouse, ‘Empire and Nation: 
Australian Popular Ideology and the Outbreak of the Pacific War’, History Australia 12, no. 3 (2015): 
30–54; Murfett, ‘The Singapore Strategy’, 97–201.
4  For instance, A.T. Ross, Armed and Ready: The Industrial Development and Defence of Australia, 
1900–1945 (Sydney: Turton & Armstrong, 1995); Albert Palazzo, ‘The Overlooked Mission: 
Australia and Home Defence’, in Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War, ed. Peter J. Dean (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53–69; Andrew May, ‘Fortress Australia’, in Between Empire 
and Nation: Australia’s External Relations from Federation Until the Second World War, eds Carl Bridge 
and Bernard Attard (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2000), 168–87.
5  May, ‘Fortress Australia’, 173.
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returned to power in October. Part of the party’s campaign agenda was 
a strong commitment to defence, including a new three-year rearmament 
program announced in September.6 The 1937–39 program was the 
third in a series. Australia’s first rearmament program was announced in 
September 1933 and the second in December 1935, both of which focused 
on modernisation.7 Although Australia’s economy was still recovering 
from the depression, the 1937–39 program was more intensive than 
those that had preceded it, combining expansion with modernisation. 
The forward estimate for the three-year budget was £43 million, marking 
deficit spending on defence for the first time since the end of World War I. 
Of this, £24.8 million was provided for new expenditure.8 
More than an increase in expenditure, the new rearmament program 
suggested the nature of Australia’s approach to defence was shifting. 
The navy was traditionally the priority in Australian and broader imperial 
defence strategy, while the army and air force were largely employed for 
the defence of Australian territory. Although this hierarchy changed very 
little in the new program, the air force was given increasing significance in 
terms of budgetary spending.9 With its vulnerable coastline and seemingly 
dangerous neighbourhood to the north, Australia’s primary concern 
was coastal attack. The mobility of aircraft—essential in deterring and 
defending against coastal raids—created a particularly important role for 
the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Accordingly, the RAAF received 
the bulk of the new expenditure, £8.8 million, while the Royal Australian 
Navy (RAN) and the Army received £7.75 million and £5.5 million, 
respectively.10 New coastal aircraft bases and anti-aircraft defences at major 
ports were proposed as part of the government’s ‘priority of provision in 
local defence’.11
Particular attention was given to Australia’s vulnerable north, including 
the construction of two new bases, at Darwin, in the Northern Territory, 
and Amberley, in Queensland.12 The bases were to be filled with new 
6  Bird, J.A. Lyons, 200–3; CPD: Representatives, 8 September 1937, No. 36, 737–81. 
7  Ross, Armed and Ready, 111. 
8  Bird, J.A. Lyons, 202; Paul Hasluck, Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 4: Civil. Volume I: 
The Government and the People, 1939–1941 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1970), 102. New 
expenditure refers to costs beyond the maintenance of existing services. This initial estimate was later 
reduced.
9  May, ‘Fortress Australia’, 169, 174, 178; Ross, Armed and Ready, 113; Horner, High Command, 14.
10  Hasluck, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, 102.
11  CPD: Representatives, 8 September 1937, No. 36, 739–40.
12  ‘Report on Progress of the Defence Development Programme (1937–38 to 1940–41) to 30th 
September 1938’, NAA: A5954, 1039/1. 
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aircraft purchases. Avro Anson and Avro Cadets, general-purpose British-
manufactured craft, were selected for coastal reconnaissance, training and 
to deter against raids, while combat ranks were filled with 180 Bristol 
Beaufort torpedo bombers. It was intended that the two Avro-class craft 
would be supplied by Britain’s Air Ministry. However, by mid-1939, 
with ongoing delivery problems, the Australian government began local 
construction, forming the Department of Aircraft Production. Australia’s 
decision to produce aircraft locally resulted in one of the more contentious 
issues in the nation’s aeronautical history, the Commonwealth Aircraft 
Corporation (CAC) Wirraway. The Wirraway was a CAC (the Broken 
Hill Propriety Limited–led syndicate) adaptation of the American NA-16 
light trainer, refitted with a simple undercarriage, bombs and a gun rack. 
Despite its original design as a trainer, the Wirraway was championed 
by Defence Minister Archdale Parkhill as a general-purpose aircraft, with 
diverse roles as a ‘fighter, [in] army cooperation duties, reconnaissance 
tasks’ and as a ‘light bomber and advanced trainer’. The Wirraway was 
committed to frontline operations just once, in the Battle of Rabaul, only 
to be shot down by the vastly superior Japanese A6M Zero.13
Australia admittedly made some questionable decisions about rearmament, 
including the quality and suitability of some equipment. Nevertheless, 
policymakers were keenly aware of the nation’s discrete defence 
requirements and sought to acquire equipment that would protect it and 
deter against future aggression.
Eastern appeasement
Australia may have been coordinating a more self-reliant defence policy, 
yet these measures would be useless unless time was created in which 
to implement them. The Australian government, accordingly, pursued 
appeasement in tandem with rearmament. Although the two may appear 
contradictory, rearmament was characterised as defensive rather than 
offensive and a contingency if appeasement failed.14
13  Butlin, Australia in the War of 1939–45, 267–8; Horner, High Command, 13–15; ‘“Supply of Arms 
to Foreign Powers Statement of Air Craft and Aero Engines Under Construction and Release for Sale”, 
Air Ministry, 20 June 1939’, cited in McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–39, 103. 
14  Bird, J.A. Lyons, 200–2.
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The 1936 trade diversion episode had ruptured Australia’s carefully curated 
diplomatic and economic relations with Japan and the government set 
out to rebuild them. The earliest expression of eastern appeasement 
following trade diversion can be identified in Australia’s response to the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. In much the same manner as it had responded 
to the Manchurian Crisis, the Australian government attempted to 
remain impartial, promoting international consultation as the means 
to a resolution. 
Australia’s position varied from that of Britain, which, like much of the 
international community, had condemned Japan’s actions.15 Following the 
outbreak of war between China and Japan, the General Assembly of the 
League of Nations recommended a conference of the Nine-Power Treaty 
members with the hope of encouraging consultation and a resolution.16 
Both Australia and Britain were signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and, 
prior to the conference proceedings, the British government privately 
indicated its belief that effective consultation between Japan and China 
was improbable, necessitating economic sanctions against the Japanese. 
In the case of sanctions, the Dominion Secretary Malcolm MacDonald 
anticipated ‘a very real danger of Japan taking violent action to prevent 
their [the sanctions] success’. He recommended that all countries intending 
to impose sanctions provide a mutual ‘assurance of military support in the 
event of violent Japanese retaliation’.17 What MacDonald had suggested 
was a fatalistic acceptance that armed conflict with Japan was inevitable 
and imminent. This position would force Australia to abandon eastern 
appeasement and drift towards a war for which it was not yet ready.
In the interim between MacDonald’s cable (19 October 1937) 
and Australia’s reply (28 October 1937), Lyons stated publicly that 
‘the settlement of differences between nations should be sought, not by 
recourse to force, but by methods of cooperation and conciliation’.18 
It was of little surprise, then, when the Australian government rejected 
the proposed economic sanctions, making clear it would only ‘consult 
on the basis of conciliation’ as it had been ‘on this understanding that the 
15  ibid., 227–8.
16  ‘Doc. 75, Bruce to Lyons, 6 October 1937’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 1.
17  ‘Doc. 83, MacDonald to Commonwealth Government, 19 October 1937’, in Neale, DAFP, 
vol. 1.
18  Museum of Australian Democracy, ‘Australian Federal Election Speeches, Joseph Lyons, 
23 October 1937, United Australia Party. Delivered at Deloraine, Tas., 28 September 1937’, available 
from: electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1937-joseph-lyons.
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Commonwealth Government accepted the invitation’ to the conference.19 
The Nine-Power Conference was inconclusive, finding no immediate 
solution to the situation. Although the situation in the Asia-Pacific region 
was not improved, any further antagonism of Japan had also been avoided.
The Nine-Power Conference episode is significant for two main reasons. 
First, it reflects a growing assertiveness within Australia’s approach to 
foreign policy. Most critically, this was an assertiveness directed towards 
Britain when the imperial figurehead’s policy did not reflect the geopolitical 
interests of its dominion. Second, in avoiding economic sanctions, the 
Australian government appeared to be returning to the strategic use of 
trade employed before the trade diversion upset. As detailed in Figure 4.1, 
Japan’s southward advance was more than simply a policy of territorial 
expansion and included securing zones for immigration and raw materials. 
At the centre of this policy were a rapidly growing population and the 
need for natural resources for continued economic growth. This involved 
the ‘economic penetration’ of Far Eastern nations, using Japanese capital 
to invest in foreign nations and secure essential tradeable goods.20 While 
this was concerning in terms of regional security, the policy of 
economic penetration presented Australia with a relatively easy means 
of appeasing Japan. 
Among the most well-known examples of Australia’s economic diplomacy 
in interwar relations with Japan are the nationwide 1937–38 waterside 
workers’ strikes—most famously, the Dalfram strike of 1938, when 
workers refused to load strategic cargo such as iron and scrap metal on 
to Japan-bound ships because it would likely be used for war purposes.21 
This action compelled Attorney-General and Minister for Industry 
Robert Menzies to declare that Australia’s international policy would 
be determined by the duly elected government, not ‘by some industrial 
section’.22 Rather than revisit in detail the well-documented Dalfram 
episode, let us consider an event that was unfolding simultaneously, yet 
has received little attention in histories of this period.
19  ‘Doc. 88, Commonwealth government to MacDonald, 28 October 1937’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 1.
20  Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, 1; ‘Longfield Lloyd to Murphy, 6 October 1937’, 
NAA: A601, 402/17/30.
21  For a detailed account of the strike movement, see R. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront: Menzies, 
Japan and the Pig Iron Dispute (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1987).
22  ‘Menzies statement for press, 26 November 1938’, in Attorney-General’s Department: 
Correspondence files, annual single number series [Main correspondence files series of the agency], 
1857–, NAA: A432, 1938/1301.
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Figure 4.1 ‘Construct New Japan as Below’: Japan’s economic 
penetration
Note: Legend reads (left to right): Industrial Centre, Immigration Spheres, Expansion 
Spheres for White Peoples, Trade Expansion Sphere, Invested Trade Expansion Sphere.
Source: Courtesy of the National Archives of Australia, NAA: A601, 402/17/30.
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In the settlement of the Trade Diversion Policy, the two nations 
negotiated a trade agreement. Japan committed to purchasing 800,000 
bales of Australian wool (approximately 533,000 bales per annum) in the 
18 months preceding 31 June 1938. As this period drew to a close and 
the two governments considered renewing the agreement, it was clear that 
Japan would fail to reach the agreed-on quota, having purchased only 
503,000 bales. The Australian government understood the implications 
of this breach, with a March 1938 Cabinet minute noting that, unless 
Japanese wool imports increased or the wool-textile quota was renegotiated, 
Australia ‘has to face a question of withdrawing the Intermediate Tariff ’.23 
Despite this assessment, neither a withdrawal of the tariff nor a reduction 
of Australia’s textile purchases was proposed. The Japanese total wool 
quota was reduced, with Australia guaranteed to service two-thirds of the 
total predicted need of 500,000 bales for the coming year. Japan would 
again fail to meet this revised quota.24 
In reviewing the 1938 Australia–Japan trade negotiations, Jack Shepherd 
remarked that Australia made no attempt to ‘drive a hard bargain’, 
ultimately accepting an agreement that was clearly in Japan’s favour.25 
This  apparent complacency can be explained in terms of eastern 
appeasement. Cabinet recognised that retaliatory action ‘would probably 
precipitate another tariff dispute’, inciting fractured diplomatic relations. 
They agreed this must be avoided, and the option was not raised again. 
The Australian government also took into account Japan’s ‘abnormal 
political and financial conditions’ when negotiating the new agreement—
that is, the nation’s over-reliance on foreign markets, which in turn created 
a trade deficit and restricted access to foreign currency.26 In a continuation 
of approaches adopted in relation to the Manchurian Crisis and its 
reluctance to penalise Japan in the lead-up to the Trade Diversion Policy, 
Australia was carefully considering the strategic role of trade as it related 
to the deteriorating situation in the Far East. 
23  ‘“Japan–Australia Trade Negotiations”, Cabinet Minute, 18 March 1938’, NAA: A1667, 
194/B/3/A/5 Part 1A.
24  Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, 156–7.
25  ibid., 158.
26  ‘“Japan–Australia Trade Negotiations”, Cabinet Minute, 18 March 1938’, NAA: A1667, 
194/B/3/A/5 Part 1A.
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Difficult decisions: Yampi Sound and the 
1938 iron ore embargo
The iron ore embargo of 1938, in which Japan was denied access to 
previously contracted iron ore deposits at the Yampi Sound mines in 
Western Australia, is an episode incongruent with Australia’s ongoing 
efforts to maintain cordial relations with Japan in a bid to prolong relative 
peace. In 1935, the Japanese operated firm H.A. Brassert and Co. Ltd 
secured a 50-year lease at Yampi Sound. Developments began immediately 
to prepare the area for extraction with a planned commencement date 
in 1938. In March 1937, reports emerged of an imminent world steel 
shortage. The Australian government concluded that it was not a lack of 
available resources that had created the shortage, but rather inadequate 
output and no move was made to restrict the exportation of iron ore.27 
Then in May 1938, in what appeared to be a very sudden decision, the 
Australian government announced an embargo on the exportation of 
iron ore, effective 1 July 1938. This decision was justified on the basis 
of conservation, with the Australian government citing a recent report that 
indicated iron ore deposits were less than had previously been estimated.28 
During March–June 1938, a distressed Torao Wakamatsu, the Japanese 
Consul-General in Sydney, was in contact with Lyons on an almost 
fortnightly basis. He pressed Lyons to allow Japanese access to the existing 
Yampi project, emphasising the considerable funds that had already been 
invested in good faith.29 Wakamatsu’s anxiety was likely heightened by 
the increasingly stringent economic sanctions and restricted access to 
credit enforced by the US following its condemnation of Japan’s actions 
in China.30 Nevertheless, Australia remained firm in its resolve and the 
embargo was enforced.
27  Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, 87–9; ‘Iron Ore: Yampi Sound’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 5 March 1937, 11; ‘Doc. 15, Cabinet Minute, 9 March 1937’ and ‘Doc. 55, Bruce 
to Lyons, 4 August 1937’, both in Neale, DAFP, vol. 1.
28  ‘Doc. 140, Prime Minister’s Department to Longfield Lloyd, 17 March 1938’ and ‘Doc. 141, 
Lyons to Bruce, 17 March 1938’, both in Neale, DAFP, vol. 1.
29  See Docs. 170, 178, 184, 208, 216, 249, ‘Wakamatsu to Lyons’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 1.
30  For a summary of the United States’ economic response to the Second Sino-Japanese War, see 
US Department of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1943), 32–6.
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While documents since released reveal that the conservation claims were 
fabricated and the iron ore embargo was anti-Japanese in sentiment, it 
was not necessarily the end of eastern appeasement. Instead, the episode 
highlights Australia’s pragmatic appraisal of appeasement and immediate 
national security requirements. While Australia supported bilateral 
economic relations despite the Sino-Japanese War, policymakers did 
not overlook the security implications of Japan’s policy of economic 
penetration. Australia’s attention to Japanese economic expansion is 
evidenced in the extensive strategic assessments compiled by the Australian 
government commissioner in Tokyo, Eric E. Longfield Lloyd. His findings 
were reported to various departments including the Departments of 
Commerce and External Affairs.
Among the activities noted by Longfield Lloyd was the Yampi Sound 
project. In March 1937, he reported having seen a map of the Asia-
Pacific region ‘upon which is shown, by the placing of a series of artificial 
palm trees, the extent … of Japanese so-called “Overseas Enterprise”’. 
One of these palm tree markers had reportedly been used to ‘coolly 
advertise’ the Yampi project as part of Japan’s program of economic 
expansion. While Longfield Lloyd recognised the strategic implications 
of this expansion, he regarded it as little more than ‘an impudence’.31 
By  late 1937, with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and 
the knowledge of inadequate imperial defence policy revealed at the 1937 
Imperial Conference, Longfield Lloyd was more concerned. He described 
Yampi Sound as a Japanese ‘foothold’ within Australian territory and 
warned that the nation’s aggressive expansion into China had been aided 
by a  seemingly innocuous system of economic projects. He feared that 
allowing the Yampi Sound project to continue could ‘only result in the 
occupation and exclusive right over a portion of Australian territory by 
Japanese interests and personnel’. So serious was the threat that Longfield 
Lloyd recommended the project be cancelled ‘by any means whatsoever’. 
One proposed measure was an export embargo justified with a ‘declaration 
of insufficiency’.32 This approach, appearing the least likely to cause 
offence to Japan, was the one later adopted.
In this instance, Australia made the prudent judgement that its longstanding 
fear of invasion and still incomplete rearmament process outweighed the 
strategic returns of appeasement and economic diplomacy.
31  ‘Longfield Lloyd to Murphy, 20 March 1937’, NAA: A601, 402/17/30.
32  ‘Longfield Lloyd to Murphy, 6 October 1937’, NAA: A601, 402/17/30.
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Britain threatens eastern appeasement
Despite the iron ore embargo, the maintenance of stable relations with 
Japan and the relative peace this promoted remained a priority for 
Australian policymakers. Britain’s relations with Japan threatened to 
disrupt this. In the years following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, 
British–Japanese relations deteriorated. There was particular animosity 
surrounding Britain’s financial assistance to the Chinese war effort and 
closer German–Japanese relations, with 1938 seeing Germany recognise 
the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo and the announcement of a new 
Japanese embassy to be constructed in Berlin.33 The most critical point in 
British–Japanese relations was the 1939 Tientsin incident.
The Chinese trading port of Tientsin was a concession to several nations, 
including Britain and Japan, the latter having partially occupied the 
area during the early weeks of the war with China. Co-occupation of 
Tientsin had been relatively peaceful until April 1939, when Chen Hsi-
keng, manager of the Japanese-owned Federal Reserve Bank of North 
China, was assassinated by a group of anti-Japanese Chinese nationals. 
The British police in Tientsin aided in the arrest of four men accused 
of the assassination, handing them over to the Japanese police on the 
condition the men would not be brutalised during interrogation. On their 
return, the men alleged they had been tortured. When the Japanese again 
requested to interview the Chinese prisoners, the British police refused to 
cede custody and granted the men refuge in the British concession area. 
In the coming weeks, tension escalated between the British and Japanese 
governments and nationals living in Tientsin. On 14 June, Japan initiated 
a blockade against France and Britain at Tientsin Port, sparking concerns 
that unresolved tensions would result in a Japanese invasion of the British 
concession area.34
For Australia, the Tientsin incident reaffirmed fears that Britain did not 
appreciate the fragility of Asia-Pacific security. With neither Britain nor 
Australia ready for war with Japan, it was necessary that conciliation be 
33  Bradford A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939: A Study in the Dilemmas 
of British Decline (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973), 132–3.
34  D.C. Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 351–6; ‘Doc. 106, Bruce to Menzies (Prime Minister), 18 June 
1939’, in R.G. Neale (ed.), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49. Volume 2: 1939 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1976) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 2].
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encouraged. As had been the case in the Manchurian Crisis, the individual 
with the greatest opportunity to advocate for Australia’s interests was 
Australia’s High Commissioner in London, Stanley Melbourne Bruce. 
In a meeting with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Bruce stressed 
that war with Japan was ill-advised while the situation in Europe remained 
unresolved. He believed Britain had dealt with the situation in Tientsin 
‘on the wrong leg’ and advised every possible effort be made to avoid 
conflict, encouraging conciliation and the handing over of the accused 
Chinese nationals.35 Faced with pressure from its dominions and, more 
significantly, the reality that it could not successfully wage war against 
Japan while seeking to deal with the situation in Europe, the British 
government was forced to choose the path of conciliation. On 20 August 
1939, the Chinese prisoners were handed over and the Japanese and 
British governments entered negotiations concerning the parameters for 
bilateral relations while Japan was at war with China.36
On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, prompting the outbreak 
of World War II in Europe. Part of Britain’s war against Germany was 
an economic blockade. This strategy was extended to Japan, threatening 
to disrupt Australia’s policy of economic appeasement. In February 
1940, fearing Germany would gain access to strategic materials via 
Japan, the UK Committee for Sale of Empire Wool Abroad instructed 
the Australian government that the sale of any crossbred wool to certain 
neutral countries, Japan included, was forbidden.37 Britain also turned its 
attention to Germany’s access to strategic materials via the Trans-Siberian 
Railway. It was proposed that merchant vessels destined for the Russian 
port of Vladivostok would be intercepted and inspected by the RN.38 
In addition to attacking Germany’s war effort, the British government was 
seeking to mirror the US policy of denying strategic materials to Japan 
in a bid to  remove its war potential.39 Britain, ill-prepared to respond 
to war in both Europe and the Pacific, knew the prospect of facing the 
35  ‘Records of Meeting, Chamberlain and Bruce, 28 June 1939’, in Records of the Cabinet Office, 
Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files (1916 to 1965), TNA: CAB 21/893; Bruce recounts 
this meeting to Menzies in ‘Doc. 114, Bruce to Menzies, 29 June 1939’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 2.
36  Watt, How War Came, 356, 358–9. 
37  ‘Doc. 41, Prime Minister’s Department to Bruce, 5 February 1940’, in R.G. Neale (ed.), 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49. Volume 3: January–June 1940 (Canberra: AGPS, 
1979) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 3].
38  ‘Craigie (British Ambassador in Japan) to Dominions Office, TNA: DO 35/1034/2; ‘Doc. 141, 
Eden to Commonwealth government, 13 April 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
39  Edward S. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy: The US Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 1, 75–7, 84–5.
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US remained the major deterrence against a Japanese declaration of war. 
In coordinating its economic policy towards Japan with that of the US, 
Britain aimed to bolster the weight of this deterrence.40 
Australia also recognised that the US remained the main deterrent 
to Japanese aggression.41 However, with no US military assurance 
forthcoming, the government was reluctant to act against Japan and did 
not meet Britain’s instructions with enthusiasm. Australia’s objection 
centred on existing wool quotas in the Australian–Japanese trade 
agreement (valid until 30 June 1940). The agreement stipulated that 
Australian wool sold to Japan could not be re-exported and the Australian 
government accordingly requested leniency.42 Menzies, concerned by the 
effect the wool boycott would have on both regional security and postwar 
trade with Japan, informed the British government of 
a very strong impression here [in Australia] that our interests are 
being overlooked, that a course is being pursued which will gravely 
impair post-war trade between Australia and neutral countries, 
and that in particular the whole matter is creating a feeling that 
British authorities are indifferent to the problems of the Far East 
and in particular to our own vital concerns to maintain friendly 
relations with Japan.43
The Australian government also dismissed plans to intercept merchant 
vessels as ‘provocative and ineffective’, arguing that economic exclusion 
would make Japan more desperate and incite a force to arms.44 In instances 
such as this, Australia was likely viewed in London as somewhat of 
a diplomatic headache. In retrospect, it reveals a prudent government that 
discerned in British policy not only a threat to regional security within the 
immediate wartime context, but also the effect that slighting Japan may 
have on future trade relations. 
Neither of Britain’s proposed measures was implemented—Bruce 
secured trade with Japan on a three-monthly basis and the interception 
of merchant vessels was deemed an impractical measure by the British 
40  Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Anglo-Australian Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War’, History 80, 
no. 260 (1995): 400–20, at p. 405; Kosmos Tsokhas, ‘Dedominionization: The Anglo-Australian 
Experience, 1939–1945’, Historical Journal 37, no. 4 (1994): 861–83, at pp. 866–7.
41  ‘Bruce to DEA, 19 June 1940’ and ‘Bruce to DEA, 21 June 1940’, both in Australian High 
Commission London: Monthly War Files, 1939–45, NAA: M100, June 1940.
42  ‘Doc. 41, Prime Minister’s Department to Bruce, 5 February 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
43  ‘Doc. 45, Menzies to Bruce, 6 February 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3. 
44  ‘Doc. 148, Commonwealth Government to Eden, 16 April 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
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government—and crisis was avoided in Tientsin. These developments 
did, however, reinforce the divergent priorities of Australia and Britain.45 
Moreover, as Kosmas Tsokhas has argued, in the case of the interception 
of merchant vessels, the limits of imperial defence were glaring.46 The US 
indicated it was unwilling to provide military aid if hostilities occurred 
in the course of the RN intercepting and searching Japanese vessels. This 
would necessitate the transfer of additional RN forces to act as a deterrent 
or, failing this, to respond to Japanese aggression. It was at the risk of 
causing ‘offence to the susceptibilities of the Japanese’ that the British 
government had decided not to intercept Japanese ships.47 In this way, 
Britain again acknowledged that it did not have the military resources to 
respond adequately to Japan if it became aggressive.
There are, of course, contemporary parallels between the 1938 iron 
ore embargo and recent concerns about Chinese commercial inroads 
in Australia and the Pacific Islands. As in 1938, these concerns hinge 
on questions of political influence and security implications and have 
led to limits on foreign property investments, the banning of foreign 
political donations and Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory 
Arrangements) Bill 2020, which seeks to bring state, territory and 
university arrangements with foreign governments in line with Australian 
foreign policy.48 Directly north of Australia, China’s infrastructure 
program, the Belt and Road Initiative, has sparked speculation that the 
nation is using debt-trap diplomacy to secure economic leverage for 
strategic gains.49 With this in mind, the 1938 iron ore embargo serves as 
a warning against over-reliance and an opportunity to invest in new and 
comprehensive partnerships. 
45  Tsokhas, ‘Anglo-Australian Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War’, 410–13.
46  ibid., 406–9.
47  ‘Doc. 180, Eden to Commonwealth government, 27 April 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
48  For discussion of Chinese influence in Australia, see Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s 
Influence on Australia (Melbourne: Hardie Grant Books, 2018); ‘Ensuring a consistent Australian 
foreign policy’, Joint media release, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for 
Women, Canberra, 27 August 2020, available from: www.pm.gov.au/media/ensuring-consistent-
australian-foreign-policy.
49  Debt-trap diplomacy sees countries being granted unsustainable loans. If a nation were to 
default on a loan, the risk is China would use this economic leverage for political influence in the 
country and perhaps even gain access to the infrastructure project to use as it saw fit.
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An Australian diplomatic service
As the war in Europe unfolded, imperial defence continued to weigh on 
the minds of Australian policymakers. The first half of 1940 was near-
cataclysmic for the Allies: Germany swiftly conquered Denmark, Norway 
and the Low Countries throughout April and May; Italy declared war on 
the Allies on 10 June; and a week later France sought an armistice. By the 
end of June, the British Empire stood virtually alone in the defence of the 
North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Pacific and Britain’s local defence. 
These developments had ramifications beyond Europe, sparking fears 
that Japan would capitalise on the Allies’ vulnerable position in the Asia-
Pacific. In May, the British government requested urgent help in the 
defence of the Far East, asking Australia to make available additional 
sloops, armed merchant cruisers and two squadrons each of Wirraway 
general-purpose aircraft and Hudson bombers, as well as the early dispatch 
of Australian Imperial Force (AIF) troops earmarked for Singapore.50 
Then, on 13 June—the same day Australia agreed to make available some 
of the requested equipment—Britain, pre-empting the fall of France, 
informed the Australian government that, for the time being, it was ‘most 
unlikely that we could send adequate reinforcements to the Far East’ in 
the event of Japanese aggression. Previously, Britain had been prepared to 
abandon the Mediterranean on Japan’s entrance into the war, relying on 
the French to contain the situation there. This course of action was no 
longer practicable.51
In the fallout of the deteriorating Allied position in Europe, Bruce openly 
criticised the lack of direction in imperial defence planning, remarking at 
a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee of the General Staff that it was
impossible to expect the Australian Government to feel anything 
other than extremely anxious in her cooperation if she had not 
a clear picture of what it was in the minds of those who were 
responsible here [in London] for the conduct of war.52
50  Horner, High Command, 35–8.
51  ‘Doc. 376, Caldecote to Whiskard, 13 June 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3. For Australia’s 
decision to make equipment available, see ‘Doc. 372, Menzies to Whiskard, 13 June 1940’, in Neale, 
DAFP, vol. 3.
52  ‘Doc. 19, Bruce to Menzies, 8 July 1940’, in R.G. Neale (ed.), Documents on Australian Foreign 
Policy, 1937–49. Volume 4: July1940 – January 1941 (Canberra: AGPS, 1980) [hereinafter DAFP, 
vol. 4].
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Britain attempted to dispel Australia’s anxieties, suggesting the US might 
be willing to declare ‘any alteration of the status quo in the Far East 
and the Pacific as a casus belli’.53 In reality, the US government faced an 
unfavourable opinion of the war in the Congress and among the public, 
and doggedly refused to commit to actions that might lead to a force 
of arms.54 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also assured the 
Australian government that if Japan invaded Australia or New Zealand, 
Britain would ‘cut our losses in the Mediterranean and sacrifice every 
interest’ to come to their aid.55 Privately, Churchill believed Japan would 
not enter the war until at least late 1941 and anticipated raids rather 
than a large-scale invasion of Australia. With Australia half a world away 
and earnestly fearing invasion and a casus belli highly unlikely, neither 
assurance was particularly comforting.
Australia’s immediate response to the crisis of 1940 was to strengthen 
its diplomatic representation. Australia had long been content with 
international representation via the British diplomatic service, believing 
formal representation was not required due to the ‘fundamental similarity’ 
the imperial framework lent to the two nation’s foreign policies.56 
By  June 1940, however, this similarity was no longer so apparent and 
it was essential Australia establish formal diplomatic relations with 
Japan. On 19 June, just two days after France began suing for peace, the 
Australian War Cabinet agreed the nation required its own diplomatic 
service in Tokyo. Here it is significant to note that the War Cabinet 
concluded such an appointment was necessary ‘before the international 
situation deteriorate[s] further’, highlighting once again the intersection 
of defence and diplomacy in Australia’s preparation for the Pacific War.57
The attempt in June 1940 was in fact not the first to try to establish 
an Australian diplomatic service in Japan. In March 1939, Lyons had 
suggested to the British government that Australia make formal diplomatic 
appointments in Japan and the US. These appointments would have been 
Australia’s first outside Britain and were, Lyons argued, ‘imperative’ to 
national interests.58 Britain endorsed the proposed legation in Washington 
53  ‘Doc. 406, Caldecote to Whiskard, 19 June 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3. 
54  Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 
1941–1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 39–40, 76; Horner, High Command, 38–40.
55  ‘Churchill to Menzies, 11 August 1940’, cited in Horner, High Command, 38.
56  ‘Mr Lyons on Australian Proposal’, The Times, [London], 8 June 1937, 13.
57  ‘Doc. 405, War Cabinet Minute, 19 June 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
58  ‘Doc. 63, Lyons to Caldecote, 30 March 1939’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 2.
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but opposed the proposal for Tokyo. The Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, Lord Caldecote, believed an appointment in Japan would ‘weaken 
the Imperial bond’ as it suggested that Australia and Britain were not 
coordinated in their views on the nation’s aggressive actions in China. The 
situation was further complicated by the fact that no legation had initially 
been proposed for China, suggesting favourability towards Japan in the 
continuing Sino-Japanese War.59 Australia did not act on its proposal for 
a  legation in Japan, although private discussions continued. In March 
1940, Menzies remarked in a cable to Bruce that ‘the increasing significance 
of the Far East to Australia appears to outweigh other considerations’.60 
These other considerations were presumably the appearance of condoning 
Japanese actions and, although only implied, imperial unity.
By June 1940, Australia’s concern was so acute it acted regardless of 
Britain’s disapproval. On 22 June, the Australian government informed 
Caldecote of the decision to establish an Australian legation in Tokyo, 
requesting he immediately initiate the necessary steps.61 John Latham 
was selected as Australia’s first Minister to Japan on the basis of his past 
experience as Minister for External Affairs and in the 1934 AEM.62 
With this appointment, Australia diverted from what had formally been 
a united foreign policy with Britain. 
In the months between the decision to appoint a minister in Japan 
and Latham’s arrival in December, Japan became further entangled in 
European and Far Eastern aggression. On 16 July, the relatively moderate 
Japanese Prime Minister Mitsumasa Yonai and his Cabinet were forced 
to resign due to pressure from the Imperial Japanese Army and the 
War Minister.63 The incoming government included Prime Minister 
Prince Fumimaro Konoe, an aggressive nationalist who had been prime 
minister during Japan’s invasion of China in 1937, and, as Foreign 
Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, who had led the Japanese delegation during 
its withdrawal from the League of Nations.64 Once in office, the Konoe 
59  ‘Doc. 75, Caldecote to Whiskard, 29 April 1939’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 2.
60  ‘Doc. 89, Menzies to Bruce, 4 March 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3. 
61  ‘Doc. 418, Commonwealth government to Caldecote, 22 June 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
62  ‘Doc. 182, Advisory War Council Minute, 29 October 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 4.
63  ‘Doc. 1079, Grew (Ambassador in Japan) to Hull (Secretary of State), 17 July 1940’, in John G. 
Reid, Ralph R. Goodwin and Louis E. Gates (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955) 
[hereinafter FRUS 1940].
64  Lionel Wigmore, Australia in the War of 1939–1945: The Japanese Thrust. Series 1: Army. Volume 4 
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), 22. 
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Cabinet announced its intentions to form foreign policy in the ‘strictest 
of relations with the Axis powers’ and with ‘vigorous prosecution of 
the plan for the establishment of a new order in East Asia’.65 Konoe’s 
new government was quick to act on this declaration: in August, Japan 
sought to align itself with the pro-Axis Vichy government in German-
occupied France; on 22 September, the Japanese Army invaded northern 
Indochina; and, on 27 September, the nation signed the Tripartite Pact 
with Germany and Italy, in which each signatory recognised the other’s 
vision and sovereignty within their respective regions and committed to 
mutual assistance in the event of war.66
Australia remained firm in its commitment to establish a diplomatic 
representative in Japan, even as Britain requested the appointment 
be postponed and the British Ambassador in Japan contemplated 
evacuation.67 The rationale underpinning Australia’s position can be 
gleaned through an Advisory War Council minute of late October 1940 
that outlined Latham’s role in Japan. The Advisory War Council hoped an 
appointment in Japan would grant Australia ‘prestige’. Although Latham’s 
appointment was ‘not an act of separation’ between the British and 
Australian governments, he was cautioned that he ‘should not be or even 
appear to be in the pocket of the Ambassador of the United Kingdom 
Government’. The government did not believe that war with Japan could 
be avoided; however, if Latham could soften perceptions of Australia and 
the Empire as a whole, this would perhaps delay Japan’s entry into the 
war. Australia would, in turn, ‘gain time to allow for the development and 
the growing strength of [its] defences’.68 The value of this approach was 
no doubt amplified as Longfield Lloyd reported mounting hostility in 
Japan towards the British—for instance, the menacing words of Sankichi 
Takahashi, outspoken former commander of the Combined Japanese 
Fleet, that Britain ‘is standing in our way and is doing her best to defeat 
our national task’. He cautioned the Japanese people not to take immediate 
action against Britain, for defeat was presently the likely outcome, but to 
wait and ‘listen to the commands of the captain’.69
65  ‘Doc. 1082, Grew to Hull, 13 July 1940’, in Reid et al., FRUS 1940.
66  Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, 143, 147–9.
67  ‘Menzies to Bruce, 9 July 1940’, in Prime Minister’s Department: Master sheets (used stencils) 
of outwards cables, annual single number series, 1939–49, NAA: A3196, 1940/15; ‘Craigie to 
Commonwealth government, 3 October 1940’, NAA: A981, Far 14 Part 1.
68  ‘Doc. 182, Advisory War Council Minute, 29 October 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 4. 
69  ‘“Latest Situation in the South Seas and Japan’s Position—Japanese People Must be Prepared for 
What May Happen”, 19 October 1940’, cutting, in NAA: A601, 402/17/30.
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As noted, Australia proposed the establishment of a legation in Washington 
in March 1939. One of Australia’s principal aims in the two years preceding 
the outbreak of the Pacific War was to draw the US into Pacific affairs 
and extract from it a military guarantee. The legation in Washington was 
central to this aim, as evidenced in a cable Menzies received from Bruce, 
who was briefly considered for the appointment: 
In Washington my activities would be directed towards ensuring 
maximum cooperation of the United States while she is out of the 
war; her military help should war go unfavourably to Allies, her 
diplomatic collaboration in resolving Far Eastern problems, and 
her armed intervention should Japan become actively hostile.70 
The man eventually charged with the task as Australia’s first Minister to 
Washington was Richard Casey. 
Casey arrived in Washington in February 1940 and his approach as 
minister mirrored Bruce’s earlier assessment. Casey pursued a twofold 
strategy of public and private diplomacy, seeking to draw attention to 
Australia’s plight in the war in Europe and overlapping Australian and 
US interests in the Pacific.71 Casey’s diaries from his time in Washington 
recount dozens of public addresses, press releases and invitations to dine 
with the US political elite.72 Casey judged the result of his publicity 
campaign to be that a great many Americans who had previously little to 
no knowledge of the far-flung Commonwealth country were now at least 
aware of the nation, its culture and concerns.73
Casey’s second task of formal diplomacy was a more difficult one as 
he had to contend with US isolationism and opposition to war, which 
were, as Casey’s biographer W.J. Hudson has noted, amplified by the 
70  ‘Bruce to Menzies, 18 October 1939’, in Prime Minister’s Department: Miscellaneous cables, 
1937–43, NAA: CP290/6, Bundle 1/1.
71  Carl Bridge, ‘“The Other Blade of the Scissors”: Richard Gardiner Casey, Australia’s First Minister 
to the United States, 1940–1942’, in Diplomats at War: British and Commonwealth Diplomacy in 
Wartime, eds Christopher Baxter and Andrew Stewart (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 127–48; 
Carl Bridge, ‘R.G. Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation, and the Origins of the Pacific War, 
1940–42’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 28, no. 2 (1982): 181–89.
72  For Casey’s Washington diaries, see Carl Bridge (ed.), A Delicate Mission: The Washington Diaries 
of R.G. Casey, 1940–1942 (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2008).
73  ‘Doc. 149, Casey to McEwan (Minister for External Affairs), 16 April 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, 
vol. 3.
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1940 presidential election.74 The crisis in Europe in the first half of 1940 
prompted the DEA, Menzies and Bruce to request Casey seek some 
measure of support from the US, be it material assistance or a declaration 
of war.75 With firsthand experience of US isolationism, Casey placed 
little confidence in the likelihood of the nation taking such a course of 
action.76 Nevertheless, he called on President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
other key officials, expressing his government’s desire to see the US make 
a declaration of war.
One such meeting was with the US Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles, with whom Casey had formed a friendship and whom he 
described as ‘receptive’ and someone to whom he could ‘talk freely and 
easily’. He painted a grim picture for Welles in which Germany, following 
the imminent collapse of France, ‘would be free and in a good position 
to concentrate all efforts by sea and air on Britain’. In this scenario, the 
landing of German troops on British soil was ‘perfectly possible’. Casey 
believed the RN ‘would not give up itself under any circumstance’, 
leading to heavy losses and possible immolation. Welles judged this to be 
‘an extremely unwise and illogical’ course of action for, while ‘the British 
Fleet remained in existence it was possible to retrieve the situation at some 
later date’.77 Welles doubtless appreciated Casey’s implied message that 
the RN was vital to the protection of US interests in Europe, for it alone 
prevented Germany turning its gaze across the Atlantic Ocean to the US. 
Although Welles promised to report Casey’s message to Roosevelt, he was 
soon informed that a US declaration of war remained ‘unthinkable’.78
As the presidential campaign progressed and it appeared likely that 
Roosevelt would be re-elected, there was a private shift in the US position 
on the war. In October, the US and British governments agreed to share 
decoded information from Japanese and German communications. 
In  December, Roosevelt approved Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s 
74  W.J. Hudson, Casey (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), 117. See also, James Prior, 
America Looks to Australia: The Hidden Role of Richard Casey in the Creation of the Australia–America 
Alliance, 1940–1942 (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2017), 53–63.
75  ‘Doc. 239, DEA to Casey, 15 May 1940’, ‘Doc. 280, Menzies to Casey, 26 May 1940’ and ‘Doc. 
287, Bruce to Casey, 27 May 1940’, all in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
76  ‘Doc. 257, Casey to DEA, 20 May 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3.
77  ‘Doc. 319, Casey to Menzies, 30 May 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 3. 
78  ‘Doc. 9, Memorandum by Hull, 6 June 1940’, in Rogers P. Churchill, N.O. Sappington, Kieran 
J. Carroll, Morrison B. Giffen and Francis C. Prescott (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States 
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suggestion that Anglo-American joint discussions be held, specifically 
focusing on the general military resources and strategies to be adopted on 
US entry into the war. These meetings would take place in Washington 
in early 1941.79
Casey was able to report a small victory for Australia. Roosevelt had agreed 
to host an Australian naval office to ‘investigate and expedite Australian 
orders in the United States in respect of Australian naval requirements’. 
Commander Henry Burrell was duly appointed, arriving in Washington in 
November 1940. Admittedly, Roosevelt requested the naval appointment 
and subsequent discussions not be publicised in the US or Australian press, 
lest he and his government be seen as warmongers.80 Nevertheless, this 
appointment indicated the US was aware of its shared security interests 
with Australia—even if it would not yet act on them—and was assessing 
the logistics of coordinated US–Australian operations. 
As the US position on the war shifted, Casey frantically made a case 
for Singapore. In meetings with State Department staff and high-
ranking military planners throughout November and December, Casey 
encouraged the transfer of US warships to Singapore, contending that 
‘with a sufficiently strong demonstration the Japanese might be deterred 
from carrying things very much farther’.81 Casey judged Hull to be 
receptive, appreciating that the war was entering ‘a new and dangerous 
phase’.82 Hull’s own retelling of this meeting was far less encouraging, 
noting that the US wished to see the effect of economic embargoes before 
it committed to deploying naval vessels. Hull, accordingly, ‘could not 
undertake to go into [Casey’s] inquiry’.83 No decision was made regarding 
Singapore and 1940 closed without a military guarantee from the US.
From January to March 1941, the British–US discussions were under way 
in Washington. During these months, it became even more urgent to 
convince the US of Singapore’s significance. Throughout February, reports 
79  Bridge, ‘R.G. Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation, and the Origins of the Pacific War’, 
184; ‘Doc. 213, Casey to DEA, 2 December 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 4.
80  ‘Doc. 177, Casey to Menzies and McEwen, 17 October 1940’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 4. 
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1939–87, NAA: A3300, 11, in which Casey recounts a meeting with Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. 
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arrived that the Japanese Army, already occupying northern Indochina, 
was making moves towards Cam Rahn Bay in the south-east. It was also 
reported that the nation was looking towards the proposal for the Kra 
Isthmus canal, which would afford Japan a strong position from which 
to attack Malaya, Thailand and, most critically for Australia, Singapore.84 
Despite these developments and Casey’s reasoning, US policymakers 
remained unconvinced that Singapore was vital to their own interests. 
Instead, they believed their forces needed to be reserved for the United 
States’ Pacific and Atlantic bases—expressly for the defence of the nation’s 
territory.85
While the British–US discussions offered welcome news for war in 
Europe, this did not extend to Australia’s region of strategic concern. The 
Australian legation staff and Burrell, who was present at the joint talks, 
reported that only an attack on US possessions would induce the nation to 
declare war on Japan. In this scenario, both the British and the US delegates 
agreed that Europe would be the priority, necessitating a holding war in 
the Pacific until Germany and Italy had been defeated.86 This decision 
was, as historians have established, the earliest suggestion of what would 
come to be known as the ‘Beat Hitler First’ policy.87 The US delegates 
recognised the strategic importance of Singapore in a war against Japan, 
admitting its loss would be ‘unfortunate’, but they were not convinced 
it would ‘have a decisive effect on the issue of the war’.88 The Atlantic 
and Mediterranean theatres were the primary concerns. If necessary, the 
US would ‘contemplate … abandoning the Far East in order to ensure 
maximum concentration in [the] Atlantic and Mediterranean’.89 The 
US delegates made clear in the strongest possible terms that ‘it would be 
a serious mistake for the United Kingdom [and its empire] in making their 
84  ‘Doc. 277, Caldecote to Whiskard, 7 February 1941’ and ‘Doc. 304, Caldecote to Whiskard, 
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strategic dispositions to withstand a Japanese attack against Singapore to 
count on prompt military support by [the] United States’.90 Quite simply, 
Britain and the US were fully occupied with affairs in Europe, leaving the 
Japanese threat on the periphery of their grand strategy for a global war.
At this point, formal diplomacy had proved fruitless in convincing the 
US that it shared security interests with Australia. Australia sought a new 
diplomatic strategy to tether its interests to those of the US and, in July 
1941, it was presented with an opportunity.
From appeasement to deterrence
Japan faced restricted access to strategic materials as a result of British 
and US sanctions in response to its activities in northern Indochina. 
The Japanese government and army placed increasing pressure on the 
NEI for greater market access throughout the first half of 1941. Failing 
this, invasion was the likely recourse. The British government, judging 
continued economic pressure to be the most effective means of deterring 
aggression, proposed decisive action: a total economic embargo against 
Japan and the renunciation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation. For the full weight of these measures to be 
felt, dominion cooperation was necessary.91
The Australian government understood it was now time to make 
a  decisive shift from appeasement to deterrence, agreeing that a full 
economic embargo would effectively hinder Japan’s capacity to carry out 
regional expansion. However, the nation would not accept deterrence 
without certain parameters and wanted to ensure more perilous measures 
against Japan included a safeguard against retaliatory hostility. With the 
knowledge that, in the case of Japanese aggression, Britain could not, and 
the US would not, respond with an adequate counterforce, the Australian 
government postponed making a final decision.92
90  ‘Casey to DEA, 24 February 1941’, NAA: A981, Far 25 Part 1.
91  ‘Doc. 386, Cranborne (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) to Commonwealth government, 
5 April 1941’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 4.
92  Tsokhas, ‘Anglo-Australian Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War’, 402, 414–17; 
‘Commonwealth government to Dominions Office, 14 May 1941’, TNA: DO 35/1035/1.
THE GENESIS OF A POLICY
104
On 9 July, Casey’s friendship with Welles provided vital information in 
Australia’s campaign to draw the US into Pacific affairs. Welles confided 
in Casey that the interception and decoding of Japanese diplomatic 
cables had revealed its army was poised to move south through Indochina, 
Thailand and the NEI. The US planned to respond with a full and 
immediate economic embargo. Although Welles admitted this course of 
action would ‘likely provoke Japan to war with them [the US] before 
long’, he believed it useless to continue issuing warnings to Japan without 
acting on them.93 Here was an opportunity for the Australian government 
to coordinate its policy with the US.
Casey immediately informed his Prime Minister and Minister for 
External Affairs of this conversation. The following day, Menzies made 
known his government’s decision on the British government’s proposed 
economic embargo against Japan. He informed Britain that Australia 
would cooperate on the condition that such action was ‘part of a carefully 
weighed plan with adequate safeguards for us’. These safeguards were 
a  coordinated Australian–British–US economic embargo against Japan 
and, critically, a commitment from the US to support Allied merchant 
ships in the event of Japanese aggression, even if no attack had been made 
against US ships.94 Britain agreed to Menzies’ conditions, informing 
the government that it expected the US would mirror British policy; 
unbeknown to Australia, the US was holding off on announcing an 
embargo so it could coordinate action with Britain. 
On 26 July, some 140,000 Japanese troops positioned themselves to 
invade southern Indochina. Britain renounced the Anglo-Japanese 
trade treaty and the US announced the seizure of Japanese assets, a total 
trade embargo and the policy of protecting merchant ships.95 Within 
a  fortnight, Australia renounced its own commercial treaty with Japan 
and imposed a full embargo. With this, Australia shifted from appeasing 
Japan to deterring it.96
93  ‘Doc. 2, Casey to Menzies and Stewart (Minister for External Affairs), 9 July 1941’, in W.J. 
Hudson and H.J.W. Stokes (eds), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49. Volume 5: July 
1941 – June 1942 (Canberra: AGPS, 1982) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 5].
94  ‘Doc. 4, Menzies to Bruce, 10 July 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
95  ‘Doc. 15, Cranborne to Commonwealth government, 25 July 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, 
DAFP, vol. 5.
96  Tsokhas, ‘Anglo-Australian Relations and the Origins of the Pacific War’, 418–19. 
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In the days before Australia announced the economic embargo, the 
government assessed how best to implement sanctions. In a 29 July 
meeting of the Advisory War Council, it was acknowledged that economic 
sanctions came with the risk of inciting a Japanese declaration of war or 
further aggressive action in other parts of the Far East. Valuable as the 
July embargo was in presenting a united response, the fact remained that 
the US had made no commitment to the defence of Australia and only 
an attack on US possessions would lead to a declaration of war. Menzies 
noted that when Australia notified the US of the economic measures being 
taken ‘it should be intimated that the possible consequences of such action 
… [were] realised and we assume that the United States Government 
also realized them’. He hoped to force on the US an acknowledgement 
that a hardening policy towards Japan came with certain risks and 
responsibilities.97
Throughout 1941, Japan and the US had been in the process of bilateral 
negotiations, which aimed to persuade the Japanese Army to withdraw 
from China and Indochina in exchange for diplomatic and economic 
assistance. Both these negotiations and the US policy of protecting 
merchant vessels provided further time in which the Allies could prepare, 
allowing a battleship and two destroyers to be transferred to Singapore.98 
By late 1941, the US–Japanese negotiations were reaching the final stages 
and it was clear that Japan, facing a steady decline in the reserves vital 
to its expansion policy in the Asia-Pacific region, would have to either 
submit to US demands or resort to war. The latter was the most likely 
outcome.99
On 26 November, Hull presented the Japanese negotiators, ambassadors 
Kichisaburō Nomura and Saburō Kurusu, with a list of general US 
demands.100 The next day, Casey reported on meeting with a ‘depressed’ 
Hull, who saw little hope for the negotiations. He showed Casey several 
recent cables from consular officers in Indochina detailing ‘considerable 
military activity’ by the Japanese, predicting correctly that the nation 
was readying itself to invade Thailand.101 The Australian government did 
97  ‘Doc. 21, Advisory War Council Minute, 29 July 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5. 
98  Bridge, ‘R.G. Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation, and the Origins of the Pacific War’, 
186.
99  Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy, 189–90, 236–40.
100  ‘Doc. 129, Casey to Curtin (Prime Minister) and Evatt (Minister for External Affairs), 
26 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
101  ‘Doc. 133, Casey to Curtin and Evatt, 27 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5. 
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not resign itself to accept this grim reality. In a 28 November meeting 
of the Advisory War Council, it was agreed that the Japanese–US 
negotiations were ‘of great value, and they should continue, in view of the 
importance of gaining time’. In prolonging the US–Japanese negotiations, 
Australia would be provided time in which to ‘bring home’ the shared 
security concerns of Australia and the US, the Australian government’s 
commitment to a coordinated strategy and, in turn, a hoped-for US 
military guarantee.102 The council accordingly agreed that Australia’s 
approach would be to maintain ‘contact as to what is happening [in the 
negotiations] and expressing opinions where asked for or where it is 
deemed prudent to suggest a word of advice’.103 On the basis of this 
directive and Minister for External Affairs H.V. Evatt’s express request, 
Casey sought to insert himself in US–Japanese diplomacy.104 
In a 29 November meeting with Hull, Casey proposed he act as a third 
party in the US–Japanese discussions. He believed relations between the 
two countries ‘had become such that neither side could initiate further 
approach to the other’. As Australia was ‘in a rather different position’, 
he wanted to meet with the Japanese ambassadors as an ‘intermediary’ 
between the two nations. Hull was reportedly ‘appreciative’ of Casey’s 
offer and gave his support for the meeting, although he showed little 
enthusiasm for the prospect of a positive outcome.105 Casey met with 
Nomura and Kurusu the following day and left the meeting with no new 
points for Hull to consider, for the Japanese had nothing to offer. It was 
clear Japan had no intention of negotiating further.106 Nevertheless, Casey 
identified a small victory in the episode, informing Curtin and Evatt that 
Hull had ‘used the term “we” in the sense of the United States and British 
countries’ when discussing how to respond to Japanese aggression.107 
At the very least, this suggested a coordinated response was the United 
States’ chosen strategy.
102  Bridge, ‘R.G. Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation, and the Origins of the Pacific War’, 
187. See also, Hudson, Casey, 126–7.
103  ‘Doc. 132, Advisory War Council Minute, 28 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, 
vol. 5.
104  ‘Doc. 137, Evatt to Casey, 29 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
105  ‘Doc. 140, Casey to Curtin and Evatt, 29 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5. 
106  ‘Doc. 144, Casey to Curtin and Evatt, 30 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
107  ‘Doc. 140, Casey to Curtin and Evatt, 29 November 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
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As Casey was urgently seeking to secure a US military guarantee, 
intelligence confirmed that Japan was set to attack Thailand, moving into 
Burma and Malaya and further into China.108 On 1 December, Roosevelt 
met with the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, to discuss 
strategies in response to this situation. Halifax reported ‘the whole tenor’ 
of the conversation had been ‘that we should both recognise any of these 
hypothetical actions to be [a] clear prelude to some further action and 
threat to our common interests against which we ought to react together 
at once’. Roosevelt made clear that, in the event of an attack on Thailand, 
Britain could ‘count on their support’.109 On the same day, Casey reported 
a comment made off the record by Welles, who believed
the line beyond which we cannot allow the Japanese to pass has 
been reached for three reasons (a) we cannot allow ourselves to be 
cut off from essential defence needs (b) we cannot be out in [the] 
position of asking Japanese permission to trade in the Pacific and 
(c) we cannot allow Burma Road, our last remaining means of 
sending supplies to be China, to be cut.110
On the basis of this scenario, Welles declared ‘the British will fight and 
we will move in behind them’.111 On learning of this, Evatt cabled Casey, 
Bruce and Frederic Eggleston, Minister to China, commending their 
efforts to encourage US armed resistance on behalf of the Allies and to 
prevent the breakdown of bilateral talks. He made careful note of these 
measures being pursued during the period before the RN ships’ arrival in 
Singapore and of the time that had been created for the final preparations 
for war in the Pacific.112
After years of uncertainty and repeated appeals by Britain and Australia, 
the Roosevelt government was finally willing to commit armed forces 
in the Far East beyond its own territories. Based on this assurance, 
Britain and Australia negotiated contingency plans for their response 
to Japan’s entrance into the war. In the event of an attack or increased 
pressure on Thailand or China, they would ‘follow the lead’ of the US, 
withholding from a declaration of war until a joint response could be 
108  ‘Evatt to Casey, 1 December 1941’, NAA: A3300, 100.
109  ‘Doc. 152, Casey to DEA, 1 December 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5, in which 
Casey forwarded Halifax’s report.
110  ‘Casey to DEA, 1 December 1941’, NAA: A3300, 100. 
111  ibid.
112  ‘Doc. 155, Evatt to Bruce, Casey and Eggleston, 3 December 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, 
DAFP, vol. 5.
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coordinated. Attacks on Russia, the NEI or Portuguese Timor would 
result in a declaration of war irrespective of US entry.113 In the end, these 
contingencies were unnecessary as, in the early hours of 7 December 
1941, Japan attacked  the US Naval Station Pearl Harbor in Hawai`i. 
Within hours, Guam and the  Philippines—both US possessions—had 
also been attacked.
The years leading up to the Pacific War were marked by immense 
uncertainty for Australia as Japan expanded its regional dominance and 
Britain—overstretched, underprepared and preoccupied with European 
affairs—pushed Asia-Pacific concerns to the periphery. It was also this 
uncertainty in tandem with the lessons learnt in previous years that 
motivated the Australian government to seek out a policy that created 
time in which to prepare for war and, from 1940, drew the US into 
Asia-Pacific affairs. Granted, Australia’s efforts alone did not secure 
a US military commitment, nor did they prevent the fall of Singapore 
and the assessment that the Pacific theatre was of secondary importance. 
Nevertheless, Australia’s response to the coming regional conflict remains 
a significant and overlooked development in the emergence of a lucid 
and opportunistic foreign policy in which policymakers carefully assessed 
international developments, the strategies of the great powers and the 
opportunities available to project the national interest. Australia now 
sought to integrate its national interest within British and US wartime 
strategies and visions for the postwar world. As has been a consistent 
theme throughout the previous chapters, this was a challenging task in 
which Australia’s junior status and the often-divergent visions of the 
British and US were significant barriers. 
113  ‘Prime Minister’s Department to Casey, 2 December 1941’, NAA: A3300, 100; ‘Doc. 153, 
Commonwealth government to Cranborne, 2 December 1941’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
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‘An undoubted right to 
speak’: Projecting Australia’s 
influence in the postwar 
Asia-Pacific, 1942–45
On 27 December 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin advised that Australia 
‘looks to America, free of any pangs to our traditional links or kinship with 
the United Kingdom’.1 These words have been popularly heralded as the 
turning point in Australian–US relations and the basis of a smooth and 
natural progression to a postwar relationship and the eventual ANZUS 
alliance.2 Certainly, Curtin’s message was a public acknowledgement that 
Australia faced an imminent crisis in the Asia-Pacific to which Britain 
was unable to respond and the nation now depended on the US for its 
security. His message, however, was not indicative of Australia’s shift 
from strategic dependence on Britain to the US, or even a particularly 
pronounced Australian–US affinity.
1  ‘John Curtin, “The Task Ahead”,’ in F.K. Crowley (ed.), Modern Australia in Documents. Volume 2: 
1939–1970 (Melbourne: Wren Publishing, 1973), 51.
2  For examples of works emphasising Curtin’s ‘look to America’ aphorism as a turning point, see 
Gareth Evans, ‘The Labor Tradition: A View From the 1990s’, in From Evatt to Evans: The Labor 
Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, eds David Lee and Christopher Waters (Canberra: Allen & 
Unwin with the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
The Australian National University, 1997), 12; Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2014), 73–80; Bruce Grant, Crisis of Loyalty: A Study in 
Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson for Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
1972), 15–16.
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With Australia’s wartime experiences the focal point for much of the 
existing literature concerning the nation’s foreign policy, much of this 
story has been chronicled elsewhere. This is particularly so in the case of 
the wartime origins of External Affairs Minister H.V. Evatt’s particular 
brand of assertive regionalism.3 This chapter builds on this work through 
a focus on developments after the crisis years of the Pacific War, as 
Australian policymakers realised the US could not necessarily be relied on 
to build a postwar order conducive to its national interest. It holds that 
Australian assertiveness was not limited to Evatt’s initiatives, placing him 
alongside other key thinkers. Their shared goal was articulating Australia’s 
status in the Asia-Pacific and setting out a strategy for managing in the 
region in the postwar period. The result was an Australian-led plan 
for renewed Commonwealth cooperation, which aimed to regionalise 
defence planning and establish a friendly yet robust counterweight to 
US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The great powers’ grand strategy
The early months of the Pacific War were ones of crisis for Australia. 
The initial foundation of Allied strategy in the war against Japan was the 
American–British–Dutch–Australian Command (ABDACOM), hastily 
established at the Arcadia Conference (22 December 1941 – 14 January 
1942).4 ABDACOM was formed without prior consultation with either 
the Dutch or the Australians, and directives came only from Britain and 
the US. This led Evatt to label it an ‘AB organisation’ rather than ‘a true 
ABDA organisation’.5 More critically, the initial ABDACOM boundaries 
excluded the continent of Australia, yet expected the nation’s forces to be 
made available for the defence of the area. It was only because of strong 
representations by the Australian government that Britain agreed to 
expand the ABDACOM boundaries. This expanded boundary included 
part of the northern Australian mainland, while the ANZAC Area 
(Australia  and New Zealand) was established as an associated support 
3  Examples of the many works dedicated to Evatt’s life and his foreign policy legacy include Alan 
Renouf, Let Justice Be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr H.V. Evatt (Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1983); Ken Buckley, Barbara Dale and Wayne Reynolds, Doc Evatt: Patriot, Internationalist, Fighter 
and Scholar (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994); David Day (ed.), Brave New World: Dr H.V. Evatt 
and Australian Foreign Policy, 1941–1949 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1996).
4  Wigmore, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, 646–9.
5  ‘Evatt to Casey, 7 January 1942’, NAA: A981, WAR 54.
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area.6 The expansion of ABDACOM was significant not only in terms 
of providing for local defence, but also because it linked to the Australian 
government’s hopes to insert itself into the grand strategy of the great 
powers. Australia was anxious to institute an ANZAC Area with itself as 
a main base in the Pacific theatre, rather than it being at the periphery 
of Allied activities.7
The loss of Malaya and Singapore and the rapidly deteriorating situation 
in the NEI highlighted the strategic neglect of the Asia-Pacific region 
and frustrated Australian–British relations. Tensions famously came to a 
head in February 1942. In January, the British government requested the 
6th and 7th divisions of the AIF be transferred from the Middle East to 
the NEI to join British troops in creating a defensive line against Japan’s 
southward advance.8 The Australian government initially supported this 
request, seeing in the concentration of the AIF in the Pacific theatre 
an opportunity, as Secretary for Defence Frederick Shedden informed 
Curtin, to strengthen ‘our claim to a voice in the higher direction of 
operations in this region’.9 In mid-February, with the 7th Division in 
transit, the Supreme Commander of ABDACOM, General Archibald 
Wavell, informed Australia that the NEI could not be held and the 
7th Division should be diverted to Burma. Senior Australian military 
officials—cognisant of Australia’s insecurity in the wake of Singapore’s 
recent collapse—advised the 6th and 7th divisions should be returned 
home for local defence. On 19 February, Curtin informed the British 
government of his decision to return the two divisions to Australia.10 
Remarkably, Churchill ignored this directive, instructing the British 
Admiralty, which was overseeing the transport of the Australian division, 
to deliver the troops to Burma. This incensed Curtin, who accused 
Churchill of threatening the security of Australia and the men on board 
6  For Curtin’s initial response to the ABDACOM machinery and boundaries, see ‘Doc. 185, 
Memorandum of Conversation by Stewart (Division of European Affairs), 12 January 1942’, in 
Frederick Aandahl, William M. Franklin and William Slany (eds), Foreign Relations of the United 
States: The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1958) [hereinafter FRUS: The Conferences].
7  Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 228–30; Horner, High Command, 147–9.
8  Joan Beaumont, ‘Australia’s War: Asia and the Pacific’, in Australia’s War, 1939–45, ed. Joan 
Beaumont (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 33–4.
9  ‘Shedden to Curtin, 9 January 1942, NAA: MP1217, 573’, cited in Horner, High Command, 
149. Curtin repeated this assessment to Earl Page, the Australian representative to the London Pacific 
War Council and British War Cabinet. ‘Doc. 334, Curtin to Page, 15 February 1942’, in Hudson and 
Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
10  ‘Doc. 345, Curtin to Page, 19 February 1942’, in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
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the convoy of ships. He insisted the troops be returned home.11 While the 
British government quickly complied, the episode had made clear that 
Australia’s views on strategic planning in the Pacific theatre were of little 
account to Britain.
As British power in the Asia-Pacific region collapsed and Australia was left 
exposed, the Curtin government pursued greater cooperation with the 
US. In early 1942, Evatt spent six weeks in the US, where he successfully 
petitioned for increased war supplies (mainly aircraft) and the creation 
of the Pacific War Council (PWC) in Washington—a body established 
for intergovernmental consultation and decision-making concerning 
Allied strategy in the Pacific theatre—in which Australia was directly 
represented.12 The PWC did not play an effective role in strategic decision-
making, as it remained largely advisory in function.13 Owen Dixon, who 
served as the Australian representative on the PWC, later described the 
body as neither effective nor well informed, with no agenda or minutes 
kept and discussions ‘always’ avoiding the ‘critical issues’ of the war in 
the Pacific.14 
Australia was presented with a new opportunity for direct representation 
in Allied strategic decision-making when the Pacific theatre was named 
an area of US strategic responsibility in March 1942. ABDACOM was 
replaced with the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), which encompassed 
Australia, New Guinea, Papua, the Philippines, the western part of the 
Solomon Islands and most of the NEI. With Malaya, Singapore and 
the NEI having already fallen and Japan on the verge of capturing the 
Philippines, the US needed a new base from which to launch actions 
against the Japanese. Australia was the only viable option. General Douglas 
MacArthur was ordered to leave the Philippines and travel to Australia, 
where he took up the role of Supreme Commander of the SWPA, with 
authority over Allied naval, land and air forces in the area.15 Newspapers 
across Australia documented the enthusiastic crowds who welcomed 
11  ‘Doc. 366, Curtin to Attlee (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs), 23 February 1942’, 
in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5.
12  ‘Doc. 446, Evatt to Curtin, 29 March 1942’ and ‘Doc. 649, Evatt to Curtin, 18 April 1942’, 
in Hudson and Stokes, DAFP, vol. 5. There was already a London PWC on which Australia was 
represented by Earl Page.
13  Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 157.
14  ‘Doc. 187, War Cabinet Minute, 12 May 1943’, in R.G. Neale (ed.), Documents on Australian 
Foreign Policy 1937–1949. Volume 6: July 1942 – December 1943 (Canberra: AGPS, 1983) [hereinafter 
DAFP, vol. 6].
15  Beaumont, ‘Australia’s War’, 35; Horner, High Command, 181.
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MacArthur, who looked to be the nation’s salvation. The arrival of US 
troops and equipment in the coming months appeared to confirm this.16 
Privately, senior Australian military officials and MacArthur agreed that 
an attack on Australia or its supply lines was highly possible in the near 
future. MacArthur advised the ‘first step’ in organising Australia as an 
effective base was ‘to make Australia secure’.17 The defence of Australia 
finally appeared to be a strategic priority, and Curtin, MacArthur and 
Shedden worked closely to develop a comprehensive plan to achieve 
this goal.18 
Despite the initial promise of a voice in strategic decision-making, 
Australia’s new status in the SWPA came with limitations. The Allies’ 
grand strategy—the so-called Beat Hitler First policy—named Germany 
‘the prime enemy’ and prioritised the Atlantic and European theatres. 
Until Germany was defeated, the Pacific War would be a holding war 
with ‘the minimum force necessary’ provided for defensive operations.19 
Joint US–Australian operations in the SWPA resulted in significant 
victories at Midway and in the Coral Sea; however, the US continued 
to refuse MacArthur’s and the Australian government’s requests for the 
increased reinforcements necessary to launch a counteroffensive against 
Japan.20 Evidently, Australia’s immediate security concerns were only 
to be accommodated when they did not jeopardise the great powers’ 
grand strategy. Australia’s place in this grand strategy foreshadowed the 
challenges the nation would face in seeking to influence the management 
of the postwar Asia-Pacific region.
16  ‘American Troops Here: USA Announces’, The Courier-Mail, [Brisbane], 18 March 1942, 1; 
‘Enthusiastic Thousands Give Welcome to MacArthur’, The Sun, [Sydney], 22 March 1942, 1; 
‘General MacArthur: City’s Rousing Welcome’, The Age, [Melbourne], 23 March 1942, 3.
17  ‘Advisory War Council Meeting, 26 March 1942, NAA: A2684, 967’, cited in Horner, High 
Command, 183. 
18  For the cooperation between Curtin, MacArthur and Shedden and the machinery for strategic 
decision-making in Australia, see Horner, High Command, 189–91.
19  ‘Doc. 115, Memorandum by the US and British COS, 31 December 1941’, in Aandahl et al., 
FRUS: The Conferences.
20  For a full account of MacArthur’s and Australia’s representations to the US and Britain, see Horner, 
High Command, 186–203; Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 152–65.
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Securing Australia in an American lake
By the second half of 1942, as the immediate threat of Allied defeat passed, 
Australia’s attention turned to postwar planning. A significant marker of 
this turn was the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, established 
in December 1942, which was responsible for coordinating Australia’s 
transition to a peacetime economy.21 The rapid success of Japan’s Pacific 
campaign had exposed the political and strategic weaknesses of the arc of 
islands to Australia’s north, while British and US neglect of the area in 
strategic planning forced on the Australian government the realisation that 
it would have to take on greater responsibility for regional defence in the 
postwar world. Australia’s future defence would rely on the preservation 
of strategic isolation, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AMF explained 
on behalf of the Defence Committee:
It follows that the preservation of this isolation should be our 
strategic aim. While this is our chief aim, we cannot separate 
our safety from that of the island groups that lay in proximity 
on the North and East, since the seizure of these by any hostile 
power would facilitate the approach to our shores and remove this 
isolation.
This could be achieved through the control of the islands to Australia’s 
north and establishment of a system of bases as ‘forward defence 
localities’.22
Evatt incorporated strategic isolation into his wartime diplomacy. 
In particular, he had designs on the Indonesian Archipelago. Following 
Japan’s invasion of the NEI in February 1942, the Australian government 
hosted the NEI administration in exile. Evatt viewed the management 
of the NEI as a particularly weak link in the arc of islands to its north, 
arguing that, having been left virtually defenceless by the Dutch, 
they were a ‘liability of dire consequence to Australia’.23 As Margaret 
George established, Evatt hoped wartime cooperation with the NEI 
administration would translate into a role in the postwar reconstruction 
of the colony. The goal was the establishment of a military base in the 
NEI, which would be added to Australia’s own South Pacific mandates 
21  Stuart Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment: War and Reconstruction in the 1940s (Sydney: 
NewSouth, 2015), 5–15, 122–58. 
22  ‘Blamey to Shedden, 15 January 1944’, NAA: A5954, 652/1.
23  ‘Doc. 330, Evatt to Bruce, 20 November 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
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and bases in northern Australia to form a defensive shield.24 Evatt pressed 
the NEI administration to grant Australia shared control of the colony 
following the war or, failing this, a long-term lease of Timor and Dutch 
New Guinea. The Dutch consistently refused any such arrangement 
and would not accept that Australia had any special role in the future 
management of the NEI.25
As Evatt pursued Australian security interests in the NEI, the future 
management of colonies and dependent territories faced immense 
changes. The US promoted a liberal international system as the future 
basis for global peace. This vision was, in effect, a stipulation of the US 
entrance into World War II. The Atlantic Charter called for a future world 
order founded on greater economic, territorial and strategic integrity. 
At the insistence of President Roosevelt and to the supreme annoyance 
of Churchill, the Atlantic Charter included the right for all people to 
choose their government. In including this detail, the US had forced an 
acknowledgment that the age of European imperialism was drawing to a 
close.26 The US instead promoted a trusteeship system, whereby colonial 
territories and mandates—including those stripped from the defeated 
Axis powers—would gradually transition to self-governance under the 
patronage of trustee nations.27
Australia was generally supportive of trusteeship for the management of 
the postwar Asia-Pacific and improving the living standards of those in 
the region. Certainly, it was not solely altruism and a commitment to 
liberal internationalism that underpinned this support. Realpolitik was 
also at play. The DEA believed the process of self-governance would 
be a slow one, unfolding over decades. This time and the nature of the 
trusteeship system would offer an opportunity to cultivate long-lasting 
diplomatic, economic and security relationships, including the provision 
24  Margaret George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1980), 14–29.
25  These exchanges can be found in ‘Netherlands East Indies—Proposed establishment of 
Government in Australia’, in Department of External Affairs: Correspondence files, multiple number 
series with year prefix [Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1927–45, NAA: A989, 
1943/600/5/1/5.
26  Stuart Macintyre, ‘Reading Post-War Reconstruction Through National and Transnational 
Lenses’, in Transnationalism, Nationalism and Australian History, eds Anna Clark, Anne Rees and 
Alecia Simmonds (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 136, 139–41; P.G.A. Orders, Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand and the Challenge of the United States, 1939–46 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 97–100.
27  William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay 1941–1945: The United States and the Decolonization 
of the British Empire (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1977), 3–4, 18, 223–4.
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of military bases in Australia’s trust territories.28 Australia’s strategic vision 
for trusteeship is captured in Evatt’s private remark that trusteeship and the 
postwar development of the Asia-Pacific would ‘allow [the] opportunity 
for collaboration between Australia and her Asiatic neighbours for 
mutual benefit while at the same time reducing the challenge that 
backward countries present to the living standards of white Australia’.29 
This assessment was steeped in the paternalistic and, frankly, racist ideas 
of 1940s international development, whereby weak and vulnerable states 
were seen to present a threat to themselves and their immediate region.30 
The US, too, was forming its own plans for the management of the Asia-
Pacific. From mid-1942, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox promoted the 
view that, as the US had invested significant capital into the development 
of wartime bases and dominated the Pacific War effort, it should receive 
certain entitlements in the peace settlement. These entitlements included 
sovereignty over all the bases the US had financed during the war and 
many of the former Japanese territories and recaptured Allied territories. 
Knox believed the future security of the US relied on its capacity to project 
its military presence.31 The Pacific Ocean had to become, as the popular 
maxim of the time stated, an ‘American lake’, with a comprehensive 
system of bases that would provide for US security and commercial 
interests in the region. Knox’s proposal was initially met with opposition, 
resting on concern that the pointedly anti-imperialist US should not be 
seen to make territorial gains in the war.32 By mid-1943, however, the 
Australian legation in Washington reported that the president, Congress 
28  ‘Australian Legation in Washington to DEA, 23 December 1942’, NAA: A989, 1943/735/321.
29  ‘Evatt to Eggleston (Australian Minister to China), 12 October 1942’, NAA: A989, 
1943/735/321.
30  This thinking is exemplified in P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, ‘The International Development of 
Economically Backward Areas’, International Affairs 20, no. 2 (1944): 157–65.
31  Knox, quoted in Daily News [Chicago], December 1942 and February 1943, in ‘Doc. 71, 
The Chargé D’Affaires, New Zealand Legation, Washington, to the Secretary of External Affairs 
(McIntosh), 9 February 1944’, in Robin Kay (ed.), Documents of New Zealand External Relations. 
Volume 1: The Australian–New Zealand Agreement, 1944 (Wellington: A.R. Shearer, Government 
Printer, 1972); ‘Australian Department of Information, extract from letter, 28 February 1943’, in 
Department of External Affairs: Correspondence files, multiple number system with SPTS [South 
Pacific Top Secret] prefix, 1943–54, NAA: A6494, SPTS 1/2.
32  Louis, Imperialism at Bay 1941–1945, 373; Orders, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the 
Challenge of the United States, 112–13.
117
5. ‘AN UNDOUBTED RIGHT TO SPEAK’
and the Departments of State and the Navy had all added their support to 
Knox’s proposal. Significantly, the Pacific territories on which the US had 
designs included Australia’s mandate territory of Manus Island.33
The US extended its brand of liberal internationalism to the postwar 
global economy. The US favoured a multilateral global trading system in 
which nations would trade on the basis of commercial competitiveness 
and liberal trade reform, rather than as self-serving protectionist blocs. 
The true production capacity of the US economy had been revealed during 
the war. Once prewar trade restrictions were reinstated, however, the US 
would again face exclusion, with a likely outcome of overproduction, 
falling export prices and rampant unemployment. Liberal trade reform 
would ensure the US no longer faced the exclusionary Sterling Area 
and could continue with a high volume of exports and, in turn, low 
unemployment.34 The pathway to liberal trade reform was codified in 
Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement. The Mutual Aid Agreement had 
been made to outline the parameters of the reciprocal aid system and 
how mutual aid would be settled once war ended. Article 7 called for 
the elimination of ‘all forms of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers’.35
Along with fears that liberal trade reform and commercial competitiveness 
would threaten the Sterling Area and Australia’s overseas markets, the United 
States’ economic plans challenged Australia’s plans for postwar regional 
security. World War II was fought around the deployment of air power 
and it was generally accepted that aviation would transform international 
communications, transport and defence in the postwar world.36 The US 
was positioned to excel in the civil aviation market, with established trunk 
routes in both the Western and the Southern hemispheres and by far the 
most competitive commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. The nation 
accordingly favoured a system of ‘open skies’, in which liberal commercial 
practices would be applied to civil aviation, allowing commercial airlines 
33  ‘“View of President Roosevelt on the Future of Pacific Islands”, Extracts from Australian 
Legation Reports, 1942–43’, NAA: A6494, SPTS 1/2.
34  Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian–American Relations and the Pacific War (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1977), 107–10; Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century, 
83–4.
35  S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 4: Civil. Volume IV: War 
Economy, 1942–1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1977), 612. 
36  Orders, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Challenge of the United States, 19–20, 102–5; 
Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment, 218–20.
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to fly and land at airports anywhere in the world.37 The US government 
also pushed for access to the military airfields it had financed and helped 
build during the war as a ‘tangible return’ for the labour and money it had 
expended.38 Couple competitive advantage with US designs on certain 
Pacific bases and the nation looked set to dominate the whole system of 
transpacific air transport and the associated lines of communication.
Britain and the Pacific dominions opposed the open skies system. 
Curtin believed the South and South-West Pacific were the ‘zone of 
security for which Australia must be specially responsible’ in the postwar 
world. Australia required its own air industry, airfields and jurisdiction 
‘in order to discharge this responsibility’.39 Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand cooperated to prevent the open skies system. In October 1943, 
informal Commonwealth discussions were hosted in London, where it 
was agreed that international aviation transport should be controlled 
by an international authority that would regulate prices, services and 
jurisdictions. It was also agreed the US be informed that ‘any facilities 
created by them will carry with them no post-war rights of ownership 
or user[ship]’.40 The settlement of civil aviation is a complex subject well 
beyond the scope of these pages, but it is indicative of Australia’s suspicion 
that the US could not be relied on to build a regional order that supported 
Australia’s interests and a pertinent example of the Commonwealth’s role 
as a mediating force in the face of the domineering US.41
Australia was determined to be directly involved in the Pacific peace 
settlement. With the US having dominated the war effort and planning 
to control a large swathe of the region—‘by force if necessary’, as one 
37  ‘“Post-War Freedom of Air is US Aim”, 18 January 1943, Melbourne Herald’ and ‘The text 
of an article by the United States Vice-President, Henry A. Wallace, March issue of the “American 
Magazine”, 10 February 1943’, cuttings, both in NAA: A989, 1943/735/835/1.
38  ‘Attachment, “US Surveys its Post-War Aviation Role”, 16 January 1943, New York Herald 
Tribune, cutting, Australian Legation Washington to DEA, 18 January 1943’ and ‘“Report on Post-
War Civil Aviation, 27 July 1943”, Halifax (British Ambassador to the US) to Eden (Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs), forwarded to DEA, 11 August 1943’, both in NAA: A989, 1943/735/835/1; 
‘Senate Speech, Senator Russell, 28 October 1943’, NAA: A6494, SPTS 1/2. 
39  ‘Doc. 292, Curtin to Bruce, 8 October 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
40  Erik Benson, ‘Suspicious Allies: Wartime Aviation Developments and the Anglo-American 
International Airline Rivalry, 1939–45’, History and Technology 17 (2000): 21–42, at pp. 25, 34–5; 
‘Attachment, UK Air Ministry Memorandum to RAF Commanders Overseas, September 1943, UK 
High Commissioners Office to Prime Minister’s Department, 16 September 1943’, NAA: A6494, 
SPTS 1/2. 
41  For an overview of the civil aviation dispute and its eventual settlement, see Alan P. Dobson, 
‘The Other Air Battle: The American Pursuit of Post-War Civil Aviation Rights’, Historical Journal 
22, no. 2 (1985): 429–39. 
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Democratic congressman remarked pithily—Australia could not dismiss 
the possibility of being sidelined.42 In late 1942, US Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull proposed a joint declaration of the Allies’ trusteeship policy, 
along with a draft of this declaration for the Allies to consider. Hull’s 
draft declaration included plans for the creation of regional councils, 
made up of local trustee nations, which would answer to an international 
trusteeship administration.43 The Australian government—cognisant of 
America’s designs on the Pacific—treated Hull’s proposal with a great deal 
of caution.
William D. Forsyth of the DEA Pacific Division was charged with 
advising on the ‘Pacific Question’.44 His reports went on to inform the 
government’s response to Hull’s proposal. Before joining the DEA in 
1942, Forsyth had served briefly in the Department of Information and 
had an emerging academic career with a particular interest in economics 
and Pacific affairs.45 His regional knowledge and economics training were 
apparent in the final reports considering trusteeship. He criticised  the 
existing system for managing colonies and dependent territories in 
the Asia-Pacific region, in terms of both Australia’s national interest and the 
wellbeing of local inhabitants. According to Forsyth, the existing system 
‘was dependent on European rather than local and Pacific considerations’ 
and it failed to provide for Australia’s ‘needs’ or the ‘progress and welfare’ 
of the trustee inhabitants. In Forsyth’s view, it had partly been the failings 
of the existing system for colonial management that had generated 
political and economic instability and driven the region towards war.46 
Australia’s long-term security, therefore, depended on ‘the conversion’ 
of its immediate region ‘from discord, backwardness, strategic weakness 
and international rivalry to economic strength, prosperity and political 
stability’.47 To achieve this, Forsyth called for a ‘self-subsisting’ Asia-Pacific 
system, helped along by a regional commission that would guide trustee 
42  ‘Australian Department of Information, extract from letter, 28 February 1943’, NAA: A6494, 
SPTS 1/2. 
43  ‘Attlee to Curtin, 11 December 1942’ and ‘Commonwealth government to Attlee, 2 January 
1943’, both in NAA: A989, 1943/735/1021.
44  ‘Attachment, Curriculum Vitae, Forsyth to Burton (DEA Secretary), 8 July 1948’, NLA: MS 
5700/7/16/3.
45  ‘Forsyth to Burton, 8 July 1948’, NLA: MS 5700/7/16/3. 
46  ‘“Departmental view on Australian Interests in the Colonial Question”, 15 April 1943’, NAA: 
A989, 1943/735/1021; ‘Pacific Area Research Reports, General conclusions, [n.d. (April 1943)]’, 
NLA: MS 5700/7/22/44. The so-called needs listed by Forsyth included regional economic interests 
and the development of Australian airfields and bases for national security purposes. 
47  ‘Draft memorandum by Forsyth, 2 April 1943’, NAA: A989, 1943/735/1021.
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nations towards the development of good governance and economic 
stability.48 He insisted Australia participate fully in the creation and 
management of the new regional system, encouraging the government to 
take on greater responsibility in the area and take ‘a practical lead towards 
the kind of post-war settlement it wishes to see in Southeast Asia and the 
Western Pacific’.49
According to Forsyth, Evatt was ‘extremely pleased’ with the proposal 
for an Asia-Pacific system with an expanded role for Australia and 
‘immediately took up the idea’.50 The Australian government finally 
responded to Hull’s trusteeship proposal in March 1943. The nation 
called for greater cooperation and accountability in the management of 
trust territories through the expanded role of regional councils, making 
internal supervision one of their functions. So important was the issue 
of accountability that Evatt argued it should be negotiated before any 
declaration of colonial policy was made. Much to Evatt’s satisfaction, the 
negotiation of the international trusteeship administration and regional 
councils was postponed until the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945.51 
Conceivably, the emphasis on accountable regional councils and Forsyth’s 
previous recommendation that Australia take the initiative in the future 
management of the Asia-Pacific region came as a result of fears the US 
would be unwilling to share power in the region. Forsyth stated as much 
in a departmental report, noting that if Britain were to lose interest or 
influence in the region, Australia may ‘have use’ for a ‘counter-weight 
to American … influence’.52 In calling for the expanded role of regional 
councils, Australia hoped to institutionalise its significance, making clear 
the US alone could not determine future management of the postwar 
Asia-Pacific region. 
The future management of the Asia-Pacific continued to weigh on the 
minds of Australian policymakers. In April 1943, Evatt departed on 
a four-month trip to Washington and London, where he was tasked with 
48  ‘Pacific Area Research Reports, [n.d. (April 1943)]’, NLA: MS5700/7/22/44.
49  ‘Memorandum by Forsyth, 29 March 1943’, NAA: A989, 1943/735/1021.
50  ‘William Douglass Forsyth interviewed by Mel Pratt, January–February 1972, Corrected 
Transcript’, NLA: TRC 121/27, Folder 1/1/76.
51  ‘Dixon to DEA, 25 March 1943’ and ‘Evatt to Dixon, 31 March 1943’, both in NAA: A989, 
1943/735/1021. For the UN trusteeship system and Australia’s role in its formation, see Matthew 
Jordan, ‘Decolonisation’, in Australia and the United Nations, eds James Cotton and David Lee 
(Canberra: Longueville Books with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012), 107–12.
52  ‘“The Colonial Question”, 15 April 1943’, NAA: A989, 1943/735/1021.
121
5. ‘AN UNDOUBTED RIGHT TO SPEAK’
securing additional aircraft for the RAAF.53 During this visit, he witnessed 
at first hand the United States’ increasing interest in the Asia-Pacific, 
including surveys of the supply position of certain Pacific islands and the 
construction of air and naval works that appeared to be permanent and 
conceivably for future occupation and use.54 He also learnt of plans for the 
US to assume military and administrative control of Japan following its 
defeat and the Big Four—Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the US—
to take control of peace negotiations on behalf of smaller powers.55 Evatt 
used an address at the Overseas Press Club in New York as an opportunity 
to push back against the big powers dominating peacemaking. He insisted 
Australia was a ‘key Pacific nation’, naturally ‘concerned as to who shall 
live in, develop and control’ this region. Accordingly, Australia was 
‘anxious to … play its part in the general and regional organization’ for 
regional security.56
In August, as Roosevelt and Churchill met in Quebec to discuss, among 
other things, the organisation of the postwar world, the DEA reiterated 
Evatt’s opposition to a ‘Big-Four peace’ in a cable sent to Dominion 
Secretary Clement Attlee. Decisions were not to be made without 
reference to other interested governments, the DEA insisted. Concerns 
were also raised about America’s interest in certain Pacific islands and plans 
to control the occupation of Japan once it was defeated. While Australia 
accepted the US would go on to play a prominent role in the Pacific, it 
was anxious to ensure future arrangements were cooperative ones that 
‘take into account the interests of all powers concerned’.57
What Evatt learnt during his 1943 visit to Britain and America had 
a profound impact on his attitude towards the Asia-Pacific region. 
He  became more outspoken and increasingly drew on the language 
of Australia as a Principal Power in an attempt to carve out a regional 
identity for the nation. On 14 October, Evatt presented to the House of 
53  ‘Note, Suggestions to Evatt on information to be ascertained in the course of his discussions 
abroad, 31 March 1943’, NAA: A5954, 474/10.
54  This activity is detailed in ‘“Future of Pacific Islands”, Extracts from Australian Legation Reports, 
1942–43’, NAA: A6494, SPTS 1/2; ‘DEA to Attlee, 24 August 1943’, NAA: A989, 1943/735/321.
55  Neville Meaney, ‘Dr H.V. Evatt and the United Nations: The Problems of Collective Security and 
the Liberal International Order’, in Australia and the United Nations, eds James Cotton and David Lee 
(Canberra: Longueville Books with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012), 37–8. 
56  ‘Address at the Overseas Press Club, New York, 28 April 1943’, in H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of 
Australia: Speeches (Sydney: Angus & Robinson, 1945), 114, 116.
57  ‘DEA to Attlee, 24 August 1943’, NAA: A989, 1943/735/321. The sender is unclear, but is 
likely William Hodgson, DEA Secretary.
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Representatives a report on his overseas visit. On the basis of Australia’s 
geography, contribution to the Pacific War and economic, defensive and 
transport interests, he described South-East Asia and the South Pacific 
as ‘coming within an extended Australian zone’. Accordingly, Australia 
‘should make a very special contribution towards the establishment and 
maintenance of the peace settlement in South-east Asia and the Pacific’.58 
Later that day, in a meeting with John Minter, First Secretary of the 
US Legation in Australia, Evatt reiterated the concept of an extended 
Australian zone. He reportedly drew two lines across the map of the 
South and South-West Pacific that the two men had been consulting. 
The first line started at Timor, extending through to New Ireland, then 
down to include Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, New Caledonia and 
New Zealand. The second line started at the Philippines and extended to 
the Marshall Islands, where it then ran up to include American Samoa, 
Hawai`i and the Aleutian Islands. ‘This’, Evatt gestured to the first line, 
‘I think should be Australia’s and this’, gesturing to the second, ‘should be 
yours … Ours is all south of the Equator and constitutes a natural line of 
defence’.59 Evatt had defined Australia’s regional sphere of interest and had 
made expressly clear that it should not be discounted by the US in future 
negotiations and security arrangements. 
The 1944 Australia–New Zealand 
Agreement and the case for closer 
Commonwealth defence cooperation
With Australian actors having consistently and openly conveyed the 
nation’s particular interests in the Asia-Pacific region and the expectation 
it would be directly involved in peace discussions, the developments 
at the Cairo Conference were ‘shattering’.60 In August 1943, Evatt 
requested Australia be represented at the Cairo Conference that was to 
58  ‘Ministerial Statement made by Dr Evatt in the House of Representatives, 14 October 1943’, in 
Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, 141–2.
59  ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Evatt and Minter, 14 October 1943, attached Johnson 
(US Minister to Australia) to Hull, 29 October 1943, National Archives and Records Administration 
[hereinafter NARA]: 47.20/164’, cited in J. Reed, ‘American diplomatic relations with Australia during 
the Second World War’ (PhD thesis, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1969), 259.
60  Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 232. 
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be held in November.61 Churchill, however, assured Evatt that Australia’s 
presence would not be necessary as the main discussions would be 
between himself and Roosevelt and inconsequential to Australia and its 
military operations.62 Despite assurances, the decisions made at Cairo 
had a material impact on the overall strategy in the Pacific and the peace 
settlement. In addition to plans for the defeat of Japan and conditions of 
surrender, the US, British and Chinese leaders had agreed that, following 
its defeat, Japan would be stripped of all territory in the Pacific that it 
had seized or occupied since World War I. Formosa (Taiwan), Manchuria 
and the Pescadores Islands would be restored to China, while the future 
sovereignty of other former Japanese territories was not disclosed. Much 
to the Australian government’s indignation, the first news it received of 
the decisions made at Cairo was in a press communiqué.63
In being excluded from what local newspapers reported as ‘the most 
important conference on the Pacific since the outbreak of the war’, 
Australia’s influence in the Pacific had been publicly dismissed.64 Evatt 
saw in this the seemingly unrestrained influence of the great power and 
was convinced Australia needed to act immediately or risk facing an 
‘untenable’ position in the Pacific peace settlement.65 He looked across 
the Tasman to New Zealand for support in this endeavour. 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement (ANZAC Agreement) was 
a treaty of cooperation signed between the governments of Australia and 
New Zealand on 21 January 1944 following a conference in Canberra. 
The earliest plans for a conference of Australian and New Zealand 
leaders was proposed by Evatt on his return home from Britain and the 
US.66 In Evatt’s preliminary correspondence with Carl Berendsen, New 
Zealand High Commissioner to Australia, topics for discussion included 
security arrangements for South-East Asia and the South Pacific, peace 
61  ‘Doc. 260, Evatt to Glasgow (High Commissioner in Canada), 24 August 1943’, in Neale, 
DAFP, vol. 6.
62  ‘Doc. 261, Glasgow to Evatt, 24 August 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
63  ‘Doc. 340, Cranborne (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) to Curtin, 1 December 1943’ 
and ‘Doc. 341, Bruce to Curtin, 1 December 1943’, both in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
64  ‘Curtin Should Have Been at Cairo Conference’, Tweed Daily, [Murwillumbah, NSW], 
4 December 1943, 3.
65  ‘Doc. 40, Berendsen (New Zealand High Commissioner in Australia) to Fraser (Minister for 
External Affairs and Prime Minister), 4 December 1943’, in Kay, Documents of New Zealand External 
Relations.
66  CPD: Representatives, 19 October 1943, No. 41, 577–6.
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negotiations and the future of certain bases and dependent territories.67 
While the conference and subsequent agreement were certainly driven by 
Evatt, New Zealand was not, as Roger Bell has proposed, simply being 
carried along by the force of his enthusiasm.68 New Zealand government 
documents reveal the nation’s own suspicions about US encroachment in 
the Asia-Pacific, as well as extensive and thoughtful discussion by both 
parties in the drafting of the ANZAC Agreement and an emphasis on 
presenting a united front.69
The most significant clauses of the ANZAC Agreement are the three 
dealing with security and defence, territories and dependencies, and civil 
aviation. In the clause addressing security and defence, Australia and 
New Zealand formally defined their regional zone of strategic interest as 
‘stretching through the arc of islands North and North East of Australia, 
to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands’.70 The two Pacific dominions 
declared their Principal-Power status and their ‘right to speak’ in decision-
making pertinent to this region.71 In a pointed reference to US plans, the 
agreement also stated the construction of military bases and facilities in 
‘any territory under the sovereignty or control of another Power’ during 
the course of the war did not ‘afford any basis for territorial claims or 
rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities’.72
In the clause concerning dependent territories, Australia and New 
Zealand disavowed changes to the sovereignty or systems of control of 
any dependent territories within their regional zone of influence ‘except 
as a result of an agreement to which they are parties or in the terms of 
which they have both concurred’.73 The proposed South Seas Regional 
Commission was a testament to this consultative theme. The commission, 
which would facilitate cooperation between trustee administrators in the 
region, took up Forsyth’s earlier recommendation that Australia should 
take the lead in developing a postwar regional system that embodied 
its interests and institutionalised a voice in decision-making. Indeed, 
Evatt and Forsyth worked closely in the preparations for the ANZAC 
67  ‘Doc. 305, Evatt to Berendsen, 21 October 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
68  Bell, Unequal Allies, 146–57. 
69  See file ‘PWR, New Zealand Australia–New Zealand Relations, Conference, 1944’, NAA: 
A989, 1943/735/168; ‘Doc. 41, Nash to Fraser, 12 January 1944’, in Kay, Documents of New Zealand 
External Relations.
70  ‘ANZAC Agreement, 21 January 1944’, NAA: A5954, 652/1.
71  CPD: Representatives, 10 February 1944, No. 6, 156.
72  ‘ANZAC Agreement, 21 January 1944’, NAA: A5954, 652/1.
73  ibid.
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Conference; Forsyth produced an immense document—by his recount, 
some 500–600 pages—which considered all aspects of Australia’s regional 
interests.74
Finally, the Pacific dominions declared their support for an international 
regulatory authority to preside over trunk routes while upholding ‘the 
right of each country to conduct all air transport services within its own 
national jurisdiction, including its own contiguous territories’.75 Along 
with adding weight to the ongoing Commonwealth–US civil aviation 
negotiations, this clause tacitly extended Australia and New Zealand’s 
regional zone of influence to include both the seas and the air of the South 
Pacific and much of South-East Asia.
Christopher Waters asserts that news of the ANZAC Agreement was 
‘greeted with dismay in London’, going on to contribute to the growing 
rift in Australian–British relations.76 While this was certainly the case in 
Washington, and there were initial misgivings in London—primarily 
that the agreement had been signed without any prior consultation with 
Britain—the British government, in fact, came to appreciate the value of 
the agreement.77
Both the Australian and the New Zealand governments were irritated by 
the Cairo Conference and Britain’s failure to consult with its dominions. 
However, with the ANZAC Agreement’s references to international 
trunk routes and military facilities constructed during the war, the US 
was clearly the prime target of their protest. Evatt did little to mask 
this, informing the British High Commissioner to Australia that his 
motivation was to offer ‘a warning to the Americans whose methods of 
infiltration were alarming’.78 It was not surprising, then, that the ANZAC 
Agreement attracted criticism in the US. The US Minister to Australia, 
Nelson T. Johnson, complained to Hull of the ‘utmost secrecy’ with 
which the ANZAC Conference and agenda had been organised, while 
74  ‘Forsyth Interview’, NLA: TRC 121/27, Folder 1/1/73.
75  ‘ANZAC Agreement, 21 January 1944’, NAA: A5954, 652/1.
76  Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s (Melbourne: 
Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1996), 25.
77  For the British government’s irritation at having not been consulted, see ‘Conclusions of War 
Cabinet Meeting, 9 February 1944’, TNA: DO 35/1989.
78  ‘Dominions Office to Cranborne, 27 January 1944’, TNA: DO 35/1989.
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one Democratic congressman reportedly complained that the agreement 
threatened America’s ‘legitimate post-war aims’, including ‘its security and 
its share in air and sea trade routes in the Pacific area’.79
The official US response came in a letter from Hull handed to Curtin 
on 3 February. The Secretary of State was ‘frankly disturbed’ by some 
of the aspects of the agreement. He flagged, in particular, the proposal 
for a conference of all powers with territorial interests in the South and 
South-West Pacific, the aim of which was to provide a forum for the ‘frank 
exchange of view on the problems of security, postwar development and 
native welfare’.80 The US government believed it premature to begin 
negotiating postwar regional security systems, believing such a conference 
would encourage regional separatism, which, if left unchecked, could 
threaten postwar peace.81
An irate Evatt responded to Hull on 24 February. The general tone of his 
response was defensive and, among other things, he listed instances in 
which the US had been deceptive in its own plans for the Asia-Pacific. This 
included several remarks made by the president during PWC meetings 
(during March 1943 – January 1944) regarding the future of some 
territories and bases in the region. Evatt implied the US had acted against 
the goals of the nascent United Nations and 1943 Moscow Declarations, 
‘prejudice[ing] a harmonious Pacific settlement’.82 This date stamping 
suggests Australia, or at least Evatt and the DEA, had been monitoring 
US territorial interests with a careful eye. Curtin was later informed the 
US government ‘frankly’ did ‘not appreciate the attitude of Dr Evatt’ 
or his conduct, particularly his recording of private conversations held 
during the PWC.83 
79  ‘Doc. 115, Johnson to Hull, 22 January 1944’, in E. Ralph Perkins, S. Everett Gleason, John 
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In the months that followed, the wording of the ANZAC Agreement was 
softened, including a modification accepting US occupation of Japan once 
defeated and usage rights of the nation’s former territories and military 
bases.84 These developments did not, however, signal Australia’s rescission 
of its regional rights and responsibilities. The Australian government 
was still determined to be directly involved in the Japanese surrender 
and peace negotiations, with Evatt going on to publicly denounce a big-
power peace as ‘intolerable’.85 During the drafting of the UN Charter at 
the 1945 San Francisco Conference, Evatt championed the role of small 
powers in the new international organisation and secured amendments 
to the domestic jurisdiction clause to protect against UN intervention in 
matters relating to immigration and economic policies and the right to 
extend these policies to dependent territories.86 
Like the US, Britain expressed some initial reservations about the ANZAC 
Agreement. For the most part, however, the government appreciated its 
merits. At the time of the ANZAC Agreement’s signing, British–dominion 
relations remained strained following the collapse of the imperial effort 
in the Pacific theatre. Couple this with the United States’ dominance of 
the overall war effort and preliminary postwar planning and the future 
status of the Commonwealth and British power remained uncertain.87 
Robert Stewart of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs in the 
US State Department judged the ANZAC Agreement to have partially 
resolved this uncertainty. He believed it ‘all too likely’ that Britain ‘warmly 
welcomes’ the agreement, ‘indicating as it does that these two members 
of the Commonwealth do not intend to be subservient to the United 
States’.88 Johnson similarly judged the agreement to represent renewed 
support for the Commonwealth. In this, there was a potential challenge 
to America’s postwar plans, as Australia and New Zealand would buttress 
British influence, potentially outweighing the US in decision-making.89
84  ‘Memorandum, Department of State, 12 September 1944, NARA: 847.00/9-1244’, cited in 
Bell, Unequal Allies, 158.
85  H.V. Evatt, ‘Risks of a Big-Power Peace’, Foreign Affairs 24, no. 2 (1946): 195–209, at p. 200.
86  Meaney, ‘Dr H.V. Evatt and the United Nations’, 40–7; Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 302–6.
87  Francine McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939–1948: The Politics of Preference 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 116–17.
88  ‘Doc. 117, Memorandum by Stewart, 1 February 1944’, in Perkins et al., FRUS 1944.
89  ‘Johnson to Stewart, 23 March 1943, Private Papers of Nelson T. Johnson’, cited in Reed, 
‘American diplomatic relations with Australia during the Second World War’, 318.
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As Stewart and Johnson suspected, neither Australia nor Britain overlooked 
the role of the Commonwealth in the ANZAC Agreement and the regional 
system it sought to institute. While the two Pacific dominions were 
willing to assume a greater role in regional affairs, they recognised they 
were not yet able to shoulder the entire responsibility for regional defence. 
Cooperation with Britain, therefore, remained ‘essential’.90 Indeed, in 
the lead-up to the ANZAC Conference, Evatt informed Berendsen that 
he hoped to see a new era in dominion cooperation that would form 
‘the foundation of the British sphere of influence in the South-West and 
South Pacific’.91 After the ANZAC Agreement was signed, the Australian 
and New Zealand governments proposed to Britain a cooperative 
Commonwealth defence bloc in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. 
In this defence arrangement—which was based on assessments made by 
the Australian Defence Committee and included the recommendation 
that an island defence perimeter be established to protect against long-
range attacks on the Australian continent—Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand would have primary responsibility for defending the area south 
of the equator, while America would take responsibility for the area north 
of the equator. Australia and New Zealand made clear this arrangement 
‘should be made as part of a general scheme’ for Pacific security and ‘not 
[be] piecemeal’.92 In effect, the Pacific dominions were seeking to create 
a cooperative Commonwealth defence arrangement that was informed 
by their particular regional circumstances and institutionalised their 
relevance as Principal Powers.
On the back of the ANZAC Agreement and the proposed Commonwealth 
defence bloc, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Lord Cranborne 
assessed that closer dominion cooperation was ‘all to the good’. In terms 
of defence, he believed it was
90  ‘“The Defence of the Southwest Pacific”, Statement by Curtin, 18 January 1944’, NAA: A5954, 
652/1. See also David Day, ‘Pearl Harbour to Nagasaki’, in Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations 
with Britain and the United States Since the 1930s, ed. Carl Bridge (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1991), 63–4.
91  ‘Doc. 35, Berendsen to Fraser, 21 October 1943’, in Kay, Documents of New Zealand External 
Relations. 
92  ‘Copy, Australian and New Zealand governments to Dominions Office, 25 January 1944, 
Dominions Office to Canada and South Africa High Commission, 14 February 1944’, TNA: DO 
35/1989. For the recommendations of the Defence Committee, see ‘Doc. 6, Attachment, “Future of 
Southwest Pacific Region—Conference Between Australian and New Zealand Ministers”, Shedden to 
Hodgson (DEA Secretary), 7 January 1944’, in Hudson, DAFP, vol. 7; ‘Blamey to Shedden, 15 January 
1944’, NAA: A5954, 652/1.
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clearly to the good that Australia and New Zealand should have 
stated publicly that they have a primary interest in the defence of 
the Pacific. This declaration may be extremely valuable when we 
come to arrange for the post-war period. Moreover, in advocating 
the principle of regional collaboration in the Pacific between all 
the Governments concerned they have in effect adopted the ideas 
which we had been considering here.93
Cranborne’s final point was in reference to recent British attention to the 
future of inter-imperial relationships, the role of the Commonwealth in 
maintaining British world power in the face of the US and USSR and 
the regionalisation of imperial defence planning, in which each dominion 
would assume greater responsibility for local defence. Like Australia and 
New Zealand, Britain was wary of US encroachment in the Asia-Pacific 
region and was not convinced it could be relied on to share power in the 
postwar world. The Commonwealth could serve as a friendly yet robust 
counterweight to the US.94
Curtin’s fourth empire
Both the demeanour—‘overbearing’ and ‘brusque to the point of being 
rude’—and the portfolio of Evatt have seen him dominate material 
dealing with this period.95 Indeed, Australia’s assertive wartime diplomacy 
and geopolitical consciousness in foreign policymaking have largely been 
characterised as Evatt’s personal project.96 Certainly, he led the way in 
building a geopolitically informed foreign policy that instituted Australia’s 
role in the management of the postwar Asia-Pacific region. However, this 
agenda was by no means his alone. Curtin, too, was considering the future 
role of the Commonwealth and Australia in the changing world order and 
implementing his own initiatives.
Beginning in mid-1943, Curtin built a case for closer cooperation in 
the postwar imperial system. World War II and the fall of Singapore, 
in particular, revealed the weakness of the existing systems for imperial 
93  ‘“Australian–New Zealand Agreement of 21 January 1944”, Memorandum by Cranborne, War 
Cabinet Meeting, 2 February 1944’, TNA: DO 35/198.
94  Waters, The Empire Fractures, 14–17; Orders, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Challenge 
of the United States, 98.
95  Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 183.
96  See for instance, Meg Gurry, ‘Identifying Australia’s “Region”: From Evatt to Evans’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1 (1995): 17–31, at pp. 18–21.
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communication and policymaking. Curtin championed a renewed 
commitment to British world leadership and the final chapter of empire 
evolution—what he called the ‘Fourth Empire’—which would unite the 
disparate members of the Commonwealth under a more unified foreign 
and defence policy.97 He argued directives could no longer come from 
Britain alone, proposing more frequent meetings of Commonwealth 
prime ministers, and not just in London. In theory, this would offer 
regular opportunities for the specific needs of the disparate parts of the 
Commonwealth to be voiced and incorporated into policymaking.98 
The showpiece of Curtin’s Fourth Empire was a permanent imperial 
secretariat—a consultative body that would meet regularly to oversee the 
implementation of a united Commonwealth response to world affairs.99 
From the leader who defiantly brought home the 6th and 7th divisions of 
the AIF, Curtin’s Fourth Empire appeared to be a naive return to dependence 
on Britain. Moreover, as Paul Hasluck and Peter Edwards have argued, it 
underscored the disunity in Curtin’s and Evatt’s appreciation of the future 
thrust of Australian foreign policy.100 James Curran identifies more merit 
in Curtin’s proposal, yet he couches it in the language of a sentimental 
attachment to Britishness, rather than a pragmatic appraisal of Australia’s 
national interest and the systems through which this could be protected.101 
A closer examination of public statements and private government 
documents, however, reveals a surprising pragmatism in the Fourth Empire 
and a level of similarity in the strategic visions of Curtin and Evatt.
Like the ANZAC Agreement, Curtin’s Fourth Empire was an astute 
appreciation of Britain’s diminishing relative influence. He believed the 
Commonwealth was ‘the most effective structure for regional security 
the world has known’, judging it to be ‘in every country’s interest and 
in the interest of any general security scheme that the structure should be 
maintained and, if possible, strengthened’.102 
97  James Curran, Curtin’s Empire (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 99–101; James 
Curran, ‘“An Organic Part of the Whole Structure”: John Curtin’s Empire’, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 37, no. 1 (2009): 51–75, at pp. 60–6; ‘Doc. 272, Press Statement by 
Curtin, 6 September 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
98  ‘Imperial Team Work’, The Age, [Melbourne], 16 August 1943, 3.
99  ‘PM’s Postwar Empire Council Plan’, The Argus, [Melbourne], 7 September 1943, 5; ‘Doc. 272, 
Press Statement, 6 September 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
100  Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs, 1941–1947 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1980), 137; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, 154, 156–60.
101  Curran, ‘“An Organic Part of the Whole Structure”’, 51–75.
102  ‘“Curtin Opens Fight for Empire Bureau”, The New York Times, 5 May 1944’, cutting, in NAA: 
A5954, 661/8. 
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Curtin reiterated the importance of maintaining British world leadership 
during the 1944 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. 
On 15  May, he called for greater Commonwealth cooperation in 
new international organisations, stressing his belief that ‘the British 
Commonwealth and Empire would have much greater influence … than 
would the United Kingdom divorced from the Dominions’.103 Although 
not explicitly stated, Curtin had implied that America alone could not 
be allowed to dominate the postwar global order. Cranborne appreciated 
Curtin’s implications, having previously judged the Fourth Empire 
proposal to be indicative of Australia’s growing impatience with ‘the 
autocratic attitude of the United States’ and seeing in this the opportunity 
‘to attach them closer to us’.104 At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference, Cranborne accordingly agreed that more effective systems for 
collaboration and consultation were required if Commonwealth influence 
in global affairs was to be sustained.105
The proposed Fourth Empire was premised on ‘full and continued 
consultation’.106 In this way, as Curran notes, Curtin attempted to 
address longstanding concerns about the imperial relationship, creating 
a  framework in which dominion voices would be present from the 
outset.107 Direct representation within the Commonwealth was 
intrinsically linked to Australia’s Principal-Power status and postwar 
security plans. A September 1943 newspaper article quoted Curtin as 
saying his Fourth Empire proposal was ‘an attempt to enhance Australia’s 
position’ and, if adopted, would ‘ensure Australia’s development as a world 
Power with a dominating influence in the Pacific’.108 This influence was 
to be cultivated through the creation of regional security zones and 
the increasing responsibility of the dominions. Curtin saw Australia as 
a trustee for British civilisation—‘a power to stand for Democracy’ in the 
103  ‘Minutes, Fourteenth Meeting of Prime Ministers, 15 May 1944’, in Records of the Cabinet 
Office, War Cabinet and Cabinet: Commonwealth and International Conferences: Minutes and 
Papers, TNA: CAB 99/28. 
104  ‘Annotations by Cranborne on a note to Machtig, Record of conversation between British 
officials in Washington and Dixon, 5 November 1943’, TNA: DO 35/1478.
105  ‘Minutes, Fourteenth Meeting of Prime Ministers, 15 May 1944’, TNA: CAB 99/28. The 
Foreign Office went on to echo the assessment that, without Commonwealth collaboration, Britain 
would likely be overshadowed by the US. ‘Foreign Office Memorandum, Stocktaking after VE 
Day, 11 July 1945’, in Records created or inherited by the Foreign Office, Foreign Office: Political 
Departments—General Correspondence from 1906–66, TNA: FO 371/50912.
106  ‘Doc. 272, Press Statement, 6 September 1943’, in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
107  Curran, ‘“An Organic Part of the Whole Structure”’, 53.
108  ‘Empire Council Explained’, Army News, [Darwin], 13 September 1943, 4. 
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South and South-West Pacific—and he was eager to see the nation take on 
a greater role in its region.109 The Commonwealth regional defence bloc 
would have the threefold outcome of demonstrating Australia’s status in 
its immediate region, ensuring region-specific interests were integrated 
within imperial defence planning and the removal of some of the strain 
on Britain to police its global empire.110
The Fourth Empire, at least in the form proposed by Curtin, failed to gain 
momentum. For the most part, this was because the other dominions—
principally, Canada—did not wish to form a common foreign policy. 
Curtin left London with a compromise. In addition to daily meetings 
with the Dominion Affairs Secretary, the high commissioners would have 
monthly meetings with the prime minister, although these soon fell by 
the wayside.111 
Despite the lack of substantive outcomes, Curtin’s Fourth Empire 
represents a significant moment in the history of Australian foreign policy. 
It was an acknowledgement that a postwar alliance with the US was neither 
likely nor beneficial to Australia’s material interests. Curtin’s proposal 
signalled a pragmatic return to Britain and the imperial diplomatic and 
strategic framework, challenging the ‘look to America’ narrative that had 
become synonymous with his leadership. Significantly, although Australia 
was returning to the imperial connection, it was not willing to return to 
the prewar relationship that had so often seen its interests overlooked. 
In the ANZAC Agreement, Australia made clear that it expected to play 
a major role in decision-making in its region. Curtin’s proposal, with 
its emphasis on direct representation and the regionalisation of defence 
planning, was the framework through which to implement the ANZAC 
Agreement’s agenda. As the next chapter details, elements of these two 
initiatives informed the blueprint for Australia’s attempts to develop 
strategic, economic and diplomatic capabilities in the new world order.
109  Curran, ‘“An Organic Part of the Whole Structure”’, 59; ‘Press Statement, 6 September 1943’, 
in Neale, DAFP, vol. 6.
110  ‘Statement by Curtin, 18 January 1944’, NAA: A5954, 652/1; ‘Memorandum, “Improvements 
in the Machinery for Empire Co-operation desired by the Australian Government”, Fourteenth 
Meeting of Prime Ministers, 15 May 1944’, TNA: CAB 99/28.





The new order: 
Australia’s perspective on 
Commonwealth engagement 
with South-East Asia and 
the South Pacific, 1946–50
By study of Pacific affairs, and through expansion of direct 
diplomatic and consular representation, Australia is setting out 
to make its own assessments of the problems of the Pacific. By so 
doing we may speak with a fresh, direct and independent voice 
in the councils of Pacific nations. It is our wish and intention 
to play a dynamic part in achieving, as a member of the British 
Commonwealth, a world comity. It is our destiny and duty to play 
that part in the Pacific.1
— Australian Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt
The experiences of World War II, coupled with sweeping changes to 
the colonial order, reaffirmed the perception of Australia as an outpost 
of white Western civilisation situated in a dangerous neighbourhood 
and demonstrated the nation could not rely on the resident order to 
adequately manage the arc of islands to its north. Australia’s postwar 
foreign policy was accordingly directed towards establishing a regional 
system in which the area to its north would become a ‘self-reliant and 
1  CPD: Representatives, 13 March 1946, No. 186, 200.
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co-operative [group of ] Western Pacific states’.2 The roots of this system, 
it will be recalled, dated back to reports in 1943 compiled by William D. 
Forsyth of the Pacific Division of the DEA. As this chapter will detail, this 
system was an integrated one designed to expand Australia’s economic, 
diplomatic and defensive capabilities.
While Canberra sought to implement policies focused on region-specific 
goals, it continued to require strategic allies. The Chifley government 
accordingly pursued a cooperative security arrangement with the British 
Commonwealth and, to the extent possible, the US. This arrangement 
would be based on the principle of reciprocity, with shared access to 
strategic bases, intelligence and defence technology. Australia’s visions for a 
cooperative Commonwealth–US security arrangement were complicated 
by emerging Cold War tensions. Britain and the US believed the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the most immediate threat 
and accordingly gave strategic priority to Europe and the Middle East. 
Australia, conversely, prioritised South-East Asia and the South Pacific 
and remained reluctant to be coopted into a bipolar view of international 
affairs. Of particular concern to Australia was the management of the 
Allied occupation of Japan. The US planned to use the nation as a tool in 
the Cold War, which stoked Australian insecurity. The Asian nationalist 
movement—particularly the independence of India in 1947—also 
complicated Australian defence planning and raised questions about the 
future role of the Commonwealth. 
Faced with this reality, the Chifley government had to find new ways to 
promote a regional system that was conducive to its national interest. 
The primary method adopted was a commitment to regional leadership. 
Contemporary political opponents of the Chifley government and 
historians since have suggested the government’s foreign policy weakened 
the Commonwealth link in favour of liberal internationalism and assertive 
regionalism.3 There were serious differences between the Australian and 
British governments—most notably, Australia’s support for Indonesian 
independence and the outright refusal to support the anti-communist 
2  ‘“Regional Arrangements with Special Reference to Pacific Policy”, DEA Report for 1944 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, 27 March 1944’, in Department of External Affairs: 
Correspondence files, multiple number series with year prefix [Main correspondence files series of the 
agency], 1914–93, NAA: A1838, 277/2 Part 1.
3  There are many works on the Chifley government’s foreign policy and its legacies. A recent 
example is Adam Hughes Henry, The Gatekeepers of Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Australian 
Scholarly Publishing, 2015), 1–7.
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Western Union Defence Organisation.4 However, the tendency to focus 
on points of Anglo-Australian conflict during the Chifley years downplays 
the degree of similarity and cooperation that still existed in the Anglo-
Australian relationship.
This chapter argues that the Commonwealth became the primary 
vehicle for Australia’s regional policy in the years 1946 to 1950. Australia 
prioritised the Commonwealth’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Along with a defensive presence, Australia encouraged a Commonwealth 
economic and diplomatic presence by way of investment in the economic 
development of the South Pacific and, in particular, South-East Asia. 
While some like David Lee and David Lowe have briefly noted the link 
between the Colombo Plan and the British commercial crisis throughout 
1940, there has been no dedicated study of South-East Asian economic 
development in relation to the Commonwealth. This chapter explores 
regional engagement as informed by a broader strategy directed towards 
strengthening the British world system and developing Australia’s long-
term diplomatic, economic and strategic capabilities.5
Robert Menzies’ Coalition government, elected in December 1949, 
is often presented as the antithesis of the Chifley government. It was 
seemingly left up to Menzies to steer Australia back towards more 
balanced relations with Britain and the US, forgoing, for better or worse, 
internationalism, independence and regional relations.6 Conversely, this 
chapter considers how ideas established by the Chifley government went 
on to inform the Menzies government’s concept of the Commonwealth 
and Australia’s immediate region. An examination of the Colombo Plan 
for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia 
reveals that the spread of the Cold War into Asia created an opportunity 
for Commonwealth–US cooperation that was conducive to Australia’s 
plans for regional engagement.
4  Neville Meaney, ‘Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 38, no. 6 (1992): 316–33, at pp. 316–18, 322–6; Peter Edwards and 
Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in 
Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 4, 9–11, 17–18, 29.
5  David Lee and David Lowe both briefly note the link between the Colombo Plan and the British 
commercial crisis throughout the 1940s. David Lowe, ‘Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan 1950’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 40, no. 2 (1990): 162–76, at p. 164; David Lee, ‘Protecting 
the Sterling Area: The Chifley Government’s Response to Multilateralism 1945–9’, Australian Journal 
of Politics 25 (1990): 178–95, at p. 185.
6  For an overview of works pitching the Chifley and Menzies governments’ foreign policies 
against one another, see David McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review’, 
The International History Review 23, no. 2 (2001): 299–321, at pp. 229–301, 304–11. 
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The South Pacific Commission: Australia’s 
commitment to regional leadership
In the 1944 ANZAC Agreement, Evatt made clear that Australia was 
a Principal Power. When World War II ended, the Chifley government 
set out to build an institutional framework within which to engage 
with its region, the centrepiece of which was the South Seas Regional 
Commission (later renamed the South Pacific Commission, SPC), helped 
along with enabling institutions like The Australian National University’s 
School of Pacific Studies and an increasing interest in Asian languages 
in the Australian Public Service.7 While the SPC was Australia’s first 
significant foray into regional institution building—it is, in fact, still in 
force today under the new name of the Pacific Community—and despite 
the sizeable collection relating to the SPC housed at the National Library 
of Australia, very little has been written on its historical significance.8 
This is an unfortunate omission from the historical record, for the SPC 
was developed at a critical juncture in Australia’s conceptualisation of the 
Pacific and its role there.
Originally proposed in the ANZAC Agreement and formalised in February 
1947, the SPC was a cooperative regional body formed to study and guide 
administrative, economic and social development in the South Pacific 
trust territories. The SPC was in line with the development objectives of 
the UN Trusteeship Council, which was established in 1945 as one of the 
foundational bodies of the UN and oversaw trusteeship administration 
and the gradual move towards self-determination. While the SPC was 
promoted as strictly separate from political matters, there were, of course, 
political implications, not the least of which included regional security.9 
The SPC rested on the idea that economic and social discord in the 
‘backward’ trust territories posed a threat to regional security. For the 
sake of peace, living standards had to be improved according to Western 
7  Wayne Reynolds, ‘Beyond White Australia: Australian Education and the Engagement of Asia 
After the Second World War’, International Journal of Learning 13, no. 3 (2006): 7–14, at pp. 8–9.
8  Details of this collection can be found in National Library of Australia, ‘South Pacific Commission’ 
(Canberra: NLA, 2008 [revised 2019]), available from: www.nla.gov.au/selected-library-collections/ 
south-pacific-commission.
9  Gregory E. Fry, ‘The Politics of South Pacific Regional Cooperation’, in The South Pacific: Problems, 
Issues and Prospects, ed. Ramesh Thakur (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 171–3; ‘“A New World in 
the South Pacific”, DEA Report, South Seas Commission Conference, 13 February 1947’, in Australian 
Mission, Political Representative to Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies [Batavia], Correspondence 
files, multiple number series [first system, Djakarta/Jakarta] [Main correspondence files series of the 
agency], 1946–50, NAA: A4355, 17/1.
139
6. THE NEW ORDER
values. Paternalism and practical limitations aside—namely, uncertainty 
surrounding future projects being, as it was, an advisory body—the 
SPC was significant in terms of breaking down Australia’s isolation from 
its region and it went on to shape the nation’s involvement with more 
authoritative bodies such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia (ECOSOC).10 
The SPC was also an important instrument in Australia’s attempt to 
revive the Commonwealth’s presence in the Pacific.11 Britain’s material 
and symbolic power was seriously depleted in the course of the war, yet it 
still had significant colonial responsibilities and commercial and military 
interests in the Asia-Pacific region. If Britain wished to have an enduring 
and legitimate role in the region, it was important it acted quickly to stake 
its claim there. As detailed in the previous chapter, John Curtin’s Fourth 
Empire proposal sought to redefine the role of the Commonwealth, with 
a focus on engaging with its disparate parts and developing specialist 
area knowledge as the basis of policymaking. Although Curtin’s proposal 
was not adopted, it can be seen that the Chifley government continued 
promoting his ideas through the SPC. This argument is supported by 
discussions during the 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin described 
Commonwealth influence in the Pacific as ‘somewhat strung out’. He 
went on to describe his hopes that Britain, India and the Pacific dominions 
would cooperate in developing a new regional organisation ‘built up 
to provide a binding link between the different parts of the Empire’. 
Bevin was particularly interested in economic development—a  theme 
on which Evatt quickly capitalised. Evatt noted the Australian–New 
Zealand idea for the SPC and requested it be included in future plans for 
a Commonwealth regional organisation, to which Bevin agreed.12 This 
request by Evatt ultimately led to the 1947 South Seas Conference in 
Canberra at which the SPC was formalised. 
10  For discussion of these agencies, see Peter Carroll, ‘Australia, ECOSOC and the UN Specialised 
Agencies’, in Australia and the United Nations, eds James Cotton and David Lee (Canberra: 
Longueville Books with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012), 147–83.
11  Gregory E. Fry, ‘International Cooperation in the South Pacific: From Regional Integration to 
Collective Diplomacy’, in The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation: Comparative Case Studies, ed. 
W. Andrew Axline (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 136, 141; Fry, ‘The Politics of South Pacific 
Regional Cooperation’, 172–3. 
12  ‘Doc. 206, Minutes First Meeting of Prime Ministers, 23 April 1946’, in W.J. Hudson and 
Wendy Way (eds), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49. Volume 9: January–June 1946 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1991) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 9].
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The SPC was not strictly a Commonwealth organisation, as the US, 
France and the Netherlands all had interests in the area and joined 
the commission. Importantly, however, it was an Australian–New 
Zealand and, by association, Commonwealth initiative. Journalists and 
policymakers alike accordingly gave emphasis to the link between the 
SPC and the Commonwealth’s enduring presence in the region. Sydney’s 
The Sun newspaper, for instance, described the SPC as an ‘Empire 
scheme’, reporting that the ‘approval of this scheme means that all the 
major portions of the Canberra Pact [ANZAC Agreement] have now 
been adopted as Empire policy in the South Pacific’.13 This emphasis 
on a coordinated Commonwealth policy reflects the weight Australian 
commentators and the government gave to both the Commonwealth 
foreign policy framework and Britain’s continued presence in this part 
of the world. Interestingly, the Commonwealth countries had the largest 
territorial interests and dependent populations in the area covered by the 
SPC. As a result, Britain, Australia and New Zealand agreed to finance 
60 per cent of the commission’s budget—the largest contribution.14 
Conceivably, there was a certain level of prestige attached to this sizeable 
contribution, signalling the Commonwealth’s enduring investment and 
influence in the region. 
Here, it is interesting to briefly note a parallel between the contemporary 
‘Pacific Step-up’ and the SPC. The flagship initiative of the Pacific Step-
up is the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific 
(AIFFP), a  $2 billion infrastructure development fund that ‘upholds 
robust standards, avoids unsustainable debt burdens and targets the 
needs of nations in the region—as identified by them—and unlocks the 
potential of private sector investment in the region’.15 This is expressly in 
response to the inroads made by China in its vast infrastructure program, 
the Belt and Road Initiative. Not only will the AIFFP theoretically 
contribute to sustained growth in the Pacific, increasing the likelihood 
of economic partnerships, but also it aims to maintain the resident 
rules-based order that has served Australia’s interests. This is alluded to 
in the joint statement made by then Minister for Trade, Tourism and 
13  ‘“New Empire Scheme Will Develop Pacific Islands”, The Sun, [Sydney], 4 May 1946’, cutting 
in Prime Minister’s Department: Correspondence files, multiple number series with alphabetical 
prefix, 1899–1983, NAA: A518, AM815/1/1/A Part 1.
14  ‘“A New World in the South Pacific”, 13 February 1947’, NAA: A4355, 17/1.
15  ‘Realising the Pacific’s vision for stability, security and prosperity’, Speech, Ewen McDonald, 
Head of the Office of the Pacific, Canberra, 7 June 2019, available from: www.dfat.gov.au/news/
speeches/ Pages/ realising-the-pacifics-vision-for-stability-security-and-prosperity. 
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Investment Simon Birmingham and Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise 
Payne: ‘We want to remain an enabler of economic opportunity for our 
neighbours and work with them to build a Pacific region that is secure 
strategically, stable economically and sovereign politically.’16 Where 
the SPC sought to institutionalise a distinct postwar role for Australia 
as an engaged and committed neighbour who could be looked to for 
support in regional development, today, the Pacific Step-up seeks to 
reaffirm Australia’s status as the partner of choice. As we reflect on these 
parallels, it is important to interrogate the harmful and paternalistic ideas 
that underpinned Australia’s engagement with the Pacific in the 1940s. 
It is promising, then, to observe the Pacific Step-up’s claim to prioritise 
resilience, sovereignty and sustained partnerships.
Defending Australia
Prominent voices have dismissed the enduring influence of the 
ANZAC Agreement and the Fourth Empire, with Joanne Wallis, for 
instance, writing of the agreement that, after the war, ‘Australia began 
stepping away from the … plan that Australia and New Zealand would 
establish a regional zone of defence’.17 In reality, as Lee argues, the 
Chifley government’s defence policy ‘took up where Curtin left off ’.18 
The Chifley government’s commitment to greater regional responsibility 
and encouraging economic, political and social stability in the South 
Pacific was in concert with defence plans. Australia’s postwar regional 
defence planning was premised on the control of the arc of islands to 
its north to defend against long and mid-range attacks. The Australian 
government was eager to see this island defence perimeter incorporated 
into a broader cooperative regional defence arrangement. During the war, 
the US had indicated its intention to retain access rights to all the Pacific 
bases it had built during the war—including Australia’s trust territory of 
16  ‘Enhancing Australia’s role in Pacific infrastructure projects’, Joint media release, Senator the 
Hon. Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 4 April 2019, available from: www.foreign 
minister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/enhancing-australias-role-pacific-infrastructure-
projects. 
17  Joanne Wallis, Pacific Power? Australia’s Strategy in the Pacific Islands (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2017), 35.
18  David Lee, ‘Britain and Australia’s Defence Policy, 1945–49’, War and Society 13, no. 1 (1995): 
61–80, at p. 61.
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Manus Island.19 On 13 March 1946, Minister for External Affairs H.V. 
Evatt announced to the House of Representatives that, while Australia 
welcomed the US using the Manus Island base, it would do so only 
on the basis of reciprocity and a Commonwealth–US ‘overall defence 
arrangement’.20 The British shared a similar vision, with Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill calling for a ‘fraternal association’ of the British 
Commonwealth and the US built on an ‘intimate relationship between 
our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the 
similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions’.21
The foundation of the proposed joint Commonwealth–US arrangement 
was laid out at the 1946 Prime Ministers’ Conference. The attendees 
agreed there was a need for a revised machinery for Commonwealth 
defence. This included greater inter-Commonwealth consultation in 
high-level strategic planning, the regionalisation of defence and each 
dominion taking on greater responsibility for local defence within its 
individual region.22 It  was also acknowledged that, in the future, the 
Commonwealth would have to work more closely with the US on issues 
of defence and foreign affairs. The Australian representatives pressed for 
the necessary next steps to be taken in formalising defence arrangements. 
Evatt and Chifley tabled the United States’ recent request for access to 
Commonwealth bases in the Pacific, suggesting such access be granted 
in exchange for a Commonwealth–US ‘common defence policy’, 
which included reciprocal base use and certain ‘defence obligations’.23 
The representatives agreed to a united Commonwealth (in this case, 
Australian, British and New Zealand) response to the US request that 
would be directed towards the establishment of a cooperative regional 
security arrangement ‘for the maintenance … of international peace and 
security in the South Pacific and South-West Pacific areas’.24 In the coming 
19  Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: Australia and the United States, 1900–1975 
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1986), 151.
20  CPD: Representatives, 13 March 1946, vol. 186, 200–1. 
21  Winston Churchill, ‘Sinews of peace’, Speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 
1946 (Fulton, MO: National Churchill Museum, 2021), available from: www.nationalchurchill 
museum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html.
22  ‘Doc. 208, Minutes Third Meeting of Prime Ministers, 24 April 1946’ and ‘Doc. 210, Minutes 
Fourth Meeting of Prime Ministers, 25 April 1946’, both in Hudson and Way, DAFP, vol. 9.
23  ‘Doc. 206, Minutes First Meeting of Prime Ministers, 23 April 1946’ and ‘Doc. 208, Minutes 
Third Meeting of Prime Ministers, 24 April 1946’, both in Hudson and Way, DAFP, vol. 9.
24  ‘Doc. 213, Minutes Fifth Meeting of Prime Ministers, 26 April 1946’, in Hudson and Way, 
DAFP, vol. 9.
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months, both Evatt and Chifley made repeated attempts to negotiate 
with the US State Department for reciprocal base use and a cooperative 
regional security arrangement.
Despite initially promising prospects for a Commonwealth–US security 
arrangement, these hopes were soon dashed. The US made paltry offers 
for reciprocal access to distant and strategically insignificant bases and 
doggedly refused to make specific defence commitments in the Pacific.25 
By mid-1947, the US government informed Australia that its ‘strategic 
interests had already moved north’.26 The declining strategic significance 
of South-East Asia and the South Pacific was largely the result of increasing 
US–USSR tensions and new plans for the occupation of Japan. Any 
opportunity for cooperation in nuclear developments was also blocked, 
with the administration of Harry S. Truman determining the US alone 
would control and manage the nuclear technology developed by the 
Manhattan Project.27 
Regional concepts and the future of Japan
The foundations of Australia’s machinery for regional defence and 
engagement were being established as US plans for the management of 
Japan began evolving. The occupation of Japan was managed by two 
key bodies. The first was the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, 
which determined the broad policies guiding the occupation of Japan. 
The second body was the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) in Tokyo, which 
advised on the implementation of Far Eastern Commission policies and 
worked towards peace negotiations. The Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Council for Japan (SCAP) was US General Douglas MacArthur, 
with whom the interim administrative directives rested. This system 
afforded MacArthur a fair amount of flexibility in decision-making and 
the Australian government had initially hoped it could appeal to him 
25  ‘Doc. 1, Evatt to Chifley’, ‘Doc. 30, Evatt to Chifley, 19 July 1946’ and ‘Doc. 316, United 
States Embassy in Canberra to DEA, 12 December 1946’, all in W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way (eds), 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49. Volume 10: July–December 1946 (Canberra: AGPS, 
1993) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 10]; ‘Acheson (Under Secretary of State) to US Embassy in Canberra, 
9 December 1946’ and ‘Memorandum by US Admiral Denfeld, [n.d. (June 1947)]’, both in NAA: 
A6494, SPTS 1/1.
26  ‘Forsyth Interview’, NLA: TRC 121/27, Folder 2/2/151.
27  This decision was formalised in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Wayne Reynolds, ‘Imperial 
Defence After 1945’, in Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation on Australia’s 
Near North, 1945–65, ed. David Lowe (Geelong, Vic.: Deakin University Press, 1996), 121–4. 
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to ensure Australia played a leading role in the management of Japan.28 
Australia’s William Macmahon Ball was appointed the Commonwealth 
representative on the ACJ, and the joint British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force in Japan was commanded by an Australian lieutenant 
general. These appointments, Macmahon Ball reflected, ‘showed a new 
and interesting development in British Commonwealth relations’.29 
The occupation of Japan initially operated on the basis of gradual 
economic reform, with strict controls to limit the nation’s war potential.30 
Generally, this met Australia’s desire for an occupation and peace treaty 
that would provide for the ‘complete elimination of Japanese imperialistic 
militarism’.31 From mid-1947, however, the US government began to 
‘Reverse Course’: the promotion of economic rehabilitation through the 
revival and expansion of capitalism to encourage the economic and social 
conditions in which democracy could take hold.32 The Reverse Course 
reflected the recent announcement by the USSR and China that they 
would no longer cooperate with the ACJ, granting the US near free rein 
in the management of the Japanese occupation and the opportunity to 
implement the burgeoning Truman Doctrine, which aimed to contain 
communism by helping certain vulnerable nations maintain their 
political and economic integrity. Occupied Japan was conducting very 
little regional trade, with many Asia-Pacific nations still resentful of 
Japan’s recent belligerence. Japan accordingly relied on exports from the 
US, contributing to a growing dollar deficit and, in turn, susceptibility 
to economic and political collapse. In supporting Japan’s economic 
development, the US hoped to establish the nation as an industrial hub for 
East Asia and an economic and strategic bulwark against communism.33
Important signifiers of Washington’s evolving ideas for Japan and the 
foundation of US power in Asia include two visits made by US Under 
Secretary of the Army William Draper—the first in September 1947 and 
28  Ai Kobayashi, W. Macmahon Ball: Politics for the People (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, 2013), 82–9; W. Macmahon Ball, Japan: Enemy or Ally? (Melbourne: Cassell & Company, 
1948), 21–2.
29  Macmahon Ball, Japan, 29.
30  Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1985), 65–72.
31  ‘“Security in the Pacific”, Address by H.V. Evatt to the Herald Tribune Forum, New York, 
2 October 1945’, in H.V. Evatt, Australia in World Affairs (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1946), 76.
32  Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 78–81; Macmahon Ball, Japan, 196–7.
33  Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 24–6, 82–3; ‘Attachment, Speech by Royall 
(Secretary of the Army), 17 January 1948, Eckersley (Acting Head of Australian Mission in Tokyo) to 
Burton (DEA Secretary), 9 February 1948’, NAA: A1838, 3103/11/161 Part 1. 
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the second in March–April 1948. Draper, who reportedly opposed heavy 
reparations and punitive peace, was joined by a retinue of prominent 
US businessmen charged with examining economic opportunities 
in Japan and the resources necessary to continue developing them.34 
Following the trips, the Army Department compiled a list of preliminary 
recommendations, including greater freedom of movement for Japanese 
businessmen, restoring power to the Japanese government and a revolving 
trade fund. The list of recommendations was presented to the State 
Department, which gave its ‘unqualified support’ to the rehabilitation 
of Japan and all associated funding.35 This approach to the occupation 
of Japan was formalised in the National Security Council (NSC) policy 
paper 13/2, signed on 7 October 1948. NSC 13/2 planned for recovery 
driven by regional economic integration, arrangements for Japanese 
military security and the signing of a lenient peace treaty.36 At this point, 
the State Department seized control of initiatives in Japan, MacArthur 
lost much of his administrative power and any opportunity for Australia 
to influence SCAP decision-making virtually disappeared.
The US considered Australia’s endorsement of its policy towards Japan 
‘highly desirable’ because of its role in the ACJ and membership of 
the Commonwealth, in which Australian support could ‘usually be 
counted upon to involve New Zealand and often UK support’.37 While 
Australian policymakers agreed that a stable Japanese economy was 
necessary for lasting peace, they feared the Reverse Course would place 
Japan ‘in a position where her industries are built up to constitute a war 
potential’.38 Patrick Shaw, the Commonwealth representative on the ACJ 
following Macmahon Ball’s departure, was concerned by the thinly veiled 
justifications for the new US approach:
34  ‘“The Trend of United States Policy Towards Japan”, [n.d. (April 1948)]’ and ‘Australian Mission 
in Tokyo to DEA, 31 March 1948’, both in NAA: A1838, 3103/11/161 Part 1.
35  John Stenson-Wright, Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Towards Japan, 
1945–60 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 32–4; Schaller, The American Occupation 
of Japan, 122, 131–7; ‘Doc. 651, Royall to Acting Secretary of State, 23 April 1948’, in John G. Reid 
and David H. Stauffer (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, 
Volume VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974) [hereinafter FRUS 1948].
36  ‘Doc. 588, Attachment, “Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan”, 
Report by the NSC, 7 October 1948’, in Reid and Stauffer, FRUS 1948.
37  ‘Doc. 1, Policy Statement of Department of State, 18 August 1948’, in Reid and Glennon, 
FRUS 1949.
38  ‘“The Trend of United States Policy Towards Japan”, [n.d. (April 1948)]’, NAA: A1838, 
3103/11/161 Part 1. Evatt reiterated these concerns in an address to Parliament, arguing that ‘it will 
be an evil day for Australia if Japan is given capacity to rearm’. CDP: Representatives, 8 April 1948, 
No. 15, 747.
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The most frightening aspect of the present development of 
American policy is that while it is ostensibly aimed at ‘lightening 
the burden of Occupation on the American taxpayer’, everyone 
including the Japanese, knows the aim is the re-establishment of 
a strong Japan as the bulwark against the USSR. Strength implies 
military as well as economic revival.39 
The Australian government was also concerned by America’s concept 
of the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese economic rehabilitation relied on 
treating the Pacific and South-East Asia as a ‘Japanese quarry’, from which 
raw materials could be sourced, converted into manufactured goods and 
sold back to these same regional nations.40 This arrangement undermined 
plans for a self-reliant regional system and relegated its immediate area 
of strategic concern to merely an appendage of US policy. Australia 
accordingly rejected US plans for Japan, promoting a just yet disciplinary 
peace treaty ‘in which all participants in War had full voices’.41 In the 
ACJ, Shaw doggedly resisted US attempts to relax restrictions on Japanese 
travel and commercial fishing.42 The Chifley government’s position, along 
with its reluctance to accept the Cold War world view, made for frigid 
Australian–US relations throughout the immediate postwar years.43 
Australia’s response to America’s unacceptable concept for Asia-Pacific 
security was to promote a Commonwealth solution. The Chifley 
government acted quickly to coordinate new security arrangements with 
Britain. The Anglo-Australian Joint Project was established in 1946, 
leading to the development of the Woomera Range Complex in South 
Australia, where long-range missiles were to be tested.44 As previously 
noted, at the 1946 Prime Ministers’ Conference, it had been agreed 
that Commonwealth defence planning would be revised with a view 
to organising on a regional basis, although no definite machinery was 
established. In early 1947, Australia took preliminary steps towards 
39  ‘Shaw to DEA, 24 March 1948’, NAA: A1838, 3103/11/161 Part 1.
40  Reynolds, ‘Imperial Defence After 1945’, 125.
41  ‘“The Trend of United States Policy Towards Japan”, [n.d. (April 1948)]’, NAA: A1838, 
3103/11/161 Part 1; ‘Attachment, Evatt Address to ECOSOC, 30 July 1948, Australian Delegation 
at ECOSOC to DEA, 4 August 1948’, NAA: A1838, 856/20 Part 3.
42  Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 278.
43  These differences were not helped by suspicions about Soviet sympathisers within the Australian 
government. See, Frank Cain, ‘Venona in Australia and its Long-Term Ramifications’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 35, no. 2 (2000): 231–48.
44  Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2000), 74–91; Peter Morton, Fire Across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project 
1946–1980 (Canberra: AGPS, 1989), 52–7, 63–9, 103–33.
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developing this machinery with a major defence review. The review, 
which considered national defence needs in the event of a global war, 
promoted the regionalisation of Commonwealth defence as the basis of 
a world system for security. As Defence Minister John Dedman explained: 
This means that each member of the Empire has a primary 
responsibility in regard to its own problem in its particular region, 
which requires working out, not only with the other members 
of the Empire concerned, but also with other nations with 
territorial and strategic interests in that area. If you piece these 
regional arrangements together you achieve a major contribution 
to an overall plan, whether on a British Commonwealth or a 
world basis.45
Within this system, Australia would be ‘the main support area’ for 
South-East Asia and the South Pacific and would, ‘from time to time’, 
act ‘on behalf of the rest of the Commonwealth’ in matters relating to 
the region.46
In 1947, Australia had been hopeful about securing a Commonwealth–
US defence arrangement. By 1948, with the Reverse Course in Japan 
and America’s refusal to make specific defence commitments, Australia 
was less optimistic and shifted its focus to a Commonwealth solution 
for Asia-Pacific security. In October, Evatt attended the 1948 Prime 
Ministers’ Conference. Among his primary aims was determining the 
‘essential measures required … to allow Commonwealth countries to 
integrate successfully in the event of war’. This included high-level 
strategic planning, equipment standardisation and determining areas of 
strategic responsibility.47 The British delegation tabled a memorandum 
that reaffirmed its commitment to the regionalisation of defence and 
the development of a machinery ‘to prepare common strategic objectives 
and organise plans’.48 Having read this memorandum, the Australian 
45  CPD: Representatives, 4 June 1947, No. 23, 3336.
46  ‘Doc. 163, Council of Defence Meeting, 12 March 1947’, in W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way 
(eds), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49. Volume 12: Australia and the Postwar World 
1947 (Canberra: AGPS, 1995) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 12]. See also, ‘Doc. 160, “Appreciation of 
Certain Aspects of the Strategical Position of Australia”, Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation, 
27 March 1947’, in Hudson and Way, DAFP, vol. 12.
47  ‘Boase (Evatt’s defence advisor during the 1948 Prime Ministers’ Conference) to Shedden 
(Secretary Department of Defence), 27 September 1948’, NAA: A816, 14/301/351.
48  ‘“Commonwealth Defence Co-operation”, Memorandum by British COS, Prime Ministers’ 
Conference, 23 September 1948’, in Department of Defence: Correspondence files, multiple number 
series [Classified 301] [Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1928–62, NAA: A816, 
14/301/351.
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delegation proposed joint planning on a regional basis—a proposal that 
was ‘given the “green light”’ by the British.49 It was on the basis of this 
joint planning that the Australian, New Zealand and Malayan (ANZAM) 
defence area was established. 
Figure 6.1 ANZAM defence area
Source: Courtesy of National Archives of Australia, NAA: A5954, 1419/13.
Established over a series of joint planning discussions in late 1948 and 
1949, ANZAM was both an area of strategic responsibility and the 
machinery for Australian, British and New Zealand strategic planning. 
ANZAM provided the basis for defence responsibilities in peacetime and 
the command structure in the event of war. Effective consultation was 
achieved through the appointment of British and New Zealand liaison 
officers, stationed in Australia. Within the ANZAM area, Australia 
assumed overall responsibility for the lines of sea communication and 
home defence, New Zealand assumed responsibility for its home defence 
and Britain for the defence of Malaya and other possessions in the area. 
Regular consultation aimed to provide for relatively cohesive planning 
49  ‘Boase to Shedden, 18 October 1948’, NAA: A816, 14/301/351.
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for ‘co-ordination with overall planning in the Anzam Area’.50 Spanning 
from the Indian Ocean across to the Cook Islands in the South Pacific 
Ocean and up from New Zealand to Malaya, the ANZAM area effectively 
codified Australia’s strategic zone of responsibility as demarcated in the 
1944 ANZAC Agreement. 
Responding to regional nationalism
America’s declining interest in Australia’s immediate region and the Reverse 
Course in the management of occupied Japan coincided with an upsurge 
of Asian nationalism, making regional engagement a more complicated 
and urgent task. Asian nationalism rendered trusteeship and the gradual 
move towards self-determination—the preferred method for trustee 
nations and the basis of Australia’s plan for engaging with the islands to 
its north—effectively redundant. Australia’s response was to reinforce its 
commitment to developing its diplomatic capabilities, principally in the 
role of a good neighbour and partner in realising the aspirations of its 
regional community.
Where the US and Britain tended to see the hand of the Soviet Union 
and ideological expansionism in the Asian nationalist movement, the 
Chifley government was broadly supportive and sought to accommodate 
the changing regional landscape within its foreign policy. This was 
particularly true of John Burton, Evatt’s private secretary (1941–47) and 
DEA secretary (1947–50), who saw in the Asian nationalist movement 
legitimate aspirations worthy of support.51 Australia’s position on Asian 
nationalism has produced scholarly assessments pointing to a profound 
shift in Anglo-Australian relations. Christopher Waters, for instance, 
argues that Australia was ‘bitterly to disappoint’ the British government 
in its resistance to the narrative of a Soviet-inspired movement.52 More 
critically, in supporting Indonesian independence and standing against 
50  Hiroyuki Umetsu, ‘The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: The UK 
Proposal to Revitalise ANZAM and the Increased Australian Defence Commitment to Malaya’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 4 (2004): 509–25, at pp. 510–11; ‘“Procedure 
for Future Planning in Relation to British Commonwealth Defence in ANZAM Area”, Defence 
Committee Report, revised copy following Joint Planning discussions, 26 August 1949’, NAA: 
A5954, 1626/4.
51  Adam Hughes Henry, ‘John Burton: Forgotten Mandarin?’, in The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of 
the Mandarins: Australian Government Administration in the Post-War Reconstruction Era, ed. Samuel 
Furphy (Canberra: ANU Press, 2015), 221; Henry, The Gatekeepers of Australian Foreign Policy, 2–3.
52  Waters, The Empire Fractures, 168–9, 171–4. 
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the Netherlands at the UN—a move the British had cautioned against—
Australia effectively undermined the legitimacy of Britain’s own claims 
in South-East Asia and the South Pacific.53 The Chifley and Clement 
Attlee governments certainly differed in their assessments of the USSR. 
When it came to Asian nationalism, Australia’s response sought to deliver 
a regional system that reinforced the Commonwealth’s influence.
Australia’s response to Asian nationalism attempted to encourage stability 
and reform its regional identity. Supporting the economic aspirations 
of the nationalists was central to this task. In early 1947, the Australian 
economist and public servant H.C. Coombs wrote to the prime minister 
offering his personal suggestions on how best to respond to Asian 
nationalism. He believed it ‘unwise’ to allow political differences to lead 
Australia to ‘oppose in any way the achievement of the legitimate economic 
aspirations of these peoples’. Coombs concluded that the Australian 
government ‘should make a conscious attempt to identify herself with 
these developments’.54 Coombs was by no means the first to note the 
relationship between economic development, diplomacy and regional 
stability. However, his position as director-general of the Department 
of Post-War Reconstruction and closeness to Chifley, as both an advisor 
and a friend, placed him among the most influential public servants in 
postwar Australia. It is significant, then, that these comments have been 
overlooked elsewhere.
While the Chifley government has been accused of betraying the 
Commonwealth in its response to Asian nationalism, there is much to 
suggest the government conceived of the changing political forces in 
South-East Asia and the Pacific as an opportunity to redefine and extend 
Commonwealth influence in the region. In a statement to the House of 
Representatives in June 1947, Evatt argued that Britain and the Pacific 
dominions had a responsibility to the region, calling on them to play their 
‘due part … in helping the peoples of these areas achieve their legitimate 
nationalist aspirations’. He made a clear link between these so-called 
regional responsibilities and safeguarding Commonwealth interests. 
53  For discussion of Australia’s role in Indonesian independence, see Peter Denis, ‘Australia and 
Indonesia: The Early Years’, in Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation on 
Australia’s Near North, 1945–65, ed. David Lowe (Geelong, Vic.: Deakin University Press, 1996), 
43–52; George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution.
54  ‘Coombs to Chifley, 11 February 1947’, in Department of External Affairs: Correspondence files, 
multiple number series with year prefix [Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1933–71, 
NAA: A1068, ER47/70/7. 
151
6. THE NEW ORDER
He encouraged Britain, Australia and New Zealand to cooperate in 
developing regional awareness, believing the two Pacific dominions were 
geographically positioned to provide ‘special area knowledge’ that could 
inform ‘what is best likely to preserve British Commonwealth interests 
in this part of the world’.55 
India was among the most important tests of Australia’s support for 
Asian nationalism. While the Chifley government welcomed India’s 
independence in 1947, it was vocal about its desire to see the nation 
remain a member of the Commonwealth. Evatt underscored the freedom 
and security Australia enjoyed as a dominion in a statement to the House 
of Representatives:
The Australian Government, as a member of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, enjoying a status of complete 
freedom and autonomy in both domestic and foreign policies, has 
looked forward to the achievement by India of a similar status and 
a similar freedom. The people of India should be fully aware of this 
free and autonomous position of Australia and other members of 
the British group of nations. On this view India could pursue all 
its national aspirations while still maintaining the link by which 
all members of the British Commonwealth are bound together.56 
Australia ultimately supported Indian membership as a republic, owing 
no allegiance to the Crown but still committed to the Commonwealth 
and the British world system. 
The Chifley government’s enthusiasm for India’s continuing 
Commonwealth membership rested on delivering strategic capabilities. 
Not only was India an important member of the Sterling Area and 
central to British commercial power; it was also defensively significant. 
As Commonwealth defence planning moved towards regionalisation, 
the Australian government identified an opportunity to draw India 
into a defence arrangement. India would act as ‘a main support area’, 
defending sea lines of communication adjacent to ANZAM and taking on 
greater responsibility in Middle Eastern defence.57 Although the Chifley 
government did not successfully secure a defence arrangement with India, 
55  CPD: Representatives, 5 June 1947, No. 23, 367–8. 
56  CPD: Representatives, 26 February 1947, No. 9, 164–5.
57  Frank Bongiorno, ‘British to the Bootstraps? H.V. Evatt, J.B. Chifley and Australian Policy on 
Indian Membership of the Commonwealth, 1947–49’, Historical Studies 36, no. 125 (2005): 18–39; 
Reynolds, ‘Imperial Defence After 1945’, 124–6; Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, 296.
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it continued to promote closer relations with this important neighbour. 
Australia consistently aligned itself with India on matters of regional 
importance at various meetings of Commonwealth ministers and at the 
1947 and 1949 New Delhi conferences.58
By mid-1948, the Asian nationalist movement was gaining momentum: 
there was agitation in Malaya, India had gained independence from 
Britain and Burma and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) followed in 1948. The DEA 
acted on the ideas presented by Coombs, Evatt and others, appointing a 
goodwill mission to South-East and East Asia. The genesis of the mission 
was a tour of the region carried out by the British Council—a British 
government–funded body designed to promote greater international 
knowledge of British culture. Following this tour, Britain requested the 
Australian government contribute to a cultural diplomacy program that 
would ‘ensure the spread of British ideas and influence … and prevent 
other foreign influences from supplanting British influence there’.59 
Macmahon Ball was appointed leader of the mission. As a prominent 
public intellectual, a close observer of Asian politics and an experienced 
diplomat, he was well suited to the task.60 Australia committed to providing 
scholarships and relief aid; these plans were later broadened to include 
the provision of supplies under UN rehabilitation and development 
schemes.61 The mission was also investigatory in nature, providing an 
opportunity to make contact with local officials and nationalist leaders 
to better understand the region and determine future development needs. 
Macmahon Ball presented his report on the mission to the federal 
government in July 1948. Above all else, he recommended Australia 
invest in the economic aspirations of Asia, including the continued 
provision of scholarships and relief aid. Macmahon Ball was particularly 
focused on education:
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Technical and intellectual aid is singularly important in these 
countries since so many of the new governments are controlled 
by students. These are young men with enough intelligence to 
understand what they lack in training and experience. To win the 
friendship and goodwill of the students and technicians is to win 
the goodwill of people with great political influence.62 
The key implication here was that Australia could demonstrate a shift from 
colonial overseer to a partner in regional affairs, signifying a commitment 
to engaging in the welfare of the peoples of South-East and East Asia.
Macmahon Ball’s suggestions seemingly persuaded the DEA and, in 
September 1948, an appreciation of the recent developments in the region 
was carried out. The key theme emerging from this was that the Australian 
government ‘should, by all possible means, encourage countries in the area 
to look to Australia as an impartial and sympathetic collaborator in their 
desire to develop stable governments and economic strength’. Existing 
scholarship programs were expanded and technical and administrative 
advice provided to local manufacturers and governments.63 As we will see, 
there is a clear link between economic and technical assistance as a means 
of garnering political influence and the future Colombo Plan.64 
Key Australian policymakers conceived of the Asian nationalist movement 
as an opportunity. They hoped to gain greater regional awareness and 
revitalise the Commonwealth presence in the area. More critically, they 
could piece together a strategic and diplomatic network in the region, 
countering America’s disinterest in South-East Asia and the South Pacific 
and its ominous plans for Japan.65 
Alongside diplomatic and strategic capabilities, Australia was seeking to 
develop its economic capabilities as part of a cohesive regional system. 
To fully appreciate the link between trade, diplomacy and security and the 
Chifley government’s thinking on regional engagement, we must consider 
62  ‘Report on a Mission to East Asia, 27 May – 6 July 1948, 27 July 1948’, NAA: A6779, 17.
63  ‘“Survey of Political Events and Trends in South East Asia”, 6 October 1948’, NAA: A1068, 
DL47/5/6.
64  A number of scholars have noted this link, including: Christopher Waters, ‘The Macmahon 
Ball Mission to East Asia 1948’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 40, no. 3 (1994): 351–63, 
at pp. 351–2, 354; Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan (Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2004), 16–18. 
65  ‘Cabinet Agendum Number 11, 2 July 1946, NAA: A6779, Volume 28’, cited in Buckley et al., 
Doc Evatt, 295–6. 
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the international order—in particular, the global economic situation, 
the United States’ Cold War plans and the impact this had on British 
world power. 
The international economic situation
While the world had largely accepted US plans for multilateralism, 
there were conflicting views and major stumbling blocks on the path 
to achieving a global multilateral trading system. The greatest of these 
obstacles was the dollar gap and sterling convertibility crisis.
Before the war, Britain had generally been able to maintain its dollar 
deficit through surplus sales to other sterling countries. The war upended 
this balance as Britain’s import needs from the US far outstripped its 
exports.66 In July 1946, the Anglo-American loan was signed, granting 
US$3.75  billion to Britain to cover its dollar purchases. However, the 
US, which believed the removal of protectionist trade practices was 
the only way to achieve a multilateral world trade system, included the 
stipulation that the sterling must become convertible to dollars in July 
1947.67 Within the Sterling Area, Britain effectively acted as the banker, 
granting permission for members to convert their sterling reserves into 
dollars to purchase US goods. This system allowed Britain to artificially 
control the value of the sterling and ration US exports to the Sterling 
Area. By enforcing convertibility, the US would reduce the effectiveness 
of Sterling Area discrimination.68
When sterling became convertible on 15 July 1947, Britain’s trading 
partners quickly sought to convert their sterling into dollars, for revenue 
and capital transactions alike. This forced Britain to draw on its dollar loan 
at a rate that would exhaust reserves by the end of the year. An emergency 
Cabinet meeting was called in mid-August and sterling convertibility was 
suspended indefinitely. Contrary to US hopes, Britain recommitted itself 
to the Sterling Area. Dollar pooling arrangements were reintroduced and 
Britain agreed to sell dollars for sterling to Sterling Area members that 
66  Scott Newton, ‘Britain, the Sterling Area and European Integration, 1945–50’, in Money, Finance 
and Empire, 1790–1960, eds A.N. Porter and R.F. Holland (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 163–5.
67  Francine McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds of Commonwealth, 138–55.
68  Scott Newton, ‘The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan’, 
Economic History Review 37, no. 3 (1984): 391–408, at pp. 392–3.
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needed to balance deficits if those members drastically limited their dollar 
spending. The Sterling Area was reinstated as an insular and discriminatory 
system of trade and finance.69
Although Australia agreed to limit its dollar purchases—the rationing of 
foodstuffs and fuel saw imports from the US fall from 19.10 per cent 
to 10.03 per cent of total imports between 1946–47 and 1948–49—it 
adopted these measures with some reservations.70 The war had driven 
home to Australia the dangers of dependency on foreign markets for 
defence goods, and the postwar reconstruction program was a long-
term solution for greater industrial capacity.71 To achieve industrial 
self-sufficiency, Australia needed new import and export markets. Even 
before the conversion crisis, there were those in Australian political circles 
mindful of the risk of economic dependency on Britain. In February 
1947, Coombs, for example, warned Chifley against overdependence 
on the Sterling Area. He believed Britain faced a ‘desperate economic 
situation’. The nation’s purchasing power was depleted, economic growth 
was stagnant and it was already clear it was beyond its capacity to absorb 
the volume of Australian produce needed to avoid a deficit. Australia 
should continue to support the Sterling Area, Coombs argued, benefiting 
from preferential treatment while planning ‘consciously to reduce our 
dependence on the United Kingdom market’. With British purchases 
making up 29 per cent of all Australian exports and more than 35 per 
cent of imports, this would have to be a gradual process. With this in 
mind, Coombs encouraged Chifley to explore trade opportunities with 
the newly independent Asian nations—namely, India, with hopes to 
build on existing goodwill between the two nations.72
By July 1947, Coombs was considering more hasty steps towards greater 
economic self-sufficiency. In his private notes, he anticipated a recession by 
the close of the year as well as Britain’s retreat to the economies of Western 
Europe. Coombs believed Australia’s policy must be ‘to cushion the effects’ 
69  Lee, ‘Protecting the Sterling Area’, 183; Newton, ‘The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British 
Response to the Marshall Plan’, 394–401; ‘Statement by Chifley in the House of Representatives, 
4  December 1947’, in John G. Crawford (ed.), Australian Trade Policy 1942–66: A Documentary 
History (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 105–9.
70  Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 38 (Canberra: Commonwealth 
Government Printer, 1951), 483–5.
71  Tim Rooth, ‘Imperial Self-Insufficiency Rediscovered: Britain and Australia, 1945–51’, 
Australian Economic History Review 39, no. 1 (1999): 29–51, at pp. 29–32.
72  Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 38 (1951), 483; ‘Coombs to Chifley, 
11 February 1947’, NAA: A1068, ER47/70/7. Figures are for the financial year 1946–47.
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of these developments—in other words, reducing dependency on Britain 
and the US. The principal cushion Coombs proposed was a long-term 
plan to develop a larger proportion of Australian trade with South-East 
Asian and Pacific countries. This included promoting Australian trade 
via increased trade representatives and providing technical education 
and finance. In theory, this assistance in the economic development of 
South-East Asian and Pacific nations would be remunerated in purchases 
from Australia.73 
There is no evidence that Coombs shared these views with his colleagues, 
however, his suggestions mirrored the DEA’s strategic interests in regional 
affairs and development initiatives such as the SPC. His ideas were also 
mirrored in the emerging Commonwealth policy that attempted to solve 
the dollar gap and safeguard the future of Commonwealth commercial 
interests in South-East Asia. To understand how this Commonwealth 
policy developed, we must look to Cold War tensions and the United 
States’ economic attempts to secure Europe. 
Following the 1947 sterling conversion crisis, the US feared economic 
crisis in Western Europe would create instability and opportunities for 
Soviet domination. The US government believed Europe’s dire economic 
situation was the result of a ‘failure … to produce’, forcing these countries 
to buy from the US without any hope of selling enough in return.74 
The solution was, as Secretary of State George C. Marshall argued, to 
rehabilitate the European economic structure, allowing it to produce 
exports for the dollar market that would, in time, establish an equilibrium. 
Marshall’s assessment was the origin of the European Recovery Program 
(ERP, or Marshall Plan), which aimed to stimulate production by way of 
dollar aid, thereby creating the conditions for an integrated Europe that 
was part of a global multilateral economy in which the dollar ruled.75 
Facing a desperate economic situation, the British government welcomed 
dollar aid, although not without some reservations. Britain pinned its 
hopes of rebuilding global power on the Sterling Area and the restoration 
73  ‘Rough Notes on Personal Letter, authored by Coombs, 3 July 1947’, NAA: A1068, ER47/70/7.
74  ‘Doc. 164, Memorandum of Conversation, meeting of Clayton (Under Secretary of State) 
and British Cabinet Members, 25 June 1947’, in Ralph E. Goodwin, Marvin W. Kranz, David H. 
Stauffer, Howard M. Smyth, O.N. Sappington, Fredrick Aandahl, Rogers P. Churchill and William 
Slany (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume 
III (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972) [hereinafter FRUS 1947]. 
75  Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 87, 96–7; ‘Doc. 140, Press Release Issued by the 
Department of State, 4 June 1947, Remarks by Marshall’, in Goodwin et al., FRUS 1947. 
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of its colonial empire in the Asia-Pacific. Britain’s trading relationships 
were based on imperial links and the ability to offset dollar deficits 
through the dollar-earning capacity of the Sterling Area countries, many 
of which were British territories or former territories in South-East Asia. 
Britain provided sterling and soft currency credit to these nations, which 
exported raw materials and consumer goods to the US. The dollars 
earnt in these sales were used to repay the British, and then deposited 
in the dollar pool. If the underdeveloped Sterling Area countries did not 
develop concurrently with Europe, there was the risk of a rapid drain on 
the dollar pool, eventually leading to the sterling becoming unviable.76 
The ERP conceived of the dollar problem as a European problem and 
accordingly sought to solve it through a regional approach. Britain, along 
with much of the Commonwealth, not only believed the dollar problem 
was an international one in which global economic rehabilitation and 
US commitments to full employment and greater purchases would be 
more effective, but also did not wish to become fully integrated into 
a European economy. Despite Britain’s insistence that the dollar problem 
was a global one, no dollar aid was granted to the Sterling Area for it 
fit within neither the United States’ Cold War strategic outlook nor its 
vision for multilateralism, centred as it was on dismantling discriminatory 
trade practices.77
South-East Asia, the solution to the dollar 
problem?
The problems apparent in the ERP were first discussed in depth by 
Australian and British officials when Chifley took part in economic 
discussions with British Cabinet ministers in July 1948 and Evatt attended 
the 1948 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. In the months 
preceding the conference, some in the Australian Treasury Department 
had raised concerns that the Marshall Plan would lead Britain to become 
increasingly reliant on Europe for both exports and imports. This would 
further limit Australia’s export capabilities, leaving postwar reconstruction 
76  Newton, ‘The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan’, 391, 
394–6; Newton, ‘Britain, the Sterling Area and European Integration’, 163, 167–9.
77  Tim Rooth, ‘Economic Tensions and Conflict in the Commonwealth, 1945–1951’, Twentieth 
Century British History 13, no. 2 (2002): 121–43, at pp. 133, 135–6; Newton, ‘The Sterling Crisis 
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Conversation, 25 June 1947’, in Goodwin et al., FRUS 1947.
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projects unfunded and contributing to rising unemployment.78 The task 
for Chifley and Evatt while in London was to find a way to balance the 
need for dollar imports with the need to conserve dollar spending.79
In a meeting with Stafford Cripps, the British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Chifley was informed that, to maintain the sterling reserves 
at a ‘safe level’ of £500 million, Britain would continue to conserve dollar 
spending, with plans to reduce imports by a further 10 per cent in the 
coming year.80 Cripps stressed that ‘everything that Australia can do to 
reduce her dollar deficit will ease the cut in dollar imports which the UK 
must make’.81 The expectation was clear: as a dominion and member of 
the Sterling Area, Australia should act to preserve Britain’s dollar position, 
likely at the expense of domestic conditions.
Despite the grim economic outlook, a hopeful long-term solution was 
presented. The solution was predicated on the stimulation of economic 
growth in the non-dollar area to create a multilateral system that did not 
rely on the dollar. To achieve this, Britain and Australia would collaborate 
in developing the industries of non-dollar countries, prioritising 
commodities with dollar earning and saving capabilities.82 This line of 
thinking formed the basis of the British government’s economic forecast. 
The long-term economic program aimed to create a multilateral Sterling 
Area, stabilise sterling reserves and reduce Britain’s per annum dollar 
deficit from £300 million in 1948 to £100 million by 1952. It was hoped 
these measures would protect the Sterling Area from any economic shock 
experienced when the ERP ended.83 
78  ‘Doc. 6, Nimmo (ABS Officer) to Treasury, 1 March 1948’ and ‘Doc. 7, Beasley (Australian 
High Commissioner in London) to Chifley, 27 March 1948’, both in Andre, DAFP, vol. 14; 
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79  ‘Doc. 21, Nimmo to Department of Treasury, 28 June 1948’, in Andre, DAFP, vol. 14; ‘“London 
Discussions”, 2 July 1947’, NAA: A571, 1948/1840.
80  ‘Notes on discussion with Cripps, 8 July 1948’, NAA: A571, 1948/1840.
81  ‘Notes on meeting of Chifley, Australian officers and Cripps, 8 July 1948’, NAA: A571, 
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When setting out the long-term economic program, Cripps had noted 
opportunities to develop dollar earning and saving capabilities in South-
East Asia.84 This region not only was home to many of the Sterling 
Area members, whose exports were mostly the raw materials needed to 
service industrial output, but also was the main area of British interests 
caught up in the throes of the nationalist movement. The political and 
economic significance of South-East Asia was underscored during the 
Prime Ministers’ Conference. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific and the Middle 
East—an area he described as the ‘middle planet’.85 Bevin saw a critical 
role for Britain and the Commonwealth, arguing that, if this area was 
carefully organised, it could become
an equilibrium between the United States on the one hand and 
Russia on the other. The great Powers represented rival ideologies 
… Between them was the United Kingdom, with her ties to the 
Commonwealth and with Europe. Here was an opportunity … 
to prevent the middle of the world from becoming embroiled in 
a conflict and to exert their [British Commonwealth] influence in 
preserving world peace.86
In this undertaking, Bevin encouraged interested Commonwealth 
members to establish a means of regular consultation ‘with the object 
of helping to put the political and economic life of countries in South-
East Asia on a firm footing’.87 While Bevin was particularly concerned 
that the area would be drawn into the Soviet sphere—a consideration 
not yet dominating Australian policymaking—his emphasis on economic 
development as a means of garnering Commonwealth influence 
nevertheless resonated with earlier assessments made by Australian 
policymakers.
Evatt immediately seized on the link between Bevin’s foreign policy 
appraisal and recent thinking on the dollar problem. He thanked Bevin 
for the attention given to ‘the development of backward areas’, describing 
84  ‘Meeting of Chifley, Australian officers and Cripps, 8 July 1948’ and ‘“Long Term Policy”, 8 July 
1948’, both in NAA: A571, 1948/1840.
85  Geographical definitions remained relatively fluid during the 1940s, and it should be noted that 
Bevin actually referenced the Near and Middle East, which would suggest western Asia. However, 
he proceeded to discuss developments in both western Asia and South-East Asia.
86  ‘Minutes Third Meeting of Prime Ministers, 12 October 1948’, NAA: A5954, 1790/1.
87  ibid.
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it as going ‘hand in hand’ with the long-term economic program.88 Evatt 
focused on the dollar problem and its implications on engagement with 
South-East Asian and South Pacific nations. While he supported the long-
term economic program, he did have reservations about the uncertainty 
of plans to develop non-dollar industries for dollar earnings and savings. 
He called for a concrete framework for promoting growth in non-dollar 
countries, including the provision of capital equipment, which ‘would 
facilitate industrial development’ and, in turn, ‘increase the domestic 
standard of living … [and] purchasing power to the advantage of Australia 
and other countries’. These suggestions received support from the other 
Commonwealth prime ministers—particularly India’s Prime Minister 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru—but did not result in any coherent policy.89
Nevertheless, both the long-term economic program and discussions 
at the Prime Ministers’ Conference are significant. They indicate the 
genesis of a Commonwealth response to the dollar problem—one centred 
on preserving British commercial power and the Sterling Area trade 
relationship in the face of challenges presented by the US-led economic 
order. Given the Chifley government’s appreciation of the value of 
economic development for promoting regional stability and developing 
future markets, Australia’s support for Commonwealth regional economic 
engagement as a solution to the dollar problem can be seen as intertwined 
with plans to develop the nation’s strategic and diplomatic capabilities.
The dollar problem continued to intensify when the US experienced 
a sharp downturn in private sector investment and domestic consumption, 
sending the nation into a year-long recession from November 1948. 
The US restricted its already small non-dollar imports, while the Sterling 
Area continued to make dollar purchases. This situation led to a large drop 
in the Sterling Area’s reserves—of some $300 million in the first quarter 
of 1949.90 Unless the dollar gap was quickly corrected, the Sterling Area 
would face a recession, necessitating further protectionist measures and 
quashing all hopes for a multilateral world trading system.91
88  ibid.
89  ‘Minutes Fifth Meeting of Prime Ministers, 13 October 1948’, NAA: A5954, 1790/1.
90  ‘Attachment, “Notes on the Dollar Problem”, Coombs to Dedman, 7 July 1949’, Papers of 
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In early July 1949, US–British treasury discussions were held, and the 
following week an emergency meeting of the Commonwealth finance 
ministers was convened in London to discuss the available options. 
The British government hoped to secure a long-term compromise with the 
US—one that acknowledged the importance of an equilibrium between 
the dollar and the Sterling Area in achieving a multilateral trading system. 
In the discussions with the US, the British tabled such a compromise, 
indicating it would improve expenditure and increase export sales in 
exchange for lower tariffs, continued recovery aid and increased purchases 
from the Sterling Area.92 In the coming months, the US government 
realised the dollar problem was increasingly becoming a Cold War problem 
and there were no gains to be had in the collapse of the Sterling Area. 
The US eventually agreed to cooperate in the proposed compromise.93
Although the British government had emphasised the importance of 
establishing multilateralism in its negotiations with the US, the Sterling 
Area remained the priority. According to a report produced following 
the emergency meeting of the Commonwealth finance ministers, all 
ministers present agreed that ‘rebuilding the sterling reserves as quickly as 
possible was of paramount importance’ and they would make ‘practicable 
contribution[s] to this end’. This involved making their economies 
as attractive as possible to dollar countries through the introduction 
of currency devaluation and tax incentives. As had been discussed in 
the long-term economic program and at the 1948 Prime Ministers’ 
Conference, the underdeveloped Sterling Area countries had a key role to 
play. There were plans to invest in these countries so they could become 
competitive producers of ‘those commodities which can earn dollars or 
which the sterling area would otherwise have to purchase for dollars’.94 
As the Cold War intensified during the closing months of 1949 and into 
1950, the Commonwealth was finally offered an opportunity to integrate 
these tentative proposals into the United States’ international outlook. 
92  ‘Meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers, Recommendations to Governments, [n.d. 
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Opportunities for Australian–US 
cooperation as the Cold War enters Asia
On 1 October 1949, the Cold War swept dramatically into Asia when the 
Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the People’s Republic of China. 
This development contributed to an increasing consensus between the 
Department of Defence and the DEA, the two departments having 
previously clashed over the strategic prioritisation of South-East Asia and 
the threat posed by communism. 95 On the basis of the changed strategic 
outlook, Burton organised a series of interdepartmental discussions to work 
towards consistency across departments when it came to regional policy. 
In addition to the ministers and senior officials from the departments of 
Trade and Customs, Commerce and Agriculture, Defence, and External 
Affairs, the Chifley government called home its diplomatic representatives 
from China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Officials from Britain and New Zealand were also invited to attend the 
plenary sessions as observers.96 
Burton’s working paper and final summary of the discussions clearly set 
out the framework for Australia’s future policy approach in its region. 
These two documents detailed fears that communist forces would use 
the arc of islands to Australia’s north as ‘stepping stones’ to the continent. 
Political and economic stability were central to the protection of this 
area, avoiding the development of an environment that would allow 
communism to take hold. It was agreed that Australia should implement 
positive measures in the region to aid the development of stable and 
moderate states that would act as a ‘buffer region between us and the 
Asian mainland’. Proposed measures included expanding bilateral trade, 
new diplomatic appointments—contacts who would not only extend 
95  ‘Joint Intelligence Committee Report 72/1949, 8 February 1949’ and ‘Moodie (Officer in 
Administrative and General Division, DEA) to Joint Intelligence Committee, 24 May 1949’, both 
in NAA: A1068, DL 47/5/6. For a full account of DEA–Defence tensions, see Christopher Waters, 
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Christopher Waters, David Lowe and Gary Woodard (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2003), 45–61.
96  ‘“Australian Policy in South East Asia”, report prepared for Burton, 12 December 1949’, NAA: 
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goodwill, but also serve as a channel for intelligence ‘gathered on the spot 
with an eye to specific Australian requirements’—and the provision of 
technical and financial assistance in the region.97 
Considering the centrality of economic development to the Chifley 
government’s previous responses to Asian nationalism and the dollar 
problem, Burton’s emphasis on investing in regional economic 
development to combat communism was not particularly novel. What 
was new, however, was that Australia’s plans for regional engagement were 
beginning to accommodate the US and its Cold War outlook. Not only 
was there an expressed willingness to cooperate with the US in providing 
assistance in South-East Asia, but also there was a changing assessment of 
Japan. The department heads agreed it was in Australia’s strategic interest 
that the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy continue, at least in so 
far as the communist victory in China had resulted in the loss of a large 
market for South-East Asian and Pacific nations and Japan represented an 
alternative market.98 Although Australia still treated Japan with caution, 
this softening position indicated a renewed willingness to cooperate with 
US plans. Fortuitously, the Truman administration was also reassessing its 
policy in the Asia-Pacific region, with outcomes overlapping with many 
of Australia’s own priorities.
The US had developed a policy for Japan as the bulwark against the USSR. 
Following the communist victory in China, however, the fear was that it 
had been the neglect of the rest of Asia that had allowed Soviet influence 
to expand into China.99 In November, the State Department presented 
President Truman with a brief considering how best to remedy this neglect. 
The communist victory in China was seen as emblematic of the new ‘tool 
of … Russian imperialism in the Far East’, and it was feared that Soviet 
influence would spread from mainland Asia down through the ‘weak and 
vulnerable’ South-East Asian nations. The State Department advised the 
president to support a program of moral and material aid to strengthen 
the area against a communist insurgency. Japan’s continued economic 
growth was fundamentally tied to this program. The nation’s political 
and economic progress would demonstrate to others ‘the advantages of 
97  ‘“Australia and Southeast Asia”, Burton working paper for Interdepartmental Discussions, 
13 November 1949’ and ‘“Australian Policy in South East Asia”, 12 December 1949’, both in NAA: 
A1068, DL47/5/6.
98  ‘“Australian Policy in South East Asia”, 12 December 1949’, NAA: A1068, DL47/5/6.
99  Claire L. Chennault, ‘The Chinese Civil War: What We Face in the Far East’, Vital Speeches of 
the Day 15, no. 15 (1949): 468–70.
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close association with the United States’. More critically, as the South-
East Asian nations developed and their purchasing power increased, Japan 
would offer an alternative regional market to China and the USSR.100
The State Department’s November report stressed the urgency of settling 
the Japanese peace treaty. This advice reinforced earlier reports, including 
those from the NSC. The US recognised that the peace treaty would give 
Japan the legitimacy and implied reform necessary for the nation to take its 
place among the Asia-Pacific community. There was also the opportunity 
to formalise the use of Japanese territory for US bases in the peace treaty’s 
terms.101 The report went on to inform US Cold War policy in Asia—
largely contained in NSC policy paper 48/2, approved on 30 December 
1949. The central tenant of NSC 48/2 was that the US would provide 
economic, technical and military assistance to friendly Asia-Pacific 
nations in an attempt to ‘increase the present Western orientation of the 
area and to assist, within our capabilities, its governments in their efforts 
to meet the minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain internal 
security’. Japan was at the top of the list of nations to be supported, with 
plans to include MFN status in the Pacific peace treaty to ensure Japan 
was positioned for economic recovery and its eventual development as 
a regional economic hub.102 
By late 1949, not only was the US government ready to negotiate Japanese 
peace, but also it had acknowledged the significance of South-East Asian 
countries, both in the sustainability of a multilateral trade system and in 
containing the spread of communism. The US was willing to provide 
these countries with the economic aid for which the Commonwealth had 
been calling since the implementation of the ERP. This convergence of 
Australian and US interests marked a renewed opportunity for regional 
cooperation. We know that Australia was aware of these opportunities 
because of reports received from the Australian Embassy in Washington—
with one such report remarking that US ‘foreign policy has turned from 
100  ‘Doc. 386, Memorandum by Jessup (Ambassador at Large) to Acheson, 16 November 1949, 
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Europe to [the] Far East’—and because NSC 48/2 was mentioned either 
directly or in passing in a number of press releases and newspapers articles 
collected by the DEA.103
The Chifley government was never able to capitalise on these opportunities 
or transfer to tangible policy the strategies developed during the later 
half of 1949, being defeated by Robert Menzies’ coalition government 
in the December election. Nevertheless, as David Lowe has noted, the 
foreign policy thinking of the Chifley government, particularly that 
which developed in the years 1948 to 1949, went on to inform the 
Menzies government’s early position towards Australia’s regional role and 
relationships with the Commonwealth and the US.104 
The Colombo Plan as a constructive 
approach to the dollar problem
In January 1950, the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Conference was 
held in the Ceylonese capital of Colombo to discuss the political and 
economic implications of the communist victory in China. Australia’s 
representative was the new Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender. 
Spender, who was ambitious and well versed in the geopolitics of Australia’s 
region, began his 16-month stint as minister with gusto. He hoped to 
transform tentative aid proposals into a concerted Commonwealth plan. 
The meeting in Colombo was the ideal platform to achieve this. Spender 
proposed a cooperative assistance program in South-East Asia that would 
create a standard of living ‘under which the ideological attractions which 
communism exerts will lose their force’.105 Along with a similar proposal 
from Ceylon’s Foreign Minister, Spender’s proposal went on to form the 
Colombo Plan.
103  These press releases and newspaper articles can be found in NAA: A1838, 3103/11/161 Part 4; 
‘Crisis in Asia: An Examination of US Policy, Remarks by Acheson, 12 January 1950’, Department of 
State Bulletin: Far Eastern Series 32 (1950): 111–18.
104  David Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War, 1948–1954 (Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 1999), 37.
105  ‘Doc. 16, “Economic Policy in South and South-East Asia”, Memorandum by Australian 
Delegation to the Commonwealth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 11 January 1950’, in David Lowe 
and Daniel Oakman (eds), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy. Volume 24: Australia and the 
Colombo Plan, 1949–1957 (Canberra: DFAT, 2004) [hereinafter DAFP, vol. 24].
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As an anti-communist program, the Colombo Plan tends to be seen 
through a Cold War lens—designed to capitalise on the symbolic 
importance of cultural and economic engagement in fighting the Cold 
War in Asia as well as mirroring Australia’s foreign policy with that of the 
US, like the Point Four Program, with hopes this would lead to a regional 
defence arrangement. Spender’s emphasis on enlisting US support for 
the Colombo Plan—in particular, his private message to Menzies that 
this was ‘the main tactical objective’—leaves little doubt the Colombo 
Plan was a  strategic solution to Asia’s sudden entrance into the Cold 
War.106 A solely strategic assessment of the Colombo Plan, however, 
overlooks the ideas about diplomatic and economic capacity-building and 
Commonwealth influence that had evolved during the Chifley years. As 
the centre of gravity of world affairs began to shift towards South-East 
Asia, 1950 provided the moment in which this thinking could be shaped 
into policy and integrated within the United States’ international outlook. 
The principal evidence that the economic capacity of the Sterling Area 
played a role in the Colombo Plan can be found in some rather neglected 
discussions during the 1950 Foreign Ministers’ Conference. During 
the second session of the conference, the dollar problem was described 
as a  Cold War problem. All present agreed that if there was a sudden 
financial crisis because of the dollar problem, a drop in the standard 
of living would invariably follow, providing the communists with the 
political and economic environment in which to flourish. To combat this, 
production would have to be increased across the non-communist world, 
promoting a unified and stable trading system.107 The link between the 
dollar problem, Commonwealth economic power and the Colombo Plan 
was more clearly noted in the eighth session of the conference. According 
to Spender: 
[T]he fuller economic development of South-East Asia would 
bring great benefits not only to the region itself but also to other 
parts of the world and, in particular, would contribute to the 
solution of the monetary problems of the sterling area. The negative 
policy of reducing dollar imports could not provide a permanent 
solution. The economic development of South-East Asia would 
provide a more constructive approach to this problem.108
106  ‘Doc. 17, Spender to Menzies, 11 January 1950’, Lowe and Oakman, DAFP, vol. 24.
107  ‘Minutes Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 9 January 1950’, NAA: A1838, 532/5/2/1. 
108  ‘Minutes Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 12 January 1950’, NAA: A1838, 532/5/2/1.
167
6. THE NEW ORDER
He went on to note promising opportunities for raw materials and food, 
‘for which there was a ready market in dollar countries’.109 Spender echoed 
tentative Commonwealth plans presented in the long-term economic 
program, seeking to reorient finance away from Europe and build up the 
Sterling Area as a market for dollar earnings and savings. These revelatory 
documents have been overlooked in histories of the Colombo Plan; nor are 
they included in the DFAT volume on the plan or the single Australian-
authored historical monograph dedicated to it.110
The Colombo Plan discussions were informed by the desire to invite the 
US to contribute to a region in which the weight of Commonwealth 
economic interests was evident. The US accepted in principle the strategic 
importance of greater dollar and sterling equilibrium and the need to 
incorporate technical assistance into its South-East Asian policy, but 
little progress had been made. This sluggishness was due to the State 
Department’s reluctance to initiate the provision of material support 
to regional associations, lest it be accused of using Asian nationalism 
to further its strategic ambitions.111 While there was an opportunity to 
attract dollar investment in an area that was so critical to Commonwealth 
commercial and strategic power, it had to be carried out prudently. In the 
memorandum outlining the Colombo Plan, Spender noted that South-
East Asia’s new significance in the Cold War ‘make[s] timely a high-level 
approach to the United States Government to represent the views of [the] 
Commonwealth … on the political and economic situation and the need 
for economic support’.112 The conference delegates supported Spender’s 
recommendations and plans were made to reconvene in the coming May 
to discuss the implementation of the Colombo Plan. However, it was 
cautioned that ‘any published version of the recommendations should be 
carefully worded, so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding’.113 
Presumably, this meant placing Cold War imperatives rather than the 
dollar problem at the forefront of discussion, as well as avoiding a brash 
request for US financial assistance.
109  ibid.
110  Lowe and Oakman, DAFP, vol. 24; Oakman, Facing Asia.
111  Lowe, ‘Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan 1950’, 165; ‘Spender to DEA, 14 January 1950’, 
Papers of Percy Spender, NLA: MS 4875/1/1.
112  ‘“Economic Policy in South and Southeast Asia”, Memorandum by the Australian Delegation 
to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 11 January 1950’, in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 
Unregistered files of the Department of External Affairs, 1920–64, NAA: A9992, 1950/1.
113  ‘Minutes Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 12 January 1950’, NAA: A1838, 532/5/2/1.
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Of course, the US did not miss the rather thinly veiled ulterior motives 
of the Colombo Plan. The US Ambassador at Large, Phillip Jessup, noted 
the problem of sterling balances was ‘closely associated’ with the Colombo 
Plan, along with the possibility of being ‘presented with a staggering bill’ 
if the US supported the plan. An article in a US newspaper described the 
upcoming conference in Sydney as 
much less a conference to discuss ‘Aid to South East Asia’ than it 
is a conference to discuss just how South East Asia can be made to 
continue its aid to the Commonwealth by supplying goods which 
the Empire can sell for much needed dollars.114 
Despite these reservations, the US agreed to join the Colombo Plan in 
November 1950, officially being admitted in February the following year.
The United States’ budding hub-and-spoke alliance system was an 
important factor contributing to its support for the Colombo Plan. 
As the Cold War entered Asia, the US was considering formal alliance 
opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region. In April 1950, the State 
Department conducted an appraisal of relations with Australia. This 
document noted that the Menzies government was more sensitive than 
its predecessor to the threat of communism and willing to cooperate with 
the US, concluding that this new attitude ‘should not be undervalued 
nor taken for granted’. This being said, Australia’s continued mistrust of 
Japan meant it could not necessarily be relied on to support US plans for 
a lenient peace treaty. The State Department, seeing a strategic opportunity 
in this insecurity, knew Australia was ‘anxious to see the US military 
position in the western Pacific strengthened’ and it believed the nation 
could not ‘afford to oppose major US policy toward Japan’.115 The hope 
here was that Australia could perhaps be convinced to support US policy 
towards Japan in return for security assurances. This logic was apparent 
in the future ANZUS Treaty signed in exchange for Australia’s support 
of a lenient peace treaty with Japan. Australia’s standing as a possible ally 
and, to that end, US support for the Colombo Plan were helped along by 
the outbreak of the Korean War and Spender’s opportunistic offer to send 
114  ‘Doc. 22, Record of the Conversation Between Jessup and Representatives of the British Foreign 
Office, London, 11 March 1950’, in Neil H. Petersen, William Z. Slany, Charles S. Sampson, John 
P. Glennon and David W. Mabon (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and 
the Pacific, Volume VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976) [hereinafter FRUS 
1950]; ‘Memorandum, Hodgson (Head of Australian Mission in Japan) to Spender, 20 April 1950’, 
NAA: A1838, 3103/11/161 Part 4.
115  ‘Doc. 96, Department of State Policy Statement, 21 April 1950’, in Petersen et al., FRUS 1950.
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Australian ground troops to Korea. For that matter, the Korean War was 
also a major factor in closing the dollar gap as US military commitments 
necessitated increased purchases from the Sterling Area, although this did 
coincide with increased commercial and technical development in South-
East Asia.116
Australia’s postwar strategy for regional engagement was multifaceted and 
highly opportunistic. Economic development in South-East Asia and the 
Pacific would preserve the Sterling Area, provide a long-term investment 
in future markets for Australian exports, promote regional goodwill and 
stability and revive British influence in the region—all of which were 
critical in building Australia’s capabilities. As the Cold War entered Asia 
and the United States’ strategic outlook expanded to include South-East 
Asia, the Menzies government was provided with a chance to transform 
the strategy developed during the Chifley years into a tangible policy. Yet, 
as the next chapter explores, the shared Cold War outlook of Australia, 
Britain and the US did not necessarily secure a Commonwealth–US 
partnership that would safeguard Australia’s national interests.




A confluence of interests: 
Australia realigns with 
the US, 1951–57
The government of Robert Menzies oversaw the signing of the ANZUS 
Treaty in 1951, marking the realisation of the Pacific security pact long 
coveted by the Australian government. By 1957, Australia had announced 
its decision to standardise military equipment for cooperation with the 
US. Some have pointed to these developments bookending the period 
1951–57 as key markers of Australia’s realignment from imperial ties and 
the British sphere of influence to that of the US and Cold War dependency. 
Such assessments tend to depict Australia’s realignment with the US as 
inevitable and seamless. Thereafter, Australia’s foreign policy ostensibly 
paralleled US directives.1 Joan Beaumont judges this to be a  ‘grossly 
simplistic’ assessment.2 The Menzies government’s foreign policy, at least 
until the 1957 endpoint of this book, can best be understood as an uneven 
transition to the US order as the government was forced to make frank 
assessments of Britain and the US, their priorities and capabilities and 
which relationship best served Australia’s national interest.
1  See T.B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1968); Alan Renouf, 
The Frightened Country (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979).
2  Joan Beaumont, ‘Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941–69’, in Ministers, Mandarins and 
Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941–1969, eds Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, 
David Lowe and Gary Woodard (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 3.
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This chapter is grounded in the uncertain and incompatible strategic 
planning of Britain and the US, exploring Australia’s efforts to forge 
a partnership between the British Commonwealth (specifically Australia, 
Britain and New Zealand) and the US, built around a common goal of 
South-East Asian security. In the wake of the 1954 crisis in South-East 
Asia, Australia came to accept the unfeasibility of coordinating US and 
British priorities in the region, deciding to put its faith in US-led regional 
defence arrangements, particularly the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), and its vision for the region. As Britain’s declining global power 
became apparent to the world in a series of crises and policy realignments, 
the Australian government was forced to acknowledge that the nation 
could no longer provide for its defensive or economic security on its 
own. This realisation hastened Australia’s move into the US sphere of 
influence, marking the departure from the Australian–British relationship 
of patronage and protection that had existed for 170 years.
ANZUS, ANZAM and the search for 
strategic planning
Prime Minister Robert Menzies opened Parliament in 1951 with a warning 
that the nation had no more than three years in which to prepare for a 
global war. The establishment of the Department of Defence Production 
and the Department of Supply to oversee government-operated factories 
for the production of defence goods, the introduction of the National 
Service Act 1951 and plans to commit a wartime expeditionary force 
to the Middle East to support British interests there are indicative of 
the real anticipation gripping Australian policymakers of a third world 
war.3 In this war, Australia would be fighting alongside Britain and the 
US, and Menzies accordingly wanted to ensure close consultation in 
the formation of global strategy. Although the US was militarily more 
powerful than Britain, Australia continued to value Britain’s experience 
in world leadership and the shared values of the Commonwealth—values 
that aligned with Australia’s national interests more closely than did those 
of the US.4 Accordingly, the Australian government—drawing on the 
3  Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, 48–50, 52–3, 88–100; CPD: Representatives, 7 March 
1951, No. 10, 77–8; Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 38 (1951), 1200–9.
4  For Australian Ambassador to the US Percy Spender’s assessment of Britain’s values and 
experience, see ‘Spender to Casey, 10 July 1951’, cited in David Lowe, Australia Between Empires: 
The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010), 145–6.
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rhetoric of an alliance of the great English-speaking nations—promoted 
the protection of the Asia-Pacific region through closer Commonwealth–
US relations. For all these efforts, however, Australia faced US reluctance 
to make tangible commitments to the defence of the Asia-Pacific and 
struggled to reconcile the fundamentally different strategic priorities of 
the two major Western powers. The nation was left unable to define its 
role, in terms of both regional and global strategic planning, and uncertain 
about what commitments to expect from its two powerful allies.
The ANZUS Treaty, signed on 1 September 1951, was a partial 
disappointment for Australia. The treaty was a vague and limited 
commitment and Percy Spender, who negotiated the treaty as Minister 
for External Affairs (soon after this, he took up the post of Australian 
Ambassador to the US), lamented to his successor, Richard Casey, that 
it was ‘difficult to find within the State Department here any real policy 
on these [Asia-Pacific] issues’.5 The reality was that, while the US was 
conscious of the strategic threats in South-East Asia and the Pacific, it 
continued to prioritise developments further north.6 Spender made it his 
ambitious personal mission as ambassador to strengthen the Australian–US 
relationship and encourage a strategic Commonwealth–US partnership. 
He sought to use the ANZUS framework as a pathway for the exchange 
of intelligence and strategic planning and to relate planning for South-
East Asia and the Pacific to the global planning that took place in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and meetings of the US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (USJCS).7
The annual meetings of the ANZUS Pacific Council presented the main 
opportunity to negotiate plans for greater coordination. At the first of 
these meetings, held in August 1952, Spender and Casey pushed for more 
details on the allocation of reserve forces to the Pacific and the machinery 
that would coordinate ANZUS defence planning. The two men hoped 
to see the creation of a ‘military committee’ of sorts, with a high-ranking 
Australian and New Zealand military representative attached to their 
5  ‘Spender to Casey, 18 March 1952’, NLA: MS 4875/1/1.
6  There is a view that the US used ANZUS to protect the Middle East—the treaty providing 
a sense of regional security for Australia and New Zealand and, in turn, freeing up forces to be sent to 
the Middle East. See, for instance, Philip Dorling, The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty: A Reconsideration, 
Flinders Political Monographs No. 4 (Adelaide: Flinders University, 1989).
7  David Lowe, ‘Mr Spender Goes to Washington: An Ambassador’s Vision of Australian–American 
Relations, 1951–58’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24, no. 2 (1996): 278–95, 
at pp. 282–3, 286–7; ‘Spender to Casey, 18 March 1952’, NLA: MS 4875/1/1. 
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respective embassies in Washington and granted access to USJCS meetings 
to ensure the two nations had a voice in global planning.8 It soon became 
clear, however, that the US did not regard the ANZUS Council as a body 
through which combined military plans would be made. Nor was the US 
willing to make concrete defence commitments.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson effectively quashed Australia’s hopes of 
being involved in global planning when he declared ‘there was no such 
animal’ and, for the time being, the ‘only real “plan” was that, on the 
outbreak of war, we should strike at the enemy’s most vulnerable point 
as soon as he showed his hand’.9 Instead, the US focused on political 
discussions and the importance of having in place a framework for 
information-sharing in the event of enemy aggression. Rather than the 
broad-ranging machinery for consultation and military planning that 
Spender and Casey had envisioned, discussions were narrowed to the 
annual ANZUS Council meetings, with a political body and a military 
body, represented by the three member nations’ foreign affairs ministries 
and military chiefs.10 Any military queries or recommendations put 
forward by Australia or New Zealand generally remained unresolved, 
bouncing back and forth between the two council bodies. What plans 
the US was willing to share were readymade without prior consultation 
or thought for the interests of the two junior partners.11 With the US 
unwilling to give Australia and New Zealand equal status in ANZUS 
defence planning, there was a need to secure an Australian voice through 
a British Commonwealth–US partnership.
The lack of a military machinery and limited opportunities to participate 
in decision-making were not the only causes for concern when it came to 
ANZUS. The treaty also highlighted the British–US struggle for power 
8  ‘Doc. 53, Minutes First Meeting of ANZUS Council, First Session, 4 August 1952’, in David 
W. Mabon (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume 
XII, Part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984) [hereinafter FRUS 1952–54, 
vol. XII].
9  ‘1 August 1952’ and ‘4 August 1952’, both in T.B. Millar (ed.), Australian Foreign Minister: 
The Diaries of R.G. Casey (London: Collins, 1972), 84–6.
10  ‘Doc. 69, Appendix A, Lovett (Secretary of Defense) to Acheson, 4 September 1954’, in 
Mabon, FRUS 1952–54, vol. XII; ‘“A Note on ANZUS Military Machinery—Its Nature and 
Tasks”, Department of Defence memorandum, 6 October 1952’, in Prime Minister’s Department: 
Correspondence files, annual single number series [classified] with occasional C [classified] suffix 
[Main correspondence files series of the agency], 1913–, NAA: A1209, 1957/4252.
11  Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, 154–5; Andrew Kelly, ANZUS and the Early 
Cold War: Strategy and Diplomacy Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1945–56 
(Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2018), 95–7.
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and tensions surrounding strategic priorities in the Far East. To understand 
these tensions, the ANZAM arrangement and British strategic assessments 
throughout 1951–52 must be examined. Originally formed in 1949, 
ANZAM was both an area of responsibility and a service-level organisation 
designed to coordinate Australian, British and New Zealand wartime 
command in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. The ANZAM area 
overlapped with the US Pacific Command and both Britain and Australia 
saw early on the need for basic coordination with the US. Attempts to 
coordinate planning began in 1948, when Australia’s Chief of Naval Staff, 
Vice-Admiral John Collins, approached the US Pacific Fleet. After a series 
of discussions between Collins, who was acting on behalf of Australia, 
Britain and New Zealand, and Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander-
in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, an agreement was signed in September 
1951. The main feature of the Radford–Collins agreement was the 
creation of a maritime boundary of responsibility between the ANZAM 
area and Radford’s area of command in which sea communications would 
be jointly surveyed during peacetime and protected in the event of war. 
In terms of administrative ease and open communication between Britain 
and its Pacific dominions and the US, the Radford–Collins agreement 
was a useful development. Beyond this, however, as both David Stevens 
and Alastair Cooper note, it did not offer access to the intelligence or 
high-level strategic planning that Australia desired.12
Despite its interests in the Asia-Pacific region, Britain had not been 
included in the ANZUS Treaty. This exclusion was largely due to the 
United States’ refusal to assume responsibility for defending the nation’s 
colonial interests. Throughout 1952, the British government campaigned 
for observer status at ANZUS Council meetings, warning against the 
appearance of weakened British–US and British–Antipodean relations as 
a result of its exclusion.13 While both Australia and New Zealand lent 
their support to British association, the US was unswayed: ANZUS 
membership remained unchanged and Britain was not associated in 
any capacity.14
12  David Stevens, The Australian Centenary History of Defence. Volume 3: The Royal Australian Navy 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 163–4; Alastair Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads: Anglo-
Australian Naval Relations, 1945–1971’, The Journal of Military History 58, no. 4 (1994): 699–718, 
at pp. 704–5.
13  ‘“ANZUS: United Kingdom Pressure for Observer Status”, 13 October 1952’, NAA: A1209, 
1957/4252.
14  ‘Doc. 54, Minutes First Meeting of ANZUS Council, Second Session, 4 August 1952’, in Mabon, 
FRUS 1952–54, vol. XII.
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Britain’s failed campaign for association with ANZUS coincided with 
a major review of global strategy. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) 
concluded that nuclear deterrence was the most effective way to avoid a 
hot war with the Soviets. This was not so in the case of the Chinese threat 
to mainland Asia and South-East Asia, which were the areas anticipated 
to be the most susceptible to aggressive communist insurgencies. Britain 
needed to establish long-term planning and expand its commitments in the 
Asia-Pacific region; however, it could not afford to do this alone while also 
investing in its nuclear capabilities. The COS accordingly recommended 
the reworking of ANZAM as a strategic planning body in which Australia 
and New Zealand would assume planning and operational responsibilities 
for the region.15 The details of the review of ANZAM were first formally 
discussed in a December 1952 meeting between Menzies, British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney 
Holland. The ANZAM review was not simply about negotiating a more 
equitable distribution of the cost of defending Commonwealth interests; it 
was also about seeking to counterbalance ANZUS and US domination of 
the determination of strategic priorities in South-East Asia and the Pacific. 
To Britain, the outside observer, its exclusion from ANZUS appeared to 
be a deliberate blow to its influence and an attempt to undermine the 
Commonwealth relationship. The British government feared that, in the 
event of conflict in South-East Asia or the Pacific, ANZUS would become 
the primary planning body—one in which it would have no voice.16
Neither Menzies nor Holland wanted to see ANZUS debased, and 
Churchill accordingly reassured them that his hope was to expand the 
strategic partnership between Australia, Britain, New Zealand and the US 
with the creation of a joint ANZAM–ANZUS committee as the central 
machinery for planning and operations in the Asia-Pacific area.17 The 
Five-Power Staff Agency, established in 1952 and comprising military 
representatives from Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand and the 
US, was the potential framework for an ANZUS–ANZAM linkage. 
Menzies and Holland agreed that ANZUS, with its exclusion of Britain 
and broadly defined area of strategic concern, was an inadequate basis 
for the defence of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The men agreed to 
15  ‘“Review of Defence Policy and Global Strategy”, COS Report, 7 February 1952’, in Records 
of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee—Reports of the Joint 
Planning Staff and successors, TNA: DEFE 6/20/17.
16  Umetsu, ‘The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’, 509–10.
17  ‘Minutes of Meeting between Churchill, Menzies and Holland, 12 December 1952’, NAA: 
A1209, 1957/4252.
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a future meeting of Britain’s, Australia’s and New Zealand’s chiefs of staff 
committees to discuss ANZAM planning and how to convince the US of 
its significance. With all this in place, the three men agreed ‘it would then 
follow that the [strategic] planning … should fall into the hands of a joint 
ANZUS/ANZAM Committee’.18
Despite initial support for revising ANZAM, developments were slow. 
The Australian government feared the Five-Power Staff Agency would 
subsume ANZAM, ANZUS or both, diminishing what little scope 
Australia had in regional strategic planning.19 The government also 
feared it would offend the US or Britain—a situation that led Casey to 
question whether ‘membership of the Commonwealth precludes any 
of us from having friends outside’.20 To a certain extent, these concerns 
were warranted. Britain’s vision of an ANZAM–ANZUS linkage failed 
to appreciate the fact that central to the significance of ANZAM was 
the protection of colonial interests—interests the US was not willing 
to defend. As will be discussed, this question of colonial interests and 
a willingness to defend broader South-East Asia was an early sign of the 
challenge Australia would face in integrating US and British interests into 
plans for regional defence.
The joint COS discussions were postponed until mid-1953, during 
which time it became clear that the Five-Power Staff Agency would not 
form the basis of military planning and command in South-East Asia and 
the Pacific. It was an ad hoc body designed to aid in information exchange 
and consider possible responses in the event of Chinese aggression.21 Now 
was the time to revisit ANZAM and consider alternative approaches to 
joint US–Commonwealth strategic planning for South-East Asia and 
the Pacific. Over five days in October 1953, the Australian, British and 
New Zealand defence chiefs met in Melbourne to discuss ANZAM 
arrangements. It was decided the ANZAM area would be reworked as the 
machinery for strategic planning by way of a permanent ANZAM chief 
of staff established in Australia. It was also agreed that responsibility for 
the defence of Malaya—the epicentre of British Commonwealth power 
18  ‘Minutes of Meeting, 12 December 1952’, NAA: A1209, 1957/4252.
19  ‘“Some thoughts on the ANZUS–ANZAM Item in London”, Watt memorandum, [n.d. (1952)]’, 
NAA: A1209, 1957/4252.
20  ‘7 September 1953’, in Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, 103.
21  ‘Foster to Matthews, 29 May 1953, NARA: RG 59, 790.5/5-2953’, cited in Kelly, ANZUS and 
the Early Cold War, 109; ‘Doc. 86, Memorandum, Allison (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs) to Dulles (Secretary of State), 29 January 1953’, in Mabon, FRUS 1952–54, vol. XII. 
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in the region—should be transferred solely from Britain to the ANZAM 
chief of staff. Crucial to the protection of Malaya was the creation of the 
British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR)—an idea first 
tabled at the 1953 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference—which 
required the three nations to train and equip a joint military force for 
forward deployment in the event of unrest in Malaya.22 The FESR was 
not ready for deployment until 1955, and its implications for Australia’s 
strategic relationship with Britain and the US will be returned to.
Crisis in South-East Asia
From late 1953, the threat of a global war gradually receded, only to be 
replaced with the increasing chance of limited war in South-East Asia. 
The ongoing power struggle in Indochina reached its peak in the early 
months of 1954, when the Viet Minh launched an offensive against the 
French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Although reconciliation talks were 
planned to commence in Geneva in April, the US government was 
sceptical about whether these would deliver a settlement for long-term 
stability in South-East Asia. The nation accordingly sought to prepare for 
a military intervention. In early April, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
approached the Australian and New Zealand ambassadors in Washington, 
encouraging their respective governments to participate in the prospective 
united action. Dulles also hoped that, in addition to their contribution, 
the Pacific dominions could push Britain ‘in the right direction’—that is, 
towards participation.23
Spender was particularly buoyed by the United States’ eagerness to 
finally commit forces to South-East Asia and encouraged his government 
to join the united action. This enthusiasm can be better understood 
in the context of fears about US isolationism. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ approach to foreign policy focused on closer 
working relationships within existing alliances like ANZUS and Spender 
was desperately looking for ways in which Australia could capitalise on 
this new approach and demonstrate its usefulness as an ally. Spender 
22  ‘Defence Talks Melbourne 1953—Sir John Harding Chief of the Imperial General Staff/
Australia and New Zealand’, NAA: A1209, 1957/5023.
23  ‘Doc. 687, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 April 1951’, in Neil H. Petersen (ed.), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1 (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1982) [hereinafter FRUS 1952–54, vol. XIII].
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feared inactivity on the proposed united action would offend the US and 
threaten prospects for future interest in the defence of Australia’s area of 
strategic concern.24 Casey shared some of Spender’s anxieties, penning in 
his diary that Washington would not ‘go in alone’ and a failure to respond 
may see them ‘change their Southeast Asia attitude’.25 Despite genuine 
concerns surrounding both the situation in Indochina and maintaining 
US interest in South-East Asia, the Australian government declined to 
join the united action. Andrew Kelly notes that the uncertain extent of 
military commitments and the recent Petrov affair, which had heightened 
concerns about the threat of domestic communism, contributed to this 
decision.26 Above all, however, Australia was guided by allegiance to 
Britain. London was not willing to act before the Geneva conference and 
peaceful alternatives had been considered and Canberra would not act 
without London, with a Cabinet document describing such a move as 
‘a terrible innovation for Australia to promote, for it would be the first 
cleavage in Commonwealth unity’.27
The Geneva conference opened on 26 April. While talks were under way, 
the Viet Minh achieved a decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu. The task 
now at hand was to settle on a diplomatic solution in Indochina. The 
conference closed on 21 July with the signing of the Geneva Accords, 
which stipulated a truce and a temporary partitioning of Indochina, with 
the French occupying the south and the Viet Minh the north. The US 
government refused to endorse the accords and, as far as it was concerned, 
this arrangement simply consolidated the communists’ position in South-
East Asia and provided a foothold from which to launch further attacks. 
In a pre-emptive effort to deter any further advances, the US government 
immediately began discussing options for a collective security pact in 
South-East Asia. Within six weeks of the delivery of the Geneva Accords, 
the members of the Five-Power Staff Agency and Pakistan, Thailand and 
the Philippines convened in Manila to sign SEATO.28
24  Lowe, Australia Between Empires, 152–3. The New Look approach to US foreign policy 
is outlined in ‘Doc. 101, Report to the NSC by Lay (Executive Secretary of NSC), 30 October 
1953’, in Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, 
National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984) 
[hereinafter FRUS 1952–54, vol. II].
25  ‘7 April 1954’, in Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, 124.
26  Kelly, ANZUS and the Early Cold War, 122–4.
27  ‘Menzies and Casey to Spender, 24 June 1954’, in Secretary to Cabinet/Cabinet Secretariat: 
Menzies and Holt Ministries—Cabinet files ‘C’ single number series, 1949–85, NAA: A4940, C987.
28  Damien Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon: SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
NUS Press, 2012), 25–8.
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SEATO was promoted as a NATO-like organisation for South-East Asia, 
and the Australian government approached the proposed treaty with clear 
expectations that it should provide the military machinery necessary for the 
exchange of intelligence and provisions for reserve forces for deployment 
in the event of a regional conflict.29 Much to Australia’s disappointment, 
SEATO was fundamentally different to NATO. While SEATO agreed 
to respond to armed aggression in the treaty area as a common threat, it 
did not earmark forces for commitments in the treaty area. Article 5 of 
SEATO provided for a consultative council through which the members 
could meet and discuss ‘matters concerning the implementation of this 
treaty’, but this did not actually constitute the command structure desired 
by Australia. Furthermore, the US included a provision that it would only 
respond to communist aggression in the treaty area.30 The constrained 
nature of SEATO was a pragmatic step to protect US freedom of action, 
ensuring the nation did not have to make specific military commitments 
in South-East Asia and that it could respond to threats on a case-by-case 
basis.31
In private discussions and in Manila, senior DEA and defence officials 
questioned the narrow anti-communist scope and the usefulness of 
a defence organisation that did not actually offer specific military 
commitments, appearing as more of ‘a simple political organisation’.32 
Despite these reservations, Australia lent its support to SEATO, conceding 
that it ‘would not be prepared to press it with the Americans beyond 
a certain point’.33 Menzies—no doubt mindful the opportunity may 
not present itself again—informed Parliament that Australia could not 
expect its ‘great friends … to accept commitments while our own attitude 
29  ‘“Proposed Establishment of SEATO—Report on Defence Aspects”, Joint Planning Committee 
report on meetings held 16, 21, 23 and 26 July 1954’ and ‘“South-East Asian Collective Security 
Organisation”, Discussion between McBride (Minister of Defence) and Casey, 19 August 1954’, both 
in NAA: A816, 11/301/938.
30  ‘Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), September 8, 1954’, in US Department 
of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents. Volume 1 (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1957–58), 912–15.
31  Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon, 26–7.
32  ‘“South-East Asian Collective Security Organisation”, 19 August 1954’, NAA: A816, 11/301/938; 
‘“Drafting of SEATO—‘Aggression’ or ‘Communist Aggression’?”, DEA working paper, 24 August 
1954’, NAA: A1838, TS654, 8/14/4/1A. Casey voiced these reservations while in Manila. For details of 
this see ‘5 September 1954’, ‘6 September 1954’ and ‘7 September 1954’, in Millar, Australian Foreign 
Minister, 178–83. 
33  ‘Notes for Casey, SEATO Conference, 31 August 1954’, NAA: A1838, TS654, 8/14/4/1A.
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remains tentative or conditional’.34 Ultimately, a limited security pact for 
South-East Asia that included the US and Britain was better than nothing 
at all.
Arguably the most important aspect of the creation of SEATO and the 
unfolding crisis in South-East Asia was the climate it created for British–
US strategic cooperation. Lowe has argued that the lack of South-East 
Asian member nations underscores the true significance of SEATO. Rather 
than a symbol of regional cooperation, SEATO was ‘an opportunity to 
integrate and expand on Australia’s defence relationships with Britain and 
the United States’.35 The earliest opportunity to pursue integrated US–
British defence planning for South-East Asia came in the early months of 
1955. Menzies was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference, where he, Churchill and Holland discussed the revision of 
ANZAM. Along with the creation of the FESR, the ANZAM chiefs 
had developed a plan (codenamed Hermes) for the defence of Malaya. 
Hermes rested on the assessment that the Kra Isthmus was the key line of 
defence. In the event of communist aggression and threat to the isthmus, 
all ANZAM resources would be mobilised towards preserving this line.36 
Menzies was willing to endorse Hermes with the qualification that all 
planning for the defence of Malaya received US endorsement. This 
qualification was largely a continuation of the original approach to US–
ANZAM linkages discussed in December 1952, whereby it was believed 
that if the US saw the significance of ANZAM and the Commonwealth 
members were making serious contributions rather than simply expecting 
the US to bear the bulk of the cost, it would be willing to commit to joint 
planning and action.37
Following the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Menzies continued on 
to Washington, bringing with him a draft of a statement guaranteeing 
‘effective cooperation’ in the event of the ANZAM powers deploying 
‘substantial forces for the defence of Malaya’.38 The US government was 
not willing to approve such a strongly worded document and instead 
provided a statement that the US ‘considers the defence of Southeast Asia, 
34  CPD: Representatives, 5 August 1954, No. 31, 67.
35  Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, 175.
36  ‘Operation “HERMES”’, NAA: A1209, 1957/4250.
37  Edwards and Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 162–8.
38  ‘Doc. 35, Menzies to Dulles, 16 March 1955’, in Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon 
(eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printer, 1985) [hereinafter FRUS 1955–57, vol. I].
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of which Malaya is an integral part, to be of very great importance’ and 
‘effective cooperation’ was implied in SEATO.39 Menzies misunderstood 
the US statement, believing it to be a commitment to joint ANZAM–US 
action in the defence of Malaya. It was based on this misunderstanding 
that he triumphantly announced his government’s decision to station 
Australian troops in Malaya as part of the FESR.40
The US government quickly clarified Menzies’ misunderstanding. 
Radford, now serving as the Chairman of the USJCS, informed Canberra 
the US had in no way committed to joint ANZAM–US planning. 
US defence planning was directed towards deterring aggression and 
defending the whole of South-East Asia. The defence of Malaya could 
only be viewed in this context.41 Casey was sent to plead Australia’s case 
in Washington, where he, too, was informed the US would not prioritise 
the defence of Malaya—an approach Radford described as ‘last-ditch’ 
defeatism predicated on the loss of the rest of South-East Asia. In the 
wake of these revelations, Australian strategic planning was, by Casey’s 
reckoning, ‘left … in the air’.42
The State Department offered some suggestions about how to proceed. 
It believed the best way to defend Malaya from external communist 
threats was containment. Australia should now direct its energies towards 
SEATO and the broader regional fight against communism.43 A similar 
proposal had also been floated in the Defence Committee with the view 
that the defence of Malaya should now be ‘relegated to the category of 
a reserve objective’ within a broader strategy of defending the whole of 
South-East Asia.44 Realising the fundamental challenge of convincing the 
US to protect British possessions and the value of the United States’ broad 
commitment to South-East Asian security as opposed to Britain’s limited 
commitment to protecting Malaya, the Australian government took on 
39  ‘Doc. 36, Memorandum of a Conversation by State Department, 18 March 1955’ and ‘Doc. 37, 
Dulles to Menzies, 18 March 1955’, both in Keefer and Mabon, FRUS 1955–57, vol. I.
40  David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far-East, 1952–1957’, Journal of Strategic Studies 
16 (1993): 511–38, at pp. 525–6.
41  ‘Doc. 65, Radford to Spender, 28 July 1955’, in Keefer and Mabon, FRUS 1955–57, vol. I; 
‘“Review of ANZAM Planning by US Joint Chiefs of Staff ”, Defence Committee Report, 30 August 
1955’, NAA: A1290, 1957/4857.
42  ‘12 September 1955’ and ‘13 September 1955’, in Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, 214–16.
43  ‘Doc. 71, US Minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting, 24 September 1955’, in Keefer and 
Mabon, FRUS 1955–57, vol. I; ‘24 September 1955’, in Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, 217–19.
44  ‘McKnight to Brown, 30 August 1955’, NAA: A1290, 1957/4857; ‘Defence Committee 
Meeting, [n.d. (on or before 30 August 1955)]’, NAA: A1290, 1957/4857.
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these recommendations. Australia abandoned the Hermes plan, much to 
Britain’s annoyance, and the FESR in Malaya was recast as a contribution 
to SEATO as a reserve force for the whole of South-East Asia.45
Japan and the economic aspects 
of SEATO
The threat of communist insurgency in South-East Asia also shaped 
Australia’s diplomatic outlook, forcing the nation to reconsider its policy 
towards Japan and the United States’ regional strategy. In the containment 
of communism, the US saw the ‘denial’ of Japan to the Soviets and 
maintenance of Japanese goodwill towards the West as crucial. This was 
codified in NSC 48/2.46 The US accordingly campaigned for a non-
punitive peace treaty that signalled Japan’s legitimacy as a reformed nation 
ready to return to the international community. Such a treaty would allow 
economic revival and remilitarisation in the future. In spite of ANZUS, 
the Australian government and public remained reluctant to embrace the 
former enemy, with racialised hostility and lingering misgivings about 
allowing Japan’s economy to again reach a war potential.47
Under the leadership of Casey and his departmental secretary Alan Watt, 
the DEA continued to prioritise increasing Australia’s representation in 
its region of strategic interest. Casey’s first overseas trip as minister was to 
South-East and East Asia. Following this trip, new diplomatic postings 
were made in the newly independent nations in the region.48 Casey was 
an ardent anti-communist and he saw the protection of the region from 
communist subversion as a central feature of regional engagement.49 The 
Colombo Plan, accordingly, remained a significant tool and membership 
45  Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far-East’, 528–9.
46  ‘Doc. 145, Note by Souers (Executive Secretary NSC) to the NSC, 4 October 1949’, in Reid 
and Glennon, FRUS 1949.
47  David Walton, Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia: Early Post-War Initiatives in Regional 
Diplomacy (New York: Nova Publishers, 2012), 27–9, 32–3.
48  Richard Casey, Friends and Neighbours: Australia and the World (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1954), 
26; ‘19 August 1951’, in Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, 37–40; ‘“Report on visit to South-East 
Asia and East Asia by Minister for External Affairs”, 21 September 1951’, NAA: A1838, 532/6/2.
49  Christopher Waters, ‘Casey: Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 3 (2005): 380–8, at pp. 384–6; James Cotton, ‘R.G. Casey and 
Australian International Thought: Empire, Nation, Community’, The International History Review 
33, no. 1 (2011): 95–113, at pp. 103–6.
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was expanded throughout the early 1950s.50 With new members being 
added and Japan’s foreign economic policy directed towards rebuilding 
regional relationships through economic diplomacy, the Japanese 
government hoped to participate in the Colombo Plan. In the lead-up to 
the 1952 meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, Britain 
raised the possibility of Japanese observer status. The following year, the 
Japanese government formally applied for membership. Both proposals 
were rejected following Australia’s firm opposition.51 In March 1954, with 
talk of Japan again seeking membership, Australia maintained its view that 
this would be ‘premature’.52 Meanwhile, Australia continued to restrict 
Japan’s access to its markets, despite the nation being its second-largest 
export market. Japan was left to face a host of import restrictions, leading 
to a two-way trade relationship at a ratio of 18:1.53 Along with straining 
its diplomatic and economic relationships with Japan, the Australian 
government’s position countered NSC 13/2 and NSC 48/2. It denied 
Japan opportunities for economic growth and regional integration, so 
hindering its ability to become the bulwark against communism in the 
Asia-Pacific.
Given Australia’s unwillingness to embrace Japan, it is somewhat surprising 
that, in October 1954, it sponsored the nation’s entrance into the 
Colombo Plan as a donor nation.54 Australia’s softening attitude towards 
Japan is best understood in the context of the 1954 crisis in South-East 
Asia and the increasing threat posed by communist China. Both the 
US and Britain were acutely aware of the importance of maintaining 
friendly relations with Japan and developing the Japanese economy as 
an alternative to China. Throughout June–July 1954, both the US and 
Britain—the latter having recently adopted a new policy towards Japan 
that aimed to ‘prevent economic distress which would foster communism 
by maintaining as high a level of trade between Japan and the sterling 
50  New regional members were Laos (1951), Nepal and Burma (Myanmar) (1952), Indonesia 
(1953) and Thailand, Japan and the Philippines (1954).
51  Ai Kobayashi, ‘Australia and Japan’s Admission to the Colombo Plan’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 60, no. 4 (2014): 518–33, at pp. 522–5; ‘Australian High Commissioner’s Office 
Karachi to DEA, 10 March 1952’, NAA: A1838, 2080/13; ‘“Japan May Join Colombo Plan”, 
The Age, [Melbourne], 6 October 1953’, cutting, in NAA: A1838, 2080/13.
52  ‘Walker to Watt, 17 March 1954’, NAA: A1838, 2080/13.
53  Peter Golding, Black Jack McEwen: Political Gladiator (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1996), 173–5; Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 42 (Canberra: Commonwealth 
Government Printer, 1956), 301. Figure for 1952–53.
54  ‘“Australia Got Japan Into Colombo Plan”, The Herald, [Melbourne], 6 October 1954’, cutting, 
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area’—petitioned Australia to improve bilateral relations and do more to 
‘bring Japan into the community of nations’.55 This pressure triggered 
a DEA submission to Cabinet reviewing Australian–Japanese relations, 
submitted by Casey on 28 July.
Casey’s submission stressed that, with Japan’s liberal democracy in its 
infancy and the nation’s economy still rebuilding, the potential remained 
for economic and political crisis and, in turn, an environment that 
would encourage communist subversion. This situation would only 
worsen if Japan continued to face a hostile neighbourhood with limited 
opportunities for economic growth. Australia’s policy towards Japan had 
to be designed to prevent a close relationship between it and China. 
This could be best achieved by providing Japan with the opportunities 
necessary for ‘meeting her economic difficulties by expanding her export 
trade, and for developing her political and economic life and institutions 
in a way that will strengthen Japan’s association with the West’.56 On 17 
August, the prime minister and Cabinet ‘reluctantly’ agreed that Australia 
would ‘adopt a more liberal policy towards Japan’. Cabinet also agreed 
that supporting the nation’s membership of the Colombo Plan would 
be the most effective first step towards implementing this new policy; 
Casey described Japan’s interest in the plan as a ‘rather heaven-sent 
opportunity’.57
Strategic planning and the little-known economic aspects of SEATO also 
played a role in Australia’s decision to support Japan’s accession to the 
Colombo Plan. As the Australian government reviewed its policy towards 
Japan, SEATO was being finalised. The US had initially hoped Japan 
would be a member—an idea that was soon set aside due to the nation’s lack 
of armed strength necessary to contribute to South-East Asian defence.58 
This was not the end of US hopes for Japan’s association with SEATO. 
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The State Department developed plans for the inclusion of an economic 
provision in SEATO for the purpose of a united economic strategy to 
counter communism. Plans were secretly made to link Colombo with 
this economic provision.59 In an August meeting between Dulles and 
Harold Stassen, Director of the US Foreign Operations Administration, 
it was agreed that, if a Colombo–SEATO link was ‘adopted as the basis 
of operations’, it would be ‘essential that Japan should be brought in to 
the Colombo Plan’.60 The importance of Japan in this relates back to 
US plans to support the nation’s regional economic integration. Japan’s 
initial donor contributions to the Colombo Plan were modest, at only 
US$40,000.61 Nevertheless, association was symbolically important in the 
rehabilitation of its regional image—a symbolism the State Department 
openly acknowledged, with one official noting ‘political reason was as 
important as economic’.62 The SEATO–Colombo Plan linkage was also 
strategically significant to the US as it fortified US diplomatic, military 
and economic influence in South-East Asia.
Australia’s support for Japan’s membership of the Colombo Plan and the 
economic aspects of SEATO was guided by anxiety about the United 
States’ commitment to the defence of South-East Asia and the need 
to demonstrate its reliability as an ally. Australia was aware of plans to 
institute a SEATO–Colombo Plan linkage, and a planning brief for the 
Manila conference reveals the nation was ‘chary’ about the proposal.63 
Despite this, Australia went on to support Article 3 of SEATO, which 
made a general commitment to economic and technical assistance and 
cooperation. This cooperation took the form of SEATO aid being 
injected into the Colombo Plan by way of strategically prioritising the 
organisation’s projects.64 That Australia was mindful of relations with 
the US—perhaps even responding to US pressure, as David Walton has 
suggested—is evidenced in the DEA’s Cabinet submission supporting 
Japan’s admission to the Colombo Plan. The submission noted that if 
Australia continued to oppose Japanese membership it may face ‘isolation 
59  ‘Doc. 267, Minutes of Meeting on Southeast Asia, 24 July 1954’, in Mabon, FRUS 1952–54, 
vol. XII; ‘Australian Embassy in Washington to DEA, 23 August 1954’, NAA: A1838, 3103/9/3/8.
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54, vol. XII.
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among the Western donor countries’.65 These Western members were 
Britain, New Zealand and the US—with all of which Australia had some 
form of regional security arrangement.
The Menzies government’s shifting policy towards Japan in 1954 
contributed in part to the 1957 Australia–Japan Agreement on Commerce, 
which heralded Australia’s rapid integration into its regional markets. This 
marked a critical point in Australia’s move towards alignment with the 
US, with the nation finally accepting, if not yet embracing, US plans to 
develop Japan as a regional economic hub and see it reintegrated into the 
Asia-Pacific community.
The retreat from the British orbit
By the end of 1955, there were clear indicators that US-led strategic 
planning, rather than an integrated US–British system, offered Australia 
the greatest assurance for regional security. These strategic imperatives 
did not exist in a vacuum and revelations in 1956–57 of the true extent 
of Britain’s military and economic capabilities expedited Australia’s 
realignment from the British orbit to that of the US. In these years, the 
Australian government was forced to frankly assess Britain’s capabilities 
and the value of the Commonwealth connection, finding they no longer 
met the nation’s economic or defensive needs. These two pillars of the 
Commonwealth connection were quickly crumbling.
The Menzies government took office with a preference for a multilateral 
world trading system and the promise that it would do away with practices 
that protected the Sterling Area and British economic interests at the 
expense of Australia’s national development. This led the government to 
abolish petrol rationing and approach the US for an individual loan of 
US$100 million within seven months of coming into power—steps that 
put pressure on the Sterling Area dollar reserves and, in turn, endangered 
Britain’s vulnerable economy.66 Throughout the early 1950s, Britain 
continued to struggle with its dollar trade and overall balance of payments, 
65  Walton, Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia, 31; ‘“Japan and the Colombo Plan”, Cabinet 
Submission by DEA, 27 August 1954’, NAA: A4940, C1009.
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leaving the nation to once again call on the members of the Sterling Area to 
introduce import restrictions in an attempt to maintain the Sterling Area 
reserves. While Australia did introduce import restrictions, there were 
general cuts to all sectors and from all sources, including the Sterling Area. 
Australia’s finance and trade policymakers maintained that the Sterling 
Area as it existed was unsustainable and the import restrictions needed to 
stabilise its reserves were anathema to a multilateral world trading system. 
Australia unsuccessfully promoted the resumption of sterling–dollar 
convertibility and integration into the multilateral system.67
Australia’s frustration with the discriminatory practices that sustained the 
British economy and the Sterling Area was heightened by problems in 
Australian–British bilateral trade. Since the end of World War II, Australian 
policymaking had been mobilised towards national development. The 
nation’s primary and secondary industries steadily expanded, as did the 
markets to which goods were being sold.68 With this rapid growth came 
the need for a larger population—to both service and purchase from 
the Australian economy. Encouraged by assisted passages and displaced 
persons programs, the annual population growth rate reached a postwar 
peak of 3.3 per cent per annum in 1950, compared with just 1 per cent at 
the outbreak of the war.69 The national development program necessitated 
a high volume of imports but, despite expanding market opportunities, 
Australia was left with a balance-of-payments problem that threatened to 
trigger a recession.70 
Britain, Australia’s largest trading partner, was a significant contributor 
to the nation’s balance-of-payments problem. British imports were 
expanding much faster than the exports Australia sold in return. 
By 1954–55, the disparity in two-way trade was upwards of £90 million 
annually.71 There had always been periods of imbalance in the Australian–
British trade relationship; by the mid-1950s, however, it was clear that 
this was a long-term trend. The British market for Australian goods was 
67  Lee, ‘Australia and the British Commonwealth’, 455–9, 462.
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shrinking. The ‘disappointingly negative’ state of Australian–British trade 
relations could largely be attributed to an unequal preference system.72 
In line with the 1932 Ottawa Agreements, Britain and Australia extended 
certain concessions to one another; however, these were not shared evenly. 
While 86 per cent of British exports received preference in Australia, only 
43 per cent of Australian exports received preference in return. Britain 
also enjoyed a higher average margin of preference: 14 per cent compared 
with the 9 per cent afforded to Australia. The British government granted 
generous subsidies to domestic producers in an attempt to stimulate 
domestic and international sales. Agricultural producers were the principal 
benefactors of these subsidies and Australia, with agriculture among its 
largest exports, was left further disadvantaged in the British market.73
Politicians, economists and exporters alike called for a review of trade 
relations with Britain.74 Preoccupation with the implementation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the fact that responsibility 
for trade, tariffs and industry was spread across three different departments 
meant that little came from these appeals.75 In January 1956, however, 
the Menzies ministry underwent a major restructure, including the 
creation of the Department of Trade. John McEwen and John Crawford, 
both previously of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture, were 
appointed minister and secretary, respectively. The two men immediately 
set out to address the imbalance in the Australian–British trading 
relationship with a proposal to renegotiate the Ottawa Agreements. 
Cabinet approved the renegotiation of the Ottawa Agreements on 10 May 
1956 and, on 9 November, after several weeks of hard-fought bargaining, 
the new agreement was finalised.76
McEwen was careful to stress the revision of the Ottawa Agreements was 
not an attack on Britain or the imperial preference system. Rather, he 
believed the Australian–British trading relationship was a ‘natural one’ 
that had become unbalanced as a result of the immense changes in the 
72  Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 352.
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international economic situation and in the individual economies of 
Australia and Britain in years since the Ottawa Agreements had originally 
been negotiated. The reappraisal of the agreements would ostensibly 
return equilibrium to the relationship.77 Some are convinced by this 
argument. Stuart Ward, for instance, writes that the renewal of the Ottawa 
Agreements 
did not, in any fundamental sense, provoke a wider examination 
of the steadily widening gap between British commercial interests 
and Australian national aspirations … Nor is there any evidence 
that the Ottawa renegotiation stimulated any … reflection about 
the declining relevance of the old imperial ties.
He goes on to note the importance of British race patriotism to the 
Australian psyche well into the 1960s as evidence of this.78 While it is 
true the revision of the Ottawa Agreements did not mark the end of 
Australian–British economic ties, it was an acknowledgement by Australia 
that it was no longer satisfied with the economic benefits offered in the 
imperial connection.
Much as he tried to soften it, McEwen could not hide the fact that Britain 
was a shrinking market for Australian goods. It will be recalled that F.H. 
Stewart had warned of this development as early as 1935 and H.C. 
Coombs echoed his concerns in 1947. Australia could not maintain its 
national development program with a continuing and widening payments 
imbalance. Parenthetically, as McEwen observed in a February statement 
to the House of Representatives, if imports were restricted as a cost-saving 
measure, employment and industrialisation would stagnate, exports 
would decline—particularly as foreign markets would likely respond to 
Australia’s import restrictions with their own such restrictions—and the 
standard of living would decline.79
Australia’s balance-of-payments problem was not simply a matter of 
improving the nation’s standard of living, it was also linked to national 
defence. Although he was the Minister for Trade, McEwen took a great 
deal of interest in defence developments. He believed Australia needed 
77  ‘Cabinet Submission by McEwen, 16 April 1956’ and ‘“Proposals concerning the United 
Kingdom and Australia Trade Agreement”, Cabinet Submission by McEwen, 7 May 1956’, both in 
NAA: M58, 219 Part 2; John McEwen and Robert V. Jackson, John McEwen: His Story (Canberra: 
Printed privately, 1983), 49–51.
78  Ward, Australia and the British Embrace, 36–8.
79  ‘Speech by McEwen to House of Representatives, 28 February 1956’, NAA: A5954, 64/1.
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a  robust economy with employment opportunities to entice migrants 
who, in turn, would service Australia’s emerging defence goods industry 
and could be called on to defend the nation in the event of another war.80 
Frederick Shedden, the influential Secretary of Defence, shared this view, 
writing in a private letter to McEwen that 
immigration is a long-term defence measure … our Immigration 
Policy makes considerable demands for imports of both capital and 
consumption goods, but to keep this going we must export more 
to balance overseas expenditure with export earnings. A further 
aid would be greater investment from overseas in Australia.81 
Shedden had been privately contacting official and business acquaintances 
in Britain, sending them copies of McEwen’s statements regarding 
Australia’s trade problem in the hope that he could impress on them the 
important link between Australian trade, immigration and defence.82 
Facing a difficult situation, the Menzies government could not afford to 
ignore any opportunity for export development.
As McEwen detailed in a number of Cabinet submissions concerning 
the Ottawa problem, there were considerable opportunities in a number 
of foreign markets. To capitalise on these opportunities, it was necessary 
for Australia to offer ‘both good customer and good supplier countries 
a fairer share of our expanding market’, with McEwen noting that some 
countries had already begun pressuring Australia to improve its imports. 
However, the ambit of preferences Australia was required to grant under 
the existing Ottawa system left the nation with little scope to offer other 
countries greater access to its markets.83 Accordingly, among the main 
provisions secured in the new Ottawa Agreement was the reduction of 
the preference margin afforded to British exports, from between 12.5 and 
17.5 per cent to 7–10 per cent.84 This provision preserved the traditional 
imperial preference system while reducing margins enough to allow 
Australia greater freedom to negotiate a better position in multilateral and 
80  Lee, Search for Security, 155; Golding, Black Jack McEwen, 166–7; Crawford, Australian Trade 
Policy, 353.
81  ‘Personal, Shedden to McEwen, 9 March 1956’ and ‘Personal, Shedden to McEwen, 26 April 
1956’, both in NAA: A5954, 64/1.
82  ‘Personal, Shedden to McEwen, 9 March 1956’, NAA: A5954, 64/1.
83  ‘Cabinet Submission by McEwen, 16 April 1956’ and ‘Cabinet Submission by McEwen, 7 May 
1956’, both in NAA: M58, 219 Part 2.
84  Golding, Black Jack McEwen, 175–8; Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 19–25.
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bilateral trade relationships. In this, there was a recognition that the days 
of the closed and economically integrated Commonwealth were coming 
to an end. 
McEwen acknowledged the broader implications of the reappraisal of the 
Ottawa Agreements. In a May Cabinet submission, he observed: ‘I am 
not unmindful of the fact that our trading relationship with the United 
Kingdom is so great that any substantial proposals on it can impinge on 
wider issues of high policy.’85 The British government, too, appreciated 
the divergence of Australian and British economic interests that had been 
brought to light by the renewal of the Ottawa system. Harold Macmillan, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, concluded: 
Australia’s changed attitude to the preference system reflected 
the fact the United Kingdom was no longer able to fulfil her 
traditional role of providing the capital needed for the industrial 
development of the Commonwealth … It would now be necessary 
… to re-examine, in light of the Australian attitude, the relative 
importance and future prospects of our trade with Australia 
and the Commonwealth, and with Europe and other overseas 
markets.86
Imperial sentiment could no longer outweigh national development needs. 
Crawford, who was involved in the renegotiation process, later stated as 
much: ‘Britain was a declining rather than a growing market’, necessitating 
‘a retreat from the political concept of an integrated Empire’.87
Turning points: Malayan independence, 
the Suez Crisis and equipping the 
Australian defence forces
As Australia acknowledged the limitations of the British market, so, too, 
did the limitations of Britain’s global power become apparent. The year 
1956 opened with the British government’s announcement that Malaya 
would be granted independence, with 31 August 1957 the target date 
for elections and the handing over of control. With the recent decision 
85  ‘Cabinet Submission by McEwen, 7 May 1956’, NAA: M58, 219 Part 2.
86  ‘Cabinet Minute, 12 July 1956’, in Records of the Cabinet Office, Cabinet: Minutes (CM and 
CC Series), TNA: CAB 128/30/49.
87  Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 319–20.
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to recast the FESR as part of a broader contribution to SEATO and the 
defence of the whole of South-East Asia, the Australian government was 
most concerned by the possibility that it would be unable to maintain 
these forces in Malaya following independence.88 These concerns triggered 
British–Malayan defence discussions and the eventual signing of the 
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA, signed in October 1957). 
Britain reserved the right to maintain forces in Malaya after independence 
and to use and reinforce these forces to counter regional threats, subject 
to consultation with and the approval of the Malayan government. 
The FESR, including Australian and New Zealand commitments, was 
explicitly named in AMDA among the forces permitted to be maintained 
in Malaya.89 There remained the symbolic implication of Britain ceding 
control to one of its few remaining footholds in the Pacific, giving way to 
suspicions in Australian government circles that Malayan independence 
marked Britain’s retreat from the region.90
The year closed with the Suez Crisis. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and 
the immediate seizure of control from the Suez Canal Company. Egyptian 
forces occupied the canal, the Suez Canal Company’s assets were frozen 
and the canal was closed to some foreign shipping. With private French 
and British nationals making up most company shareholders, it was in 
the two nations’ interest to maintain private ownership and unrestricted 
access to the canal. The two governments approached Israel, which had 
been denied access to the waterway, and conspired with it to regain 
control of the canal. When Israel invaded Egypt in October, France and 
Britain responded with a military intervention, which was framed as 
a mediation force between the two combatants. Australia supported the 
military intervention in Egypt—a move one historian describes as ‘blind 
88  Edwards and Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 188–92; ‘Cabinet Minute, 16 January 1956’, 
NAA: A4940, C1473 Part 1.
89  ‘“The Future of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in relation to the Malayan Defence 
Agreement”, Cabinet Submission by Casey and Beale (Acting Minister for Defence), [n.d. (June 1957)]’ 
and ‘“A Defence Appreciation on the Future of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in relation to the 
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90  Wayne Reynolds, ‘Menzies and the Proposal for Nuclear Weapons’, in Menzies in War and Peace, 
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loyalty’ to Britain—but it was one of only a handful of countries, with the 
UN Security Council deeming the action unwarranted and demanding 
the withdrawal of forces.91 
The Suez Crisis not only damaged Britain’s international prestige, but 
also revealed the nation’s economic vulnerability. Britain relied on the 
canal for access to oil, and the high cost of oil elsewhere and stockholder 
speculation triggered a plummet in Sterling Area foreign currency 
reserves.92 The British government sought financial assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to fortify the sterling. The 
US government—the largest single donor to the fund—feared Soviet 
intervention if the situation in Egypt continued and informed Britain 
that it would categorically block any attempts to seek assistance from the 
IMF for the purpose of maintaining forces in Egypt.93 Facing a financial 
crisis and entirely reliant on the support of the US to continue its Suez 
operations, Britain was forced to withdraw from Egypt.
From the outset, Casey had misgivings about Britain’s response to the Suez 
situation, which he freely shared with Menzies.94 Along with correctly 
predicting the international backlash Britain would face if it resorted to 
the use of force, Casey appreciated the inference of British vulnerability if 
an apparently great power had to ‘use force on a small Afro-Asian nation 
to deal with a political problem’. He continued:
The use of force in the Suez issue would be ‘life or death’ to 
Britain—and more likely death than life, by reason of the 
overwhelming volume of world opinion against her that the use of 
force would generate, which would greatly diminish her influence 
in world affairs.95 
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Casey clearly grasped Britain’s economic and defensive vulnerability 
and how the situation in Egypt would bring this into focus for an 
international audience.
Amid Malayan independence and the Suez Crisis, Australia’s defence 
policy  underwent a major review. In June 1956, Menzies travelled to 
London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. There he 
learnt that Britain’s future defence policy in the event of a global war would 
include the use of thermonuclear weapons—previously treated as weapons 
of last recourse. Global war, however, was far less likely than a  limited 
war in South-East Asia. It remained unclear what level of support Britain 
would offer in a limited war.96 Britain’s decision to focus on developing its 
massive force capabilities led to the 1957 Duncan Sandys defence white 
paper and the decision to reduce conventional forces in the Asia-Pacific 
region—seemingly confirming Australia’s fears that Britain was retreating 
from the region.97
On his trip home, Menzies visited Washington, where he pressed 
Eisenhower for details of the US policy for the use of nuclear weapons 
and other new strategic defence technologies in the event of a limited 
war in South-East Asia. New technologies like intercontinental missiles 
would be essential in maintaining Australia’s strategic isolation; however, 
as Menzies informed Eisenhower, a small country like Australia would be 
‘unable to afford these new weapons and would probably have to get along 
with conventional weapons’. Eisenhower assured Menzies that Australian 
military forces well-armed with conventional weapons would be adequate, 
believing ‘the real deterrent in the eyes of the common man is not the 
number of atomic bombs which might be stored in some unknown 
place … but rather the man in uniform who can be seen’.98 With both 
Britain and the US committed to nuclear deterrence and the expectation 
96  ‘Minutes First Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 27 June 1956’, NAA: A1838, 
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that Australia would make a meaningful contribution to the defence of 
South-East Asia, there was a clear need for the nation to  reconsider its 
strategic position.
The revelations in London and Washington triggered a Defence 
Committee review of Australian defence policy in October 1956, with 
Cabinet approving its recommendations the following February. The 
1957 Defence Review was a careful assessment of Australia’s capabilities 
and the relationships and strategies that would best serve the nation’s 
interests in the event of a limited war in South-East Asia. The review 
argued that, as a small and isolated nation, Australia was ‘dependent on 
the Western Powers, in particular the United States, for her ultimate 
security’. To achieve this security, Australia had to ‘relate’ its defence 
planning to the ‘global strategy of the Western Powers’ and seek to make 
a meaningful contribution to the implementation of this strategy. This 
approach would both contribute to the defence of the Western bloc and 
‘strengthen her case for the support of her allies’ should a direct threat 
to Australian security present itself. The review identified participation 
in regional collective security arrangements as ‘the best means’ available 
to integrate Australian defence planning into the strategy of the Western 
powers. SEATO was ‘the most important’ of the regional arrangements 
and ‘the most practicable organisation in which Australian strategic plans 
can be coordinated with those of the US’.99
The Eisenhower administration’s New Look policy towards foreign 
and defence issues shaped the United States’ approach to SEATO. The 
New Look policy reduced US defence costs by expanding the nation’s 
nuclear deterrent and reducing the size of its conventional armed forces. 
At the same time, the US encouraged its allies to build up their own 
conventional forces for local security, allowing the US to provide massive 
retaliation rather than expensive and inflexible long-term commitments. 
The core tenets of the New Look policy were promoted by the US in 
the formation of the strategic concepts for the defence of the SEATO 
area.100 Broadly outlined, the SEATO strategic concepts planned for 
an immediate response to a communist threat—likely isolated guerilla 
99  ‘“The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy”, Defence Committee report, [n.d. (October 
1956)]’, in Department of Defence: Correspondence files, multiple number series [Class 501] 
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activities. This initial phase would be followed up by ‘supporting actions’ 
to protect the lines of communication and contribute to counteroffensives 
when necessary. The nature of this warfare—liable to erupt anywhere and 
with little or no warning—and the size of the treaty area necessitated that 
SEATO members maintain highly mobile and flexible forces.101
On 4 April 1957, Menzies presented the 1957 Defence Review to the 
House of Representatives and announced his government’s decision to 
adopt its recommendations. In preparing for a limited war, the review 
recommended a move away from the traditional organisation and 
deployment of large ‘ineffective’ divisions of multipurpose forces that 
had received general training. Instead, it was recommended that Australia 
focus its efforts on the creation of ‘hard-hitting, flexible, mobile and 
readily available forces’.102 In his 4 April address, Menzies called into 
question his government’s own policy of national service, arguing that 
capability had been sacrificed to the sheer number of men trained. 
For this reason, the national service intake would be reduced from 34,000 
to 12,000 annually for the AMF, while the RAN and RAAF programs 
were terminated. Menzies, anticipating criticism, pointed out that savings 
would be diverted to the creation of a Mobile Brigade Group. The new 
group of 4,000 regular forces would be highly trained and specialised for 
immediate deployment in the event of limited war in South-East Asia. 
Able to be deployed quickly to respond to an immediate threat and, 
if need be, supported by additional forces drawn from the citizen and 
regular forces, this contingent was consistent with the strategic concepts 
for the defence of the SEATO area.103
The 1957 Defence Review identified a critical lack of modern defence 
equipment, calling for the defence forces to be rearmed ‘with the most 
modern conventional weapons available’.104 There was, as Casey noted 
in an October 1956 diary entry, ‘only one country from which we 
could get equipment of consequence … and that is the United States’. 
‘I realise,’ he continued, ‘that this means a departure from our traditional 
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standardisation with the United Kingdom—but we have to face up to 
this break sometime.’105 Menzies faced this break on 4 April, announcing 
his government’s decision to standardise AMF and RAAF equipment 
with that of the US. Preliminary plans included the local production 
of FN rifles (used by the US Army), the acquisition of 12 US C-130 
Hercules-type modern transport aircraft and the formation of Australia’s 
first surface-to-air weapons unit.106 Having traditionally cooperated with 
Britain’s defence industries, Menzies was conscious of the implications 
that US standardisation may have on the Australian–British relationship. 
The decision, he argued, was ‘not a heresy’, rather it recognised ‘the facts 
of war’. By virtue of SEATO and ANZUS, Australia would fight 
any future war in South-East Asia alongside the US. The US had the 
capacity to maintain a supply of defence goods, while Britain would find 
it ‘manifestly difficult’; although not specified, this conclusion was no 
doubt drawn as a result of the ongoing economic challenges faced by 
Britain and its embarrassing exit from Egypt.107 Britain was struggling to 
maintain a major defence role east of Suez and Australia’s reliance on the 
US increased accordingly.
Australia’s transition to the US and adherence to its global strategy were not 
inevitable. Rather, maintaining British world power via cooperation with 
the US was a priority for the Menzies government. It was only through 
a careful and forthright assessment of the capabilities and priorities of 
Britain and the US that Australian policymakers concluded that the latter 
would best serve the national interest in the future. Britain’s economic 
and defensive capabilities were unequivocally limited and it appeared to 
be retreating from South-East Asia. Conversely, the US seemed finally 
to be interested in the region and appreciative of its importance within 
global strategy. The developments covered in this chapter, particularly 
those during the years 1955–57, can be seen as a culmination of the 
lessons learnt and experimentation in foreign policy approaches in the 
previous three and a half decades as Australia made astute appreciations 
as to what the national interest was and the relationships that would best 
protect it. The final decision by Australia to realign with the US reveals 
105  ‘10 October 1956’, in Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, 247.
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a level of autonomy and forward thinking that has been underappreciated 
in existing assessments of these crucial years in the development of the 
Australian foreign policy tradition.
The year 1957 was not the end of Australian–British high-level relations, 
with the RAN operating in line with British standards until 1961 and the 
two nations cooperating in 1964–65 in the defence of the Federation of 
Malaysia in the face of Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi.108 Britain and 
the Sterling Area also remained Australia’s most significant commercial 
links into the 1960s. However, the Australian government was aware of an 
urgent need to diversify its trade relations, as the British government sought 
greater economic engagement with Western Europe via membership of 
the European Economic Community. The Australia–Japan Commerce 
Agreement, which was renewed and expanded in 1963, and a burgeoning 
commodities export trade formed the foundation of Australia’s economic 
adjustment. By 1966, the Australian dollar was introduced, signalling 
the nation’s withdrawal from the Sterling Area, and Japan had become 
Australia’s largest export market.109 In spite of these enduring links, 
developments and policy decisions made in the period 1951–57 marked 
a distinct departure from the traditional Australian–British relationship of 
patronage and protection. With this, there was the acknowledgement that 
the imperial connection could no longer provide for Australia’s material 
interests nor its defensive security.
108  Cooper, ‘At the Crossroads’, 709–10; David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the 
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The 36 years between the apparent settlement of Asia-Pacific peace and 
the assertion of US power in the region at the 1921–22 Washington Naval 
Conference and Australia’s economic and military reorientation to the US 
order in 1957 wrought immense change in the Australian government’s 
approach to regional and great-power relations. Yet, nowhere in the existing 
literature is there a comprehensive study of Australia’s policy response. 
Instead, classic works and more recent contributions alike have tended to 
dismiss the proposition that Australia had a foreign policy before 1941. 
To the extent that a distinct Australian perspective has been identified, 
it has been compartmentalised or merely gestured to. This book offers 
a reassessment of Australia’s foreign policy origins and maturation in the 
twentieth century. It identifies a marked continuity in how Australia’s 
political elite approached foreign policy over the period 1921–57. 
Policymakers were attentive to the nation’s strategic position, the changing 
international context and the forces of trade, diplomacy and defence. 
The policy that emerged in response was an integrated one that sought—
with varying levels of success—to build a system that balanced geography 
with dependency on great powers. The integrated aspects of this policy 
extended to the theoretical level, with Australian actors demonstrating 
a keen appreciation of the interrelation between trade, diplomacy and 
defence when forming policy. This book successfully demonstrates that it 
was pragmatism, rather than naive loyalty or toadying to Britain and the 
US, that drove Australia’s Asia-Pacific policy in this period.
First among its two aims, this book set out to examine the development of 
a distinct Australian approach to foreign policy. In so doing, the absolute 
importance of the interwar years has been established. Many thought 
the interwar years were a period of relative complacency as Australia 
relied uncritically on the imperial connection and new international 
arrangements to provide for its material security. By contrast, this 
study holds that it was the combined effect of economic crisis, regional 
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instability, US isolationism and, most critically, the shortcomings of the 
imperial connection during the period 1921–31 that forced on Australian 
policymakers the need to reassess relations with regional and great powers 
alike and to seek greater influence in Asia-Pacific affairs.
In focusing on how Australia navigated great-power relations and 
the systems through which they interacted with the world, this study 
challenges the ideas espoused by Hugh White and others that Australia 
has historically taken great-power protection and representation for 
granted.1 Australia’s relations with Britain and the US over the period 
1921–57 are marked by an acknowledgement among policymakers and 
intellectuals that the difference of Australia’s economic and geopolitical 
considerations from those of Britain and the US meant neither of these 
nations could necessarily be relied on to provide for Australia’s national 
interest. In response, policymakers attempted to draw attention to the 
importance of Australia’s region and tie its unique interests and material 
needs to those of the great powers.
As a small power with limited influence in international decision-
making, Australia was required to carefully assess methods for projecting 
its influence.  For instance, in the 1934 AEM and the Pacific pact 
proposals of 1935 and 1937, Latham and Prime Minister Joseph Lyons 
characterised Australian and British interests in the Asia-Pacific as 
entangled and harmonious. The hope—although not realised—was that 
the imperial framework could be employed to deliver regional security 
outcomes. Richard Casey’s activities in Washington are a particularly 
pertinent example of Australia’s pragmatic—indeed, opportunistic—
approach to great-power relations. Cognisant of Australia’s limited 
influence in high-level strategic planning, Casey employed alternative 
measures to promote common Australian–US interests. He sought to 
use the United States’ economic policy towards Japan and US–Japanese 
negotiations to underscore the Australian government’s commitment 
to a coordinated response to war in the Pacific and to prolong relative 
peace, providing vital time in which to secure a US military guarantee. 
Herein are examples of the maturation of Australia’s policy apparatus, as 
policymakers experimented with channels through which to voice their 
1  White, The China Choice, 12.
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opinion and exert influence. This study has accordingly highlighted an 
intuitive and explicitly pragmatic approach to foreign policy that has not 
previously been identified.
There was also a pragmatism in Australia’s contracting and expanding 
relationships with the US and Britain as the government carefully assessed 
which partnership would best serve its national interest. In the years 
immediately preceding the Pacific War, Australia was increasingly willing 
to challenge Britain when it was seen to threaten relations with Japan, 
including proposed economic sanctions following the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War and a partial trade embargo targeting neutral 
countries in the early months of World War II. In these instances, the 
Australian government can be seen to have made pragmatic appraisals 
of the benefits of the imperial connection and Britain’s questionable 
diplomatic approach as it related to the deteriorating situation in the Far 
East. Concurrently, the Australian government turned its attention to the 
US for defence assurances beyond the Empire. This heralded a  period 
of intense Australian–US collaboration and, on Australia’s part, strategic 
dependence. However, as the crisis years of the Pacific War passed, the 
Curtin government acknowledged the US could not be relied on to build 
a postwar order in the Asia-Pacific that was conducive to the national 
interest. The ANZAC Agreement and the Fourth Empire proposal 
signified a return to Britain and the Commonwealth connection as the 
foundational framework through which Australia would interact with 
the world in the immediate future. By 1957, the centre of gravity in 
Australian foreign policy and future planning had shifted decisively to the 
US, as the Menzies government made a series of frank assessments about 
the material value of the Commonwealth connection and Britain’s fading 
resolve and capacity to provide for its economic and defensive security.
In examining the opportunistic and pragmatic nature of Australia’s 
interactions with Britain and the US, it becomes apparent that the nation 
has not been a passive player, nor has it taken for granted that the great 
powers would provide for its security. Australia gradually developed 
and experimented with tools to project its influence in international 
affairs and carefully assessed the strategies and capabilities of the great 
powers, considering which relationship best served its trade, defence and 
diplomatic interests.
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The second aim of this book has been to highlight the absolute importance 
of trade in Australia’s foreign policy conceptualisations and approaches. 
In  integrating the themes of trade, diplomacy and defence throughout, 
this book has highlighted the value of trade as a tool of diplomacy and its 
effect on strategic decision-making. This methodology augments existing 
studies, such as Neville Meaney’s landmark 1976 volume of A History of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901–23, subtitled The Search for 
Security in the Pacific, which challenged the orthodoxy that Australia was 
without a distinct foreign policy outlook or approach yet dismissed entirely 
trade and economic policy as they related to national security. The effect 
has been to expand the historical understanding of how Australian actors 
approached foreign policy in the twentieth century.
Amid the economic and strategic uncertainty of the 1930s, regional trade 
relations provided the basis for a policy designed to expand Australia’s 
regional presence, strategically engage Japan in a bid to reduce the 
likelihood of hostilities and meet the urgent need for new export markets 
brought on by the Great Depression. This astute appreciation of the 
varied and complementary benefits to be had in increased regional trade is 
quite remarkable given the view that Australia had ‘few ideas and policies 
of its own’ and had not ‘shuffled its way into a foreign policy’ until 
1941–42.2 This book establishes that the comprehensive and integrated 
understanding of foreign policy that was institutionalised for Australia 
in 1987 was, in fact, a feature of the way Australian actors had been 
approaching policymaking from as early as the 1930s.
Australia’s postwar plans for the Asia-Pacific region drew together 
threads from interwar and wartime policy thinking. In 1943, William 
D. Forsyth of the DEA Pacific Division called attention to the need for 
a self-subsisting system that would foster political and economic stability 
in South-East Asia and the South Pacific. These economic development 
plans were in concert with Australia’s desire to see the arc of islands to 
its north developed as a defence perimeter. This regional concept went 
on to inform policymaking in the period 1946–50 as the Chifley and 
Menzies governments supported economic development in South-
East Asia and the South Pacific. As in the 1930s, regional economic 
development had the manifold goal of expanding Australia’s strategic, 
economic and diplomatic capabilities. In Australia’s process of increased 
2  Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia, 25; Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment, 18.
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regional economic engagement, there was a tacit acknowledgement that 
the British market was not without its limits and an extensive economic 
adjustment was at hand. This situation was acknowledged as early as 
1931, when the Great Depression forced on Australian policymakers the 
reality that there were limited opportunities for growth in the British 
market. Herbert Gepp subsequently explored regional opportunities on 
behalf of the Prime Minister’s Department. Two years later, the Advisory 
Committee on Eastern Trade was established, with trade commissioner 
appointments throughout the region following soon after. In 1947, with 
the British economy in crisis, economist and director-general of the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, H.C. Coombs, recommended 
the Australian government begin to cushion the effects of Britain’s waning 
economic capabilities—the principal cushion being the markets in 
Australia’s immediate region. A decade later, the Ottawa Agreements were 
renegotiated to allow foreign countries greater access to the Australian 
market—signalling that Britain, the natural market, could no longer 
meet Australia’s development needs—and the Australia–Japan Commerce 
Agreement was signed.
The period 1921–57, then, is part of a longer history of the multifaceted 
role of trade relations in Australian foreign policy and the nation’s 
economic disengagement from the British world and integration into 
its regional markets—a process that continued in Bob Hawke’s North-
East Asian ascendency and ‘enmeshment’ with Asia, the Rudd–Gillard 
governments’ rhetoric of the Asian Century and, most recently, the 
‘stepping-up’ of Australia’s engagement in the Pacific.3
Granted, Australia’s efforts were not without significant challenges 
and failures.
As global powers, the strategic outlooks of Britain and the US have 
predominated. Australia’s status as a junior and strategically dependent 
partner contributed to an expectation of commitment to the great powers’ 
world view. A tension ultimately exists when Australia’s geographical 
considerations are not served by the strategic outlooks of its security 
3  Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy: Report to the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canberra: AGPS, 1989); Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012); 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Stepping-Up Australia’s Engagement with Our Pacific 
Family’, Pacific Step-Up (Canberra: DFAT, n.d.), available from: dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/
Pages/stepping-up-australias-pacific-engagement.aspx. 
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partners. Australia did not exclusively kowtow to the directives of the great 
powers. Indeed, as this study has established, often the inadequacies of 
US and British policy were what led Australia to assume a more assertive 
posture, doggedly refusing to engage in activities it saw as threatening its 
economic and regional security. Nevertheless, there were points at which 
Australia was forced to make damaging or disappointing compromises—
most readily observed in the Trade Diversion Policy and the US only 
allowing Australia partial insight into and a limited voice in ANZUS 
and SEATO decision-making. This brings into sharp focus one of the 
dominant themes of this study and, indeed, of Australia’s foreign policy 
tradition more broadly: the liability of constructing a foreign policy within 
an asymmetrical relationship, particularly one centred on two different 
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